


JPRS-UMA-90-013

4 JUNE 1990



FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-90-013

CONTENTS

4 June 1990

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Young Military Deputies Criticize Defense Leadership [OGONEK No 9, Feb 1990]	1
History, Future Course of Political Bodies Discussed [V.V. Sklyarov, V.V. Yarmo'enko; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 5, Mar 90]	6
Writer Ponders Effects of Political Climate on Military [S. Gagarin; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 5, Mar 90]	11
Officers Discuss Multi-Party Systems in Socialist Societies [N. Meshcheryakov et al; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 7, Apr 90]	16
Turkmen Political Worker Predicts End to Political Departments [V. Mulyar; SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 9-15 Apr 90]	20
Participants' Reactions to Events of Komsomol Congress [A. Kovalev, V. Zyubin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Apr 90]	21
All-Army Komsomol Conference Forthcoming [S. Kalinin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Apr 90]	21
Turkestan MD Encouraging 'International Education' [I. Korotkikh; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Apr 90]	22
Growth of Veterans' Movement Noted [R. Shtaf; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Apr 90]	22

ARMED FORCES

Moiseyev Responds to Readers on Perestroyka in Armed Forces [M.A. Moiseyev; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 2, Feb 90]	23
Moiseyev Interviewed on 45th Anniversary of WW II Victory [M.A. Moiseyev; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 3, Feb 90]	28
Lack of Good NCO's [I. Panchenko; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 3, Feb 1990]	30
Military Deputies Interviewed on Current Problems of Armed Forces [V. Zolotukhin, N. Petrushenko, A. Tsalko; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 3, Feb 1990]	32
Report on Latvian Draft Law on Alternative Labor Service [L.L. Bartkevich; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 17 Feb 90]	40
Discussion of Latvian Draft Law on Alternative Service [LATINFORM: SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 21 Feb 90]	42
Latvian Resolution on Draft Law on Alternative Service [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 21 Feb 90]	46
Latvian Law on Alternative (Labor) Service [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 28 Mar 90]	47
Estonian Law on Labor Service [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 22 Mar 90]	50
Editor Opposes Change to Professional Armed Forces [VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 2, Feb 1990]	52
Rear Adm Kokotkin in Roundtable on Manpower, Military Reform [V. Moroz; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3 Apr 90]	53
Discussion of Future of Armed Forces: 'Professional Vs. Mercenary' [A. Turchinov; PRAVDA, 7 Apr 90]	57
Opposing Views on Professional Army Presented	59
Favoring A Professional Army [V.V. Serebryannikov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 9, May 90]	59
Also Favoring Professional Army [A.N. Antoshkin; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 9, May 90]	63
View Opposing Professional Army [V.A. Pusev; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 9, May 90]	67
Work of USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Veterans, Invalids [V. Kosarev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3 Apr 90]	70
Maj Gen Kudinov on Theft of Weapons, Materiel [I. Yesyutin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Apr 90]	72
Obituary: Lt Gen Tyulin [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Apr 90]	74

NAVAL FORCES

Thoughts on Regimen of Soviet Sailors in Foreign Ports [S. Kuzmin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Feb 90]	75
Baltic Fleet Experiments With 'Professional' Missile Boat Crew [V. Gromak; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Apr 90]	76
Experiment With 2-Year Contract Servicemen [G. Krivosheyev; IZVESTIYA, 13 Apr 90]	77

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

'Zenit' Plant in Tashkent Producing Consumer Goods [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 25 Jan 90]	79
'Command' Style Conversion May 'Deepen Economic Crisis' [A. Mukhina; POISK No 10, 8-14 Mar 90]	79
Conversion at Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant [A. Usoltsev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 20 Mar 90]	81
Centralized, Administrative Management Hinders Conversion Program [B.V. Salikhov; EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI No 4, Apr 90]	82
Maj Gen Shenin on Defense Ministry's Spring Agricultural Effort [V. Shenin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Apr 90]	88

PRE-DRAFT TRAINING AND THE DRAFT

Growth of Military-Patriotic Clubs, Associations [O. Sholmov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Apr 90]	90
---	----

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Update to British Sea Harrier [KRYLYA RODINY No 3, Mar 90]	92
New British Combat Air Support Aircraft 'SABA' [KRYLYA RODINY No 3, Mar 90]	92
Commentary on British Defense White Paper [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Apr 90]	93

Young Military Deputies Criticize Defense Leadership

90UM0573A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 9,
Feb 1990 pp 28-30

[OGONEK Roundtable consisting of Major O.A. Bochkov, subunit chief of staff, Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District; Major V.A. Yerokhin, deputy squadron commander from Kiev Military District; Colonel V.S. Smirnov, deputy unit commander from Astrakhan Oblast; Major V.N. Lopatin, political worker and head of the University of Marxism-Leninism from Vologda; Lieutenant Colonel K.A. Kharchenko, aviation regiment political section chief; Colonel A.V. Tsalko, combined unit commander; and, Major V.P. Zolotukhin, SOVETSKIY VOIN Magazine correspondent, conducted by Aleksandr Bolotin: "OGONEK Roundtable: What Kind of Army Do We Need?"]

[Text] Participants in the roundtable were Major O.A. Bochkov, subunit chief of staff, Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District; Major V.A. Yerokhin, deputy squadron commander from Kiev Military District; Colonel V.S. Smirnov, deputy unit commander from Astrakhan Oblast; Major V.N. Lopatin, political worker and head of the University of Marxism-Leninism from Vologda; Lieutenant Colonel K.A. Kharchenko, aviation regiment political section chief; Colonel A.V. Tsalko, combined unit commander; and, Major V.P. Zolotukhin, SOVETSKIY VOIN Magazine correspondent.

Our prewar and postwar generation was educated in sacred worship of the Army that had just won the Great Victory. Any man in shoulder boards looked like a hero in our eyes and for many years each of us felt not only profound respect toward people in military uniform but also instinctively saw them as protectors and saviors in life's most varied situations. Only later did we understand that everything is not so simple and that the Army, being the flesh of our society's flesh, had focused within itself a whole series of acute unresolved problems and shortcomings and that not only heroic deeds and heroism but also a mass of deeply ingrained negative phenomena are found in the sphere of Army life that were a deep dark secret hidden from the people for a long time and only glasnost, opened by the processes of perestroika, have allowed us to ponder the causes and consequences of these phenomena and that right now, as never before, the answer to the question, just what should the modern Soviet Army be, is important.

OGONEK has been conducting a discussion on military issues for a prolonged period of time. We have attempted (and henceforth will continue this) to protect servicemen who publicize illegal actions of the high military ranks above them and who have turned to us for help from the Army's totalitarian arbitrariness; we have printed Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev's Open Letter to the Editor of the Magazine and the editorial commentary to this letter on our pages and we have published Academician Georgiy Arbatov's comments "An Army for the Country or a

Country for the Army?". And recently a group of officers—USSR People's Deputies—visited the editorial offices and sat around the roundtable to discuss certain concepts that, in their opinion, require urgent military reform.

[Bolotin] There is no arguing: Each state has the right to military secrets. But how many times, while turning to a military theme, have we journalists experienced truly universal torment for we have found ourselves in a thick fog of total secrecy [surrounding] all aspects of Army life. In your opinion, do we have the opportunity to remove a portion of these unneeded barriers to the press and to grant the press free access to those complex processes that are occurring right now in the Army without damaging military policy or military doctrine?

[Tsalko] I am sick and tired of the assertion widely circulated by the leaders of the military department that the press not only is not objective but is first of all not qualified to cover some aspects of Army life and that the mass media is guilty for nearly all of the Army's troubles. Whether you want to or not, you need to recall that well-known saying: Do not lay the blame at someone else's door.... But for whom is it now a secret that the Army is infected by those same social diseases from which all of our society suffers. It is another matter that criticism of negative phenomena to a certain degree wounds Army leaders who absolutely equate themselves with the entire Army. That is why there is such a stubborn desire not to let the world know about the Army's internal problems and to hide from the broad masses everything that is occurring behind the fences of military units and also in the offices of the Ministry of Defense itself.

[Zolotukhin] Accusations against the press of attacks against the Army are becoming increasingly official in nature. For example, a memorandum of two Central Committee Departments—the State and Legal Department and the Ideological Department—was published in IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS [CPSU Central Committee News] No. 1 1990 in which a number of publications, also including OGONEK, were subjected to criticism for allegedly biased coverage of life in the Armed Forces of the USSR. Its authors are silent about what this bias consists of. Then no one can write in a critical tone about a military censor whose prohibitive frenzy at times reaches the point of being a curiosity. We Army newspaper journalists suffer the most from it. For example, there is an officially approved list of restrictions including the fact that we cannot show more than one case of violation of military discipline in a single newspaper article. We cannot specifically write about cases of relations at variance with regulations and that means that a serious analysis of this problem is impossible. We have to resort to Aesopian language: They say Private Petrov was not very polite to Private Sidorov as a result of which the latter ended up in the hospital with a fractured jaw. Or restrictions when describing cases of alcoholic beverage consumption in military units. Here there can also be only one last name although it is well

known that, as a rule, a Russian man does not drink alone. All of this causes our readers to laugh and mistrust the objectivity of the information. However, laughter among the troops is not a rarity right now. But, tell me, how can an otherwise normal man react to the order that is never given to submit the [subunit] roll since communists, Komsomol members, and political workers have been restructured so much in some subunit? And why have the others not been restructured?

[Bolotin] I also recall something similar from my own experience. An episode figured into one of the essays written about two years ago where the garrison commander, a lieutenant colonel, about whose high-handedness legends circulated, slapped the faces of two young lieutenants and they stood at the position of attention, pale, with tears in their eyes, and just persistently repeating the same thing: "We will complain, comrade lieutenant colonel." I must admit I was stunned when high-ranking generals from the General Staff told me in total seriousness that such a thing could not be in the Soviet Army but I had not invented it, I had not dreamt it up, and I had seen it all with my own eyes. This episode was mercilessly crossed out by a military censor. At that time I thought that a double [standard of] morality exists here—[one for] those who rule absolutely and [another for] those who are absolutely subordinate. And the gap between the one and the other is enormous.

[Lopatin] In due course, a USSR Minister of Defense letter—a sort of appeal to pay attention to subordinates, to manifest concern about them, etc.—was circulated. But it was a dead document. First of all, it was not fortified by specific statutes and, second, it was obvious the people who compiled it were poorly acquainted with the very fine nuances of Army life. Yes, a gap undoubtedly exists between leaders of the highest military echelon and the individual executing the order. Take just the age of our main Army leaders. Of thirty deputy ministers of defense, only one is less than 60 years old and 11 are over 66 years old. For example, they are more than 30 years older than me—this is already two different generations. Many of them assumed these positions during the most stagnant years when protectionism and nepotism flourished in the Army as nowhere else. There is this sad anecdote: Why can a general's son not become a marshal? Well, because the marshal has his own son. Yes, this is sad but it is a reality. Add the table of ranks with the exclusive differentiation in privileges here. This has already become a state misfortune when even a normal good man, having received a high position, a soft chair, broad stripes [on the sides of his trousers], and sated with food frequently becomes different.

And yet if we look deeper, to the root, the main cause that explains this gap is something else in my opinion. In our environment, they say that a smart, thinking officer, who has his opinion and knows how to defend it, is unlikely to break through to the high commanders. The system for forming generals is a sensitive barometer for measuring "comfortable" people who are capable of

blindly obeying and reasoning along those same categories as the higher leadership. In short, this system permits only people similar to themselves into it and buys them lock, stock, and barrel. Of course, other spheres of society also suffer from this disease but the Army personnel training and education system is distinguished by its particular conservatism and a sufficiently powerful personality suppression mechanism has developed here. Therefore, we are insisting on democratization of the entire military structure of society in our proposed reforms in accordance with the principles of the rule-of-law state and the standards of international law.

[Tsalko] I recall the All-Army Officers Assembly that took place during December 1989 at the Central Theater of the Soviet Army. It was prepared in the spirit of the good old traditions: They carefully selected and instructed the delegates and did everything so that the real leaders of military garrisons who express the opinion of the majority did not end up in Moscow. On the eve of the assembly, the officers were issued credentials and valuable gifts and were promoted to the next rank ahead of time—they were generally won over. Naturally, there was an appropriate atmosphere in the hall. They placed those who think differently, the most aggressive portion of the delegates, in the balcony from which they removed all microphones. Groups of sycophants in military uniforms who were seated in various sections of the hall created noise—in this manner, pressure was exerted on us from above and from below. We heard all kinds of shouts! Demands were heard to remove [people] from positions and to discharge them from the Armed Forces.... They accused me of being an enemy of the Soviet Army and they proposed taking away the Party membership card of Colonel Martirosyan who came out onto the rostrum to speak on military reform. Minister of Defense, General of the Army D.T. Yazov, while surrounded by a crowd of people, issued an order for all to hear: "And you, Comrade Lopatin, sit down, here you are not at the Supreme Soviet...."

[Kharchenko] No matter what the leaders want, today the bitter truth about the Army is being wrested from the shackles of secrecy. And we people's deputies know the mood of officer personnel and we know that tens of thousands of homeless officers exist, that thousands of reports from young officers requesting release from the Armed Forces are laid on desks everyday, and we also have information that the monetary income of a member of a serviceman's family is 40-50 percent lower than that of a family member, say, of an average worker throughout the country. And how much else is still closed to the truth for now....

The idea of the rebirth of officers assemblies as it was in the old Russian Army is wonderful in and of itself since there is a noble meaning to it that harnesses an enormous work potential to improve the Army environment. Unfortunately, all of these noble wishes are reduced to naught by the inability of individual leaders from among the highest military ranks to speak with subordinates on an equal footing. Selection of the chairman of the

officers assembly by secret ballot and broadening his jurisdiction and functions could become the main thing in this idea. And what did in fact result? A minister of defense order established the officers assembly, all officers have been declared to be members of it, and the unit commander has been declared to be its chairman. Everything is being done based on orders from above and this assembly operates within the framework of old structures. We can call it Party, Komsomol, whatever we want to, but only not officers in that sense in which it came into being long ago. If you like, this is a graphic illustration of adapting the old system to new conditions and of the spasms of power that are attempting to hammer old content into new forms. The results of the All-Army Officers Assembly are also characteristic. There are very many beautiful words but, in essence, nothing in the Address they adopted. The report is window-dressing and nothing more.

[Lopatin] One more interesting trend is being seen right now. While attempting to preserve their reputation at all costs and while maintaining a bold front, a portion of the Armed Forces high command staff is attempting to ideologize the concept of the impossibility of transferring the Army to the course of ordinary democratic changes. What is the cost of the speech at the All-Army [Officers] Assembly by Military Commentator Karem Rash (OGONEK wrote about him recently), one of the defenders of this ideology, who with devil-may-care honesty compared officers with pedigreed dogs since, in contrast to mongrels, only pedigreed dogs can live in accordance with regulations, so take pride in this, comrades, and do not stick out your nose. Do not get it into your head to criticize your commander because only a stooge or riffraff can stoop to such criticism but a real soldier or citizen would never subject to doubt the appropriateness of his commander's or leader's actions. Everything has been turned upside down and it seems that a subordinate's servile psychology is the guarantee of confirmation of order. Here is the department's transparent appeal to forget about honor and dignity, to tighten our belts a bit more, and to trim [our hair] using the same comb....

[Smirnov] As a rule, A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate, answers the question: "Why is the release of young officers from the Army attaining such massive proportions right now?" by saying that present young people are afraid of the difficulties, rigors, and deprivations associated with military service. I do not know how sincere he was in his answer but the general of the army really does not understand that people in shoulder boards are waking up from stagnant passiveness and, like representatives of other social strata of society, are beginning to think about the solidity of other "unwavering postulates," they are seeing things clearly and are becoming disillusioned since the ideal created in their youthful imagination of the highly educated, intelligent, spiritually and physically developed defender of the Homeland is entering into grim contradiction with reality.

The "mechanism of non-freedom" that has become the lot of our Army is an inheritance from the totalitarian regime and the administrative-command system that replaced it as a result. The principle of dependence has been clearly unleashed in it: An officer will get nowhere for 25 years and you can force him to do whatever you want. If you want to advance in the service, if you want to attain rank, position, an apartment—subordinate yourself absolutely.... Remember the manual—Paragraph one: The commander is always right. Paragraph two: If the commander is wrong, refer to paragraph one. As a result, strong pro-Stalinist moods exist in the Army until the present time and jargon is used in political classes when speaking about the cult of personality and the vast scale of repression associated with it. The aura of Stalinism impregnated by a spirit of repression, fear, and violence crowns the sinister profile of relations at variance with regulations like a nimbus. All informal power is given to the "grandfathers," be they senior sergeants or generals. The most horrible thing is that soldiers frankly state: If there was no "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts], the Army would fall apart. Here there are no relations between people with their concerns and interests, there are only relations between commanders and subordinates. And the main thing is that a mechanism of reliable control over the Armed Forces is absent. We can address an issue to any echelon—to the Politburo, Council of Ministers, or to the Supreme Soviet and the identical resolution will follow: "Comrade Yazov. Look into this."

We deputies pinned great hopes on the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense Issues and State Security. But for the time being it has not justified our expectations. Manned to a significant degree by representatives of the Ministry of Defense leadership and arms industry, the Committee first of all protects the interests of these departments. At one of the meetings, we attempted to convince the members of the Supreme Soviet of the need to place middle echelon officers into this organ if only to control to some degree the expenditure of the people's money on military needs but we did not receive any support. Once again that same barrier of secrecy that does not permit us to see what is being constructed behind the high fence—a military facility or a dacha costing hundreds of thousands of rubles for a high ranking general.

[Bolotin] I have spent almost my entire life near Khamovniki—the traditional Moscow Rayon where barracks of military subunits have been deployed since time immemorial. Yes and there are two Military Academies nearby—General Staff and imeni M.V. Frunze. An oncoming crowd of officers of all ranks literally sweeps over me each day on the way to work in which the faces of generals with birth dates much earlier than the postwar years flash by. I personally like these people in principle. But how do you avoid the sensation of an avalanche advancing toward you and how do you not think about how much it costs the State to support this gigantic military machine? The excess of military might,

moreover under conditions of the new approaches to foreign policy, weighs heavily like an inordinate burden on the taxpayers' shoulders and it is criminal right now, under conditions of serious inflation, to purposely avoid seeing reduction of military appropriations, if not as a panacea from all troubles, then certainly as a real and possible reserve to correct our economy's totally distorted backbone.

[Yerokhin] You had to see how stubbornly the department rubs the tarnished copper of its prestige. And alas, at the same time, it is not always using pure methods. At the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies, we along with some scholars presented a draft military reform concept. Signed by 20 military deputies, it was turned in to the secretariat and, in accordance with the approved rules, should have been disseminated as an official document. Later something occurred that is not altogether understandable. The document disappeared. After our numerous attacks against the secretariat, they told us: Comrades, your program has been studied but we have a recommendation not to publish or disseminate it. We still managed to get a meeting with Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. He supported us and publicly proclaimed that there are interesting ideas in the military reform concept and that today it is necessary to listen to the opinions of both senior and junior [officers]. Then we received an expert assessment—a self-styled analysis of the concept performed by Ministry of Defense and General Staff research workers, among whom were philosophers, economists, sociologists, and historians. There is a conclusion in the majority of the program's provisions: We must agree. All of this instills hope.

[Lopatin] What is the main idea of the military reform concept? The draft provides for a gradual transition to a smaller professional regular Army based on voluntary entry into its ranks. Our current foreign policy position does not cause anyone to doubt the need for further Armed Forces reductions. Furthermore, lately we have noted a consistent policy to return the Soviet military contingent within the limits of the USSR's national state borders. Yes and calculations show: The qualitative level of Western countries professional armies is gaining more in comparison with ours.

[Tsalko] When we attempt to determine the status of the professional Army, we are always corrected—mercenary. But is that so? A small example: One tank costs approximately one million rubles. But who operates it? For example, I know of a case when a tank regiment came to a dead halt an hour after it left the tank park. New engines had been installed in the vehicles and young inexperienced and, the main thing as it turned out, uneducated and untrained drivers ruined them. Equipment operation in the Armed Forces—is the lion's share of expenditures. In the current practice of compulsory service, a soldier receives some sort of initial professional skills only one and a half years after being drafted into the Army, but this already occurs at a time when the

"demobilization mood" prevails over him. It is impossible to talk informally about modern complex equipment. Approximately four thousand servicemen die annually due to inept handling of equipment as well as from other causes. And that is in peacetime. The conclusion of the commission that investigated the case of the Komsomolets submarine accident and loss was simple: A compulsory service soldier cannot master such equipment during such a short period of time. Data was recently published that the number of mishaps and accidents among drivers of military vehicles is two to three times higher than among civilians throughout the country.

There is another side to the coin. As a rule, our military pilots retire at 35-37 years of age and American pilots retire at 46. The fact is that [good] living and working conditions are created for them and for others. And really flying personnel preparation and training costs billions of rubles. What is more advantageous to the State: To always keep the expensive training assembly line in motion or to create conditions for an officer under which he would willingly serve until the age limit? This also certainly affects soldiers of other branches of service—tank crewmen, artillerymen, etc.

For some reason it is precisely the Army that is ignoring the economic situation in the country. For example, since January 1 1990, not only production enterprises but entire regions, territories, and republics have transitioned to cost accounting. And this means that we need to pay money for each diversion of people to military assemblies. The question is: From which pocket? The problem is transferring to the practical sphere and no solutions have been determined to resolve it. It is also impossible to rule out the demographic situation. American sociologists have calculated that, by the year 2000, half of our Army's strength will consist of residents of Central Asia and the Republics of the Transcaucasus. Is high qualitative level possible for the Army when a language barrier exists between commanders and subordinates?

While talking with soldiers, I have frequently asked them this question: What monthly salary would they calculate for voluntary service in the Army. The answers are varied—the amount, depending on branch of service, fluctuates somewhere between 300 to 500 rubles but there are also those who say that they would not want to be in a military formation for any amount of money. We also need to consider this mood if we are seriously talking about the Army's combat capability.

[Bolotin] I must confess that everything you are saying is quite beyond my understanding. Approximately a month ago, General of the Army A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, while answering questions from PRAVDA's military department, quoted V.I. Lenin, asserted that in the final analysis victory in any war is determined by the state of mind of those masses who spill their blood on the field of battle and that the formation and strengthening

of the moral political morale and spirit of the troops is not a natural process but the result of purposeful party political and political education work.... And you are talking about some sort of rubles and salaries?

[Bochkov] The establishment of the Army must be based on opinions about the nature, course, and outcome of war. What is our Army's purpose? It will hardly be able to conquer any territories or convince anyone of the superiority of the socialist system. It must be ready for defense and for no more than that. Therefore, ideological views toward the Armed Forces must also substantially change in light of the new political approaches and under conditions of a reduced military threat and a change of military doctrines and strategies. The highest elected State organs and society as a whole can provide effective leadership to the entire defense sphere only under conditions of the military department being under control with complete glasnost and the maximum possible openness [otkrytost]. After all, each citizen of the USSR must personally be interested in the quality of his Army. But, while handing over his hard-earned ruble for its maintenance needs, he must be firmly convinced that this money will be used as intended and that it is actually directed toward financing military organizational development in accordance with the level of the actual military threat and defense sufficiency. How tired we all are of empty dead declarations from which no one is hot or cold.... I am sorry but what kind of high moral and political military morale can we talk about if the issue concerns a soldier or officer tormented by "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts] and whose family is cooped up in a poorly furnished dormitory that is poorly adapted for living. How much can we confuse the issue through this loud verbal chatter!

[Tsalko] Political organs have been transformed into the Army's conservative layer that painfully clings to the spirit of old times in new conditions. They are excessively inflated—today there is one political worker for every three to four officers in a company—and they are also formed according to principles that are quite divorced from modern democratic realities. Life suggests that the political directorate must relinquish its exclusive right to be the unconditional leader and controller of Army life. We need to fight for the right to the people's recognition and revival of authority and prestige. The optimal variant that is prompted by the times is the need to decisively reduce the number of political organs and their staffs, legitimize their selection from top to bottom, and reorient all work toward elevating the personality of the soldier and his social protection.

[Bolotin] Incidentally, more about A.D. Lizichev's recent interview with PRAVDA. Let us carefully and thoroughly read that portion where the chief of GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy] talks about political structures that exist in various armies of the world and, in particular, about the U.S. Army's entire moral and political training system, consisting first of all of services that maintain links with society and military clergymen, that affects the

formation of servicemen's morale. If these institutions are capable of humanizing the Army and changing the condition of a serviceman's personality, the conservative and closed nature of internal Army procedures and the barracks way of life, and if they can insure equal civil rights for military personnel and create specific protection mechanisms for their personalities on a voluntary service principle then, naturally, the question arises, why do we need an expensive apparatus of political workers established on a bureaucratic basis that is isolated from life and that in many ways duplicates command and headquarters echelons.

[Lopatin] No one is arguing against one-man command in the Army but, in order to sufficiently put a stop to some zealous commanders' ambitious frenzy, it must be implemented on a legal basis. Military reform also provides for a systematic review of all currently existing legislative acts, regulations, provisions, and formal instructions for the purpose of creating truly socialist democratic relations in multi-ethnic military collectives and to insure a healthy, moral, and psychological atmosphere here.

For this, we first of all need to remove the secrecy from issues of military organizational development, tell the entire truth about the state of our defenses and about what is occurring right now in the forces, and discuss the burning issues of Army life with the people. This is the main idea of perestroika. We can obtain budget appropriations for the new professional Army through significant reductions of arms, Armed Forces strength, and the number of military educational institutions. Life has demanded the development of an optimally economic military personnel training system, change of the command and control organ staff position structure, and wider employment of civilian experts in the Army. We will also be decisive in the following matters. We need to eliminate the military shadow economy and expensive privileges for highly placed commanders.

We propose gradually implementing the transition to a professional Army, beginning with the strategic nuclear missile and airborne forces (Navy and Air Force), then the ground forces and air defense. We can use forms of the territorial militia system based on DOSAAF training subunits to train reserves. The Armed Forces new organizational staff structure envisioned by reform will permit us to insure improvement of troop training to conduct combat operations, exclude their use for functions uncharacteristic to them, and eliminate military construction and railroad troops as a labor army.

The Army can no longer exist as a state within a state. All of society must be involved in its management. And the high leadership must hand over this sphere to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the government. They will determine all issues of organizational development, military budget expenditures, and Armed Forces training.

We wholly support Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's opinion which he expressed in a report to the last CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The attitude of soldiers and officers toward the Soviet Army and toward the military profession must really be truthful and respectful. "But this," as he added, "does not eliminate the fact that issues of our Army's functioning must be the subject of democratic discussion within society." Officers—USSR People's Deputies—are striving for precisely this discussion.

COPYRIGHT: "Ogonek", 1990.

History, Future Course of Political Bodies Discussed

90UM0490A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 5, Mar 90 (signed to press 22 Feb 90) pp 26-33

[Joint article, published under the heading "Theory and Practice: Reflections Before the Congress," by Cols V.V. Sklyarov and V.V. Yarmolenko: "The Time of Dilettantes Is Over...."]

[Text] The polemics over the advisability of centralized leadership over the political bodies at the beginning of the 1920s, the Stalinist period of curtailing democratic principles in party work, the "drifting" toward an administrative-pressure style in the period of stagnation and the return to political methods of leadership.... The journal editors have asked Candidates of Historical Sciences, Cols Viktor Vasilyevich Sklyarov and Vladimir Vasilyevich Yarmolenko to voice their opinions on just how all of this has told and does tell on the building of the political bodies, their work, and the mistakes and lessons of the path traveled.

[Col V. Yarmolenko] In the general flow of the debate concerning the party and the ways of restoring its Leninist basis, at present they are widely discussing the problems concerning the renewal of the style and methods of work by the Army and Navy political bodies as the leading party bodies in the Armed Forces. Certainly everyone has already recognized that renewal is essential and that the broadening process of democratizing army life makes it simply impossible to maintain the previous strong-arm methods and administrative pressure in party political work. However, in the general range of opinion one can see various approaches, from the very moderate with a mere face-lift for the decrepit facade and giving a democratic appearance to the former methods, to the extremes of abandoning the political bodies totally having reassigned their functions to elective party bodies and a very small category of officers who would be concerned purely with educational work. Need one go to such extremes?

[Col V. Sklyarov] History has already shown repeatedly that the supporters of abrupt measures have rarely assembled a majority under their banner. This is all the more impossible now when the processes of democratization and glasnost are gaining more and more strength

in society, including in our army milieu. Even the categorical judgments with which it is impossible to agree to some measure help shed light on the reasons for that dissatisfaction with the style of work of the political bodies and which is observed among their workers as well as among many ordinary communists. You will agree that criticism of the party-political apparatus and at times the sharply negative attitude toward it are not without grounds. Here one must put both the loss in certain stages of the democratic traditions in the work with the communists and all the servicemen and abuses on the basis of the hardening of a strong-arm style and which to a certain degree has rested on the granting of administrative-executive functions to the political bodies and the inability of a portion of the workers from the apparatus to establish proper relations with the commanders and primary party organizations. Not to consider these factors would be wrong.

On the other hand, I have repeatedly had to debate the supporters of so-called "extreme" views and who assert that the political bodies have long outlived themselves. And I have inevitably been convinced that either my opponents were not familiar with the history of party construction or relied solely on their own personal experience, extending the insult of one specific bureaucrat from the party political apparatus (and unfortunately we have a number of these) to all the political bodies as a whole.

[Col V. Yarmolenko] Possibly it is not worth so harshly judging the position of those from whom such appeals derive or seeing an evil intent in them. Destructive ideas have always attracted a certain portion of the politically unlettered persons in their seeming revolutionariness. But I agree fully with you that historical experience cannot be their ally in this. I propose that there is a need to speak in greater detail about this, for a view of history is always instructive.

From the moment of the birth of the Armed Forces, one can trace attempts to find the most effective organizational form of party leadership in the Army and Navy. V.I. Lenin and the party Central Committee were constantly concerned with this problem, relying on revolutionary experience and encouraging in every possible way the initiative of the army communists.

In the summer of 1918 on the fronts of the Civil War, almost simultaneously elective divisional and army party committees arose as the leading party bodies and these were a carbon copy of the existing system of local territorial party organizations and the appointed political departments as the administrative-political apparatus of the military commissars. As new armies and divisions were constituted, the role of the political bodies grew continuously and their activities assumed an ever-more diverse nature. From purely administrative activities the political bodies moved to extensive political work in the troops. Life itself and the realities of the

combat situation forced a review of the tasks and a broadening of the zone of influence of the political departments.

Although the political bodies and the troop party committees endeavored to delimit the spheres of their activity, this was only poorly realized. The parallelism inevitable in such a situation arose and from the top to the bottom there flowed orders which at times were mutually exclusive. But the political bodies were more adapted to actions in a rapidly changing situation of continuous fighting and responded more effectively to the changes in it. The Member of the 2d Army RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] S.I. Gusev pointed out that as the army grew and became stronger, the superfluous of leadership over party work in the army in the field by the army party committee became more and more apparent. The link of the army and regimental committees, he wrote, had become haphazard and leadership over their work was nullified.

The Central Committee, having carefully analyzed the experience of party construction in the operational army, on 25 October 1918, officially established the political departments as the leading party bodies and abolished the party committees in the army and divisional echelon. The 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress in March 1919, upon the proposal of V.I. Lenin, adopted a decision to abolish the All-Russian Bureau of Political Commissars and establish the political department of the Republic RVS. This completed the creation of a centralized system of political bodies.

[Col V. Sklyarov] All the same, it makes sense to more clearly state why the political bodies gained recognition as the most efficient organizational form of party leadership in the Army and Navy. At present, it is fashionable to voice doubt as to the advisability of various decisions taken in the past. The questions of the organizational development of the Armed Forces are no exception.

[Col V. Yarmolenko] Let me establish three factors. First of all, the political bodies successfully combined, and I should say very successfully combined, in their daily activities centralism and democracy of leadership and party and military-administrative functions with an indisputable priority for the former. More flexibly and efficiently than the army and divisional party committees, they resolved a broad range of questions.

In addition, they were staffed with professional workers capable of competently carrying out party organizational and ideological work.

Finally, the enormous authority of the political bodies of those times became established in the masses of soldiers because the traditions of the Bolsheviks were fully apparent in their work. These traditions included loyalty to the ideas of the revolution, a close link with the people, iron discipline, professionalism and efficiency.

The general conclusion is that the political bodies most fully met the demands and specific features of the military organization. This, incidentally, was Lenin's idea. He emphasized that the successful development of a socialist army is the result of the fact that political departments worked more widely in the military area. I would like also to quote the words of M.V. Frunze who with every desire could scarcely be suspected of exaggeration. He wrote: "Who introduced elements of order and discipline into the ranks of our Red regiments which were organized to the roar of cannon rounds? Who during the hours of failure and defeat supported the courage and good cheer of the men and injected new energy into their shaken ranks? Who organized the army rear, instilled Soviet power there and established Soviet order, thereby providing the rapid and successful advance of our armies? Who by their tenacity and hard work shattered the ranks of the army, disrupted its rear services and thereby prepared for the coming successes?"

"This was done by the political bodies of the army and done, it must be said, brilliantly."

[Col V. Sklyarov] At the same time, it is known that after the Civil War, opinions were repeatedly voiced that the political bodies were extraordinary institutions needed only in the time of war and unacceptable under peacetime conditions. This thesis has been strongly exploited by the current supporters of their elimination.

[Col V. Yarmolenko] Actually, attacks on the political bodies did not begin today. After the Civil War and with the transition to peacetime construction, the question of the organizational forms of party construction, including the necessity and role of political bodies, assumed a very acute, debated nature. In the words of the Chief of the RKKA PU [Worker-Peasant Red Army Political Directorate] A. Bubnov, during the period from the end of 1920 to the beginning of 1924, three attacks were initiated against the political bodies.

Various proposals were put forward: abolish the political bodies generally, convert to their electing, subordinate them to the party commissions, deprive the political bodies of party functions and convert them to cultural-educational institutions. Trotsky at the end of 1920 at the All-Russian Conference of Red Army and Navy Political Workers advanced the idea of eliminating the PUR [Political Directorate of the RVS] and turn over its functions to the local party bodies. As a whole, the question of the political bodies and their role and powers at that time was very acute.

[Col V. Sklyarov] Here it is important to clarify the position held by the RKP(b) Central Committee on these questions.

[Col V. Yarmolenko] I will refer to just two documents. The Tenth RKP(b) Congress decided "to maintain the political apparatus in the form as it has developed over the three years of the war..." having rejected any alternatives. In relying on the Congress decisions, the party Central Committee subsequently acted decisively

against any attempts to play down the Army and Navy political bodies. The Decree of the Central Committee Orgburo [Organizational Buro] of 11 August 1924 emphasized: "The Central Committee cautions the military political bodies and local party organizations against attempts noted in certain organizations to narrow the role and importance of the military political bodies or even more their direct replacement in the question of leadership over political work and the party committee."

Moreover, I would like immediately to sweep away possible doubts that such decisions were imposed from above. At this time in the army party cells, there was an extensive debate of the further fate of the political bodies. The decisions of the congress and the party Central Committee were based largely on the results of this. So a majority of the communists decisively favored the keeping of the political departments. The arguments given were: a mechanical shifting of the forms of work of the local party organizations into the army without considering the specific features of the army inevitably would lead to a weakening of party leadership and reduce the influence of the army party organizations on the quality of the training and educational process; the replacing of the political bodies or the narrowing of their role was fraught with serious consequences for the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, as these would entail a weakening of political education work in the troop collectives.

[Col V. Sklyarov] Later, incidentally, certain steps were also undertaken which would limit the range of the influence of the political bodies. But these were not lasting. In 1940, if you recall, the political departments were reorganized into political propaganda bodies. Their activities were restricted solely to the sphere of ideological work. However, during the first months of the Great Patriotic War it became obvious that a serious mistake had been made. We were simply forced to return to their former status of—and let me stress this word—political bodies, that is, those combining administrative functions and the functions of propaganda and agitation and party leadership.

Let us also recall the first half of the 1950s and the policy carried out vis-a-vis the political bodies by the then Minister of Defense, MSU G.K. Zhukov. At present, it is not considered correct to criticize this outstanding military leader of the Great Patriotic War. But if we wish to be objective in treating history, then let us be consistent in everything. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum held on 29 October 1957 pointed out that G.K. Zhukov had violated the Leninist, party principles of leadership over the Armed Forces and had carried out a line of curtailing the work of the party organizations, political bodies and military councils and of eliminating the leadership and control over the Army and Navy by the party, its Central Committee and the government.

In one of the archives I happened to run across a verbatim record of a speech by the then chief of the

Political Directorate of the Interior Troop: at a meeting of the party aktiv. I would like to quote certain ideas in it: "Having implemented a number of organizational measures in a spirit of the order of the USSR minister of defense, we have abolished the sections of party organizational work and the sections of propaganda and agitation in the political departments of the formations and the position of the full-time secretary of the party buros in the individual battalions, and have disbanded the military political schools. As a result, the troops have been put in an exceptionally difficult situation in terms of the cadres of the political personnel and this cannot help but tell on the overall state of party political work. One of the negative consequences from weakening the role and influence of the political bodies has been to reduce the activeness of the party organizations...."

[Col V. Yarmolenko] Nevertheless, the lesson, as they say, would come in handy in the future. In the 1960s, many political bodies were replaced by party committees. At that time, I had just graduated from school. I remember well what chaos reigned in the organization of party political work. The political departments were to be broken up but it was not precisely determined who would perform their functions. The party committees out of inertia were basically concerned with internal party work and had a very slight impact on discipline and combat training. The result was well known. In 1967, the CPSU Central Committee was forced to adopt the well-known decree "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy." In accord with its demands, practical organizational measures were implemented to improve the structure of the political bodies and party organizations.

[Col V. Sklyarov] All the same, I would not assert so categorically that the replacing of the political bodies with party committees led solely to negative consequences. With the creation of the party committees, there was a sharp rise, for example, in the number of communists involved in party work through various commissions which were set up under them on volunteer bases, the circle of the party aktiv was broadened, and the role of the party organizations was increased in settling cadre questions and the entire range of questions imposed on the troop collectives.

Although, of course, the pluses were much fewer than the minuses. In my view, the advantages of the political bodies over the party committees was that here the personnel was engaged professionally in political work, they had experience and knowledge for all-round influencing of army life and at the same time possessed a number of opportunities to protect the servicemen from social injustice and hold a high-handed leader responsible....

But what happens if we imagine a combat situation. Would it be possible for a party committee, without having administrative-executive authority, to act decisively and efficiently in a combat situation? I feel that it could not. It is a collective, elective body and naturally

the secretary has not been granted those powers which have been given to the chief of a political body as a deputy commander for political affairs. It seems to me an impossible matter to even assemble the party committee quickly and at any time. And if one grants the secretary the rights of a political department chief, then the discussion of abolishing political bodies loses any sense.

As for the main argument, I have already made it, in discussing the 1920s, but I will repeat it again. The time of dilettantes is over, including in party political work. At present in the troop collectives, as in society as a whole, a very difficult ideological situation has arisen, while interethnic relations and social problems have become exacerbated. A professional political worker is simply indispensable. And the presence of political bodies precisely ensures the high professionalism of the party political apparatus and hence the necessary level of influence on the personnel. How is this achieved? Primarily by the stability of the nomenklatura of their regular officials.

I realize that this sounds out of place in the period of the "total" criticism of the apparatus. But let us be realists. If we eliminate the political bodies, we must hence eliminate the entire system of training the political cadres, the network of military political schools which have come into being up to the present and, as experience has shown, have basically proven effective.

Let us imagine that the political bodies have been abolished. In this instance whom will the VUZes train? The party committee secretaries? Certainly this is an elective position. Where is the guarantee that the graduates, for instance, of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin will be elected to this position? There is none. This, incidentally, is an answer for those who propose converting to the electing of political workers on the regimental level downwards.

[Col V. Yarmolenko] Possibly I am exaggerating, but doesn't it seem to you that underestimating the role of the political bodies and the party political apparatus as a whole largely stems from the fact that a very significant portion of the command and engineer personnel has not completely understood the essence of one-man command on a party basis. Even in the 1920s, there was the rather acute question of the need to improve relations between the political bodies and the commanders.

[Col V. Sklyarov] As far as I know, these problems have existed virtually in all stages of party construction in the Armed Forces. Even now, they have not been completely eliminated from the agenda.

For long years, military historians, and not only military ones, treated the development of one-man command in the Armed Forces as a process which as a whole developed harmoniously, without any complications. Yes, there was no antagonism but the difficulties, as they say, did occur. Primarily over the absence of a dependable mechanism for realizing those standards of the party

basis of one-man command which presupposed a close tie between the solely-responsible commander and the communists and all the servicemen, and his daily reliance on the party organization and the institutions of the soldier community.

This is confirmed by documents of the 1920s and 1930s which constantly call upon the leadership to "be permeated with an understanding of the importance of party political work," to take an active part in it and endeavor to coordinate the efforts of all the command and political cadres. Party work should be so organized, stated the Circular of the PUR of 24 December 1923, that each communist develops an awareness of responsibility primarily to the party and only then following the service hierarchy. Then we read: the abnormal relationships observed due to the difficulty of delimiting in the army the concepts of party and service discipline and stemming from this between the superiors and subordinates, the toadyism and servility should be rooted out by the most decisive measures.

However, under those conditions it was not possible to completely carry out this task. Moreover, the problem became more aggravated from the second half of the 1920s.

On 27 June 1928, the chairman of the USSR RVS in his appeal to the leadership of the RKKKA spoke about the "two currents" which could be seen in the army, "two lines." To exaggerate somewhat, he pointed out, in asking the commander how he considers the political services of the Red Army, the answer would come: Of course, political work is essential and without it the Red Army cannot exist, but it would be better to carry it out without the party political apparatus. But if you were to ask the political worker about the commanders, then after infinite compliments for them he would set out a whole arsenal of arguments of immaturity, errors and political ignorance of the commanders.

It was commonly said that only active, constant involvement of the command personnel in party political work and in the life of the party as a whole could serve as a guarantee for correct leadership over the units entrusted to it. A decree of the RVS was also adopted. It demanded an understanding by all personnel of the importance of party political work and the role of the persons and bodies carrying it out and the thwarting of any attempts to consciously curtail it.

[Col V. Yarmolenko] But certainly this was not completely carried out. Clearly the sources of these "two currents" were too deep.

[Col V. Sklyarov] The problem was that the concluding of the process of forming a party-political apparatus after the end of the Civil War was viewed by a portion of the military leadership as an opportunity to avoid party political work. That was the first thing. Secondly, the transition which started in the mid-1920s to one-man command was perceived by many as a process of granting the commander unlimited power, including in

the sphere of directing party work. This trend began to gain strength in the 1930s. The dominance of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system in the nation also left its imprint on party work in the Armed Forces. In particular, the balance of the basic principle of democratic centralism—democracy and centralism—clearly began to shift toward the latter.

[Col V. Yarmolenko] I would clarify the point that during these years the principle of democratic centralism was largely replaced by bureaucratic centralism. This happened primarily because the primary party organizations and the rank-and-file communists to a significant degree lost any real opportunity to influence party policy. The most important Leninist demand was seriously violated and according to this all party bodies and their cadres should be under the constant supervision of the party masses. Many negative phenomena in the party were also linked to the excessive rise in the role of the apparatus on all levels. In the army, due to its specific features, this process was carried out in even more rigid forms.

[Col V. Sklyarov] Naturally, under such conditions and, as you have said, with the more rigid centralism characteristic of the Armed Forces, the role of the political bodies was weakened. On 8 April 1938, at the All-Army Conference of Political Workers with the participation of the commanders, a document was adopted approved by the Main Military Council of the RKKA and supported by the party Central Committee. This stated: "The commissars of divisions and regiments, the political departments and the inferior party organizations of the RKKA do not have any serious influence on resolving pertinent party organizational questions."

[Col V. Yarmolenko] I feel, however, that such a conclusion would scarcely mean recognition of the fact that the political bodies had outlived themselves. Although one cannot help but point out that by this time they had lost in their activities much of what should be inherent to them as party leadership bodies. And it is only now that we are beginning to return to that system of democratic procedures for leadership of party political work on all levels and which had begun to develop under V.I. Lenin but had not been successful in establishing itself.

For example, at that time they regularly held all-army conferences of political workers of different categories and here they discussed the most important and often the most disputed questions. The resolutions of the conferences which accumulated collective wisdom were often approved by the USSR RVS and the RKKA Political Directorate and acquired a directive nature. It also happened that the decisions of certain conferences were discussed in the Central Committee and after this assumed the force of general party documents. In addition, under the chief of the PUR there was a permanent political conference at work.

I would like to draw attention to the following detail. A little more than a year ago, a decision was adopted that

the political bodies were to report on their work to the appropriate party conferences. Certainly this is an old tradition. Let me quote several lines from the Decree of the Central Committee of 27 June 1921: "The chiefs of the political departments and directorates are to report to the party conferences of the appropriate troop formations and the resolutions adopted on their reports are to be submitted without fail to the superior political body or to the party Central Committee." In the 1930s, however, these and other democratic methods of leading party political work were distorted and some were lost altogether.

[Col V. Sklyarov] After the 20th Party Congress and the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, attempts were made repeatedly to return to them. But, alas, many good intentions were not to be realized. The habit of rigid centralization was overcome only by great effort, many workers of the political bodies suffered from a complete lack of initiative, they did not possess the ability to make decisions independently and as before endeavored to command the party organizations and establish their relations with them according to the old scheme of "order—execution—report." Although as a whole there were changes. If one can so express it, the air of democratization had begun to blow. The personnel gained the right to voice their opinion on a series of major problems and participate not only in the execution but also in the elaboration of party decisions. You have already mentioned the well-known Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Improve Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy." It must be pointed out that for those times this was a rather bold and progressive document which outlined a whole series of measures to activate the work of the political bodies and primary party organizations. This decree, we remember, had a major impact in the troops.

However, there then followed the years of stagnation and the positive processes were gradually reduced to nothing. The correct words on closeness to the people and reliance on the collective, public opinion and supervision from below were swamped in the noisy slogans of the ensuing campaigns. Arguments about uniform party discipline for all were a screen for some and a terrible warning for others. Party comradeship was merely declared but, in fact, was replaced by a party hierarchy.

[Col V. Yarmolenko] Let us not exaggerate. What you are saying applies to far from all.

[Col V. Sklyarov] But we must not forget the lessons of the past. Too much in the work of the political bodies still needs changing including the style, methods and nature of relations with the primary organizations....

[Col V. Yarmolenko] The structure, incidentally, as well. I will not take it upon myself to judge the political directorates of the districts or the Armed Services. I will merely say that their structure has long ceased to be effective. So in the political department of a formation I would propose having the following positions: chief of

the political department, his deputy for ideological work, a senior instructor for party organizational work, a research sociologist (with a basic higher education in the area of sociology and psychology), a senior instructor for cultural educational work, and a senior chief of the political department for youth work. Such changes, in my view, will help raise the level of the political department's ideological activities and bring these closer to the specific man.

[Col V. Sklyarov] I would agree. Only, unfortunately, a change in form far from always involves a change in content. For this reason, I consider as very timely (and possibly, we are even too late) the course presently established of mastering the political methods of leadership. These are methods which presuppose the ability to carry out party policy through the communists using means of persuasion, with a reliance on democratic principles and considering public opinion and the interests of others. Finally, these are methods which pursue a scientific foundation for the decisions to be taken and which repudiate arbitrariness, incompetent intervention and discussion from the "commanding heights"....

The political bodies will be able to master them and then, I am certain, the doubts as to their necessity will disappear by themselves.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1990.

Writer Ponders Effects of Political Climate on Military

90UM0488A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 90
(signed to press 22 Feb 90) pp 3-10

[Article, published under the heading "Notes of a Political Commentator," by Stanislav Gagarin, member of the USSR Writers' Union: "Military People Are Dependable People..."]

[Text]

Defenders of the Law, Where Are You?

Certain of our political leaders, political writers and well-known persons in the nation are presently saying that "the b.s. book of 1989...was the first Congresses of the USSR People's Deputies." It undoubtedly is a figurative comparison but in no way is devoid of common sense. Certainly during the congresses there was a creative search for ways out of the crisis, the most important laws were adopted moving us along the path toward a democratic state under the law, and a clear and objective assessment was provided for certain events in the life of our nation.

But the congresses are over but the concerns are still here. And they are even growing! It seems as though a "civil war" had started in political writing. Certain mass

information media have even reached the point of "interpreting" the congress documents in their own manner.

As is known, the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies condemned both politically and morally the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979. The truth was said that this rash decision was taken actually in bypassing the law by a narrow group of persons, Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov and Gromyko. One cannot help but agree with such a conclusion by the Congress. Like all Soviet people, I wholeheartedly support it. But here let me point out what has happened after this: individual literary and artistic journals and newspapers and the informal press has intensified the pressure on the "Afghaners" [Afghan veterans], in endeavoring to defame them, to underplay the courage and heroism of these people and sow doubt in their souls, and at the same time do the same for those who will still serve in the Army and Navy. At the same time, at the Congress it was stated: "While politically and morally condemning the decision to introduce the Soviet troops...it must be stated that this in no way cast a shadow on the soldiers and officers sent into Afghanistan. Loyal to their oath and convinced that they were defending the interests of the motherland and providing friendly aid to the neighboring people, they were merely carrying out their military duty." And so the "ultraprincipled" writers, journalists and documentary filmmakers endeavor more and more often to treat this duty...solely in a negative light. Who needs this and why? Such authors themselves constantly assert that they stand above politics and are merely stating the fact. Is this the case? I do not think it is.

Once the remarkable Brazilian writer Jorge Amado was asked to answer the question: "Does he consider himself to be a political writers?"

The answer of the famous novelist, this Latin American Balzac was surprisingly concrete:

"Every writer is a politician," said the Brazilian master, "including those who think that they have no relation to politics, for literature is completely politics. A writer influences the readers and this is a political action."

One other observation which is of interest. Let us recall, respected compatriots that in the course of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, some of our representatives literally "stormed" the Congress rostrum in order to protest, to condemn and heap disdain on the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and government for using force during the events in Beijing. They literally demanded that the Congress come out with a uniform negative assessment for the development of internal processes in the sovereign, friendly state and they were indignant over the violating of human rights there. But in the course of the Second Congress, on 20 December 1989, the United States invaded the territory of the Republic of Panama. The most powerful state in the world, in violating all international law standards,

threw its supermodern mercenary army against a tiny state and caused colossal destruction. Hundreds of Panamanians were killed and wounded! Tens of thousands of people remained homeless! And what about this? Were the deputies indignant? Did they condemn the aggression? Our homegrown "humanists" were silent. They did not come up to the high forum to make their protest. So we would like to shout to some of the "representatives of the people": "Defenders of the law, where are you?"

This Unpopular Afghan War....

Yes, literature is politics. In understanding this, I welcome the creativity of writers who are convinced that they must defend the interests of Soviet power and are concerned for more closely uniting the Soviet Army with the people from whom it has always drawn and will continue to draw vital energy and creative spirit.

And since the enemies of our fatherland are so fond of drawing any sort of analogy with the West, we might recall here that, mildly speaking, unpopularity which marked the American Army after its defeat in Vietnam. It was the same thing...the liberals there tried to belittle the GI, the American soldier, in the eyes of their compatriots. They completely intimidated the American Army. But two terms in the White House were enough for Ronald Reagan to turn public opinion in favor of the army. Of course, the Pentagon was not idle either, it organized things in a scientific manner, it called in psychologists and sociologists, the mass information media, experienced journalists and, certainly, talented writers.

And again the American people are proud of their army, and they respect the defenders of the American Dream which is remote for us (the Great Rus has a different story) but sympathetic for the foreigners.

As they say, each to his own but love and respect of a people for the army are in the front row of common human values and for which the homegrown humanists push so.

Of course, no two literatures are alike. It is possible to write an anecdotal novel about Chungking, depict a construction battalion as a group of pathological renegades and represent hazing as something part of everyday life. But certain writers are wrong to assume that they are completely independent in their own views about the army itself and those who comprise it. Certainly an artist has the right to write as he wishes. Up to the point when he takes out the manuscript and presents it to the publishing house or magazine. And only then, as they say in Odessa, will they take a look.... If the story or tales contain the truth, for instance, about the same Afghanistan and our fellows who fought courageously and unstintingly in the hot mountains, at some journal they will have nothing to do with you as your works have no dirty antiarmy scum. But if there is a good deal of dirt, then certainly such a mix would bring the editor-in-chief to the desk.

I have had a look at the stories of Oleg Yermakov. The fellow fought in Afghanistan and now works as a journalist in the Smolensk area. I can say directly that he is a talented writer. I picked up a selection to read published in 1989 in the journal ZNAMYA. I was struck by the fact that the author was introduced by Grigoriy Baklanov himself. I feel there must be a reason for this.

And how! Oleg Yermakov has overemphasized the improper relations to the limit, his "Afghaners" use drugs and, as an apotheosis of moral degradation, execute unarmed dushman who have surrendered to the mercy of the victors. In a word, "super-repugnant dregs" were serving in Afghanistan. And since there were basically Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian fellows there, the impression is created that precisely these "Slavic untermensch" embodied a harsh, rough force, an evil dim-wittedness and cruelty.

And so the Slav was drawn into confrontation with his compatriots. Probably Oleg Yermakov does not even realize that he is a toy, a puppet in the hands of those politicians from literature and who is being used in the game played to fan international hostility. To the young writer it seems that he is independent, is writing the truth and only the truth. But no one has told him that you are not writing a sketch, dear Comrade Yermakov, but rather a story, an artistic work which possesses enormous psychological force. The literary image is a generalizing image and from your stories, young compatriot, the readers will judge all the Afghaners.

And for now it is flattering for him as he has been published in a thick magazine. I can imagine how this author is praised on Tverskiy Boulevard and how he is being used for the policy being organized by ZNAMYA. So now a second selection of Oleg Yermakov has appeared and now NOVYY MIR has made a fuss and also is going to publish him. A writer with a definite focus is successfully shaped.

Thus, O. Yermakov has already been harnessed to the "political yoke" so that he might show his own creative dispassionateness. Probably we are all guilty of this. How does this happen? An author has come to Tsvetnoy Boulevard or the Arbat, No 20 (the editorial offices of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA or NASH SOVREMENNİK) and there, for some reason, they did not get on with the fellow. But at "other publishing houses" the "intelligent" people have realized what was what and enticed and wooed the young man with impeccable background data.

The misfortune of young writers is they do not understand completely what forces have been aroused by perestroika. Inherent to the youth generally is the attitude of the fronde, a desire for the contradiction, and a wish to meddle where there is absolutely no need to. Initially, I was surprised: why precisely do the youth publishing houses err in leftist extremism? There is certainly the factor that at times they are directed by the covert forces of the warpers of our society and their

intrigues naturally are aimed at the youth, the hope of the fatherland and its future. But another factor is present. The years of stagnation trained the people who wished to have their say but were forced to remain silent. Now the curtains have been parted, and the uncultivated, poorly educated journalists from the young, and to them I would also add the writers, cinematographers and artists, begin to kick up their heels from the April euphoria, like calves born in the winter when they are first let out to pasture.

In the people they say that the youth is green or that it indulges in folly. This is true but we are now living at too rapid a pace to wait for our literary replacements to mature and respectively begin thinking in a dialectic manner. Alas, no moment remains for us to get into the swing of things or adapt.

Here is an example of the one-sided approach to those same Afghan events.

We were preparing an adventure story by Sergey Dyshev entitled "The Styx—River of the Dead," and it was to be published in the collection "Voyennyye priklyucheniya" [Military Adventures]. The editor, a young girl, having just begun her professional path, asked in perplexity: "In Afghanistan did they really kill only our troops? In the story there is not a single episode where the enemy suffered any losses...."

And certainly the author of the book is a military journalist. He had been present at this war more than a time or two and had participated in the fighting! How could this be?

They turned to Sergey Dyshev. "Did the enemy suffer any losses?" "Certainly it did," he replied. "Why then in the story is there not even a hint of such circumstances?" "One doesn't write about our victories in Afghanistan," replied the talented—and we certainly have no doubts of this—writer, frowning. "The war was unpopular...."

This is the sort of skewed conscience one can encounter! And certainly this is purely the political positing of the question, when they speak about the unpopularity of the war in Afghanistan. The very idea of introducing troops, of course, is wrong and unpopular, although it is well known with what joy the indigenous population of the neighboring nation initially greeted the soldiers. There is the different question of the hopeless political support for military operations. We have long needed to particularly raise this question.

Certainly the introduction of our troops could have turned out differently. And generally, subjunctive moods in politics and history are senseless. What was was. It is a question of the courage of the young soldiers of the fatherland who showed the ineradicability of the inherited spirit and who honestly carried out their military duty. About them we are obliged to tell the truth, without blackening or embellishing reality.

Recently, the adventure novel by Aleksandr Schelokov entitled "Zharkiye gory" [Hot Mountains] was published and this was first put out by the Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Here for us is a truly popular, just, professionally written story about the events in Afghanistan. I admit that I read "Zharkiye gory" in a single night. It is remarkably written, the composition is sharply focused, and the heroes and characters are so starkly depicted that you will long remember them. The sensation remains that you acquired real friends and that you could go out on reconnaissance with them, or wherever you liked.

The battalion commander Aleksandr Burlak is a true knight without fear or reproach. Yes, he is a superman but not in the Western understanding but in the human, Russian sense. One could serve under such a man confidently and calmly, if the last word is applicable to Afghan life.

The reflections of Burlak are amazing in their philosophical content, spiritual strength and particular psychological energy. It comes constantly from the battalion commander and infects everyone nearby. He says, for example, to his deputy commander for political affairs Major Poludolin: "The main thing which you and I should always remember is how to make the fellows soldiers. Beat it out of them...don't make such faces. We must beat out the idealism. Much in our fellows is dangerous and foreign. Not for society but for them themselves. Somewhere we lost the art of producing heroes."

Alas, how we have lost it.... But what do you want, dear compatriots, when nearly day after day the people's army is flooded from spigots of toxic slander, and when individual instances are inflated to universal scale. Here is a characteristic example. A group of deputies from the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet turned to the Party Central Committee with the request: what has been the reason for the death of young Lithuanians called up into the Army? The USSR Ministry of Defense explained the reasons for the death of all 90 men over the last 10 years.

And what did it turn up? There was no link to the remoteness of the areas of service and a majority perished precisely in the Baltic. The reasons were drunkenness and major violations of safety rules.

Yes, there are fatal occasions in the army. There are accidents, attacks on patrols which, incidentally, have grown more frequent in line with the increased crime rate and which has been caused by the sharply curtailed fight for sobriety. But the overall mortality rate in the army is much lower than in individual regions of the nation. Nevertheless, they continue to accuse the army of all sins and the military are called parasites, although it has long been known that "those who do not want to feed their own army will feed a foreign one." You do not wish to defend the fatherland with weapons in hand? Then it will be defended by others, but it will be your lot to immediately execute commands given in a foreign

tongue. Will such an idea be to the liking of the mothers and fathers who helped their over-aged dimwits avoid military service? Drag down, reduce and eliminate the army, and you with satisfaction will be taken under guard by mercenaries from across the sea who receive their pay in a freely convertible currency.

From the military districts it has been announced that just for the young soldiers the heart-sick parents send an average of a half-million rubles a year. Certainly they know that no one has as yet died from hunger in the army.

And so we produce "spoiled kids," time-servers, malingerers weak in soul and body. The young people lose their dignity or, more accurately, they are unable to gain it long before induction into the army. A self-respecting person would not allow himself to be turned into a "shave-tail," or having become a "senior," would not insult a junior comrade. So the roots of "hazing" must be sought not only in the army, but they were put down in the peacetime life of a young soldier.

I have often been at the border posts. There you will find real family relations. The person serving his second year is the elder brother and mentor of the first-year man. And this is found everywhere, from Brest to Bukhta Provideniya in Chukotka.

Have any of the army political workers studied this experience? I doubt it...but they should. Certainly the experience of human relations among the soldiers of Afghanistan has not been collected or generalized. And this experience is very rich and certainly there was virtually no "improper relations." Why? It is very simple. If today you make me clean your boots, tomorrow I would scarcely break a leg to protect you with my own chest against dushman bullets.

Only let us not wait, friends, until they have made up obligatory instructions for the troops. The novel by Aleksandr Schelokov will provide the army and those preparing to serve in it much more than any dry paragraph of valuable instructions.

The author has certain ideas on whether it would have been worth sending specially trained volunteers to Afghanistan. "They formed up the regiment and shouted: Volunteers, one step forward! Although we know how many of them, these young fellows, there would be in each line."

Unfortunately, volunteering alone is not enough. It is extremely essential to have a kind word about modern military heroism. Let us recall the start of the Great Patriotic War! All writers of induction age "with pen and notebook" were in the army in the field. And now? It is a shame to say that many are merely trying to see how to kick more painfully the army and the young fellows serving in it. And they blame not themselves, those studying in prestigious universities at home and abroad, but rather others, and that is the whole point.

The patriots who has not been fooled by the super-liberal press were left with a bad taste in their mouth from the decision of the USSR Supreme soviet in the autumn of 1989 to let all students go home at once.

As if patiently explaining to small children at a session, Army Gen Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov showed how they must not act so unreasonably as there was no one to replace the soldiers who had not served their full time. The servants of the people did not even heed the arguments of the minister of defense. Given power, they followed the principle of: Carry out orders. Comrade minister, get by as best you can. I am certain that later no one sent a request to D.T. Yazov to find out how the army was getting by with such a shortage of personnel.

The army is used to correcting the mistakes of others. But at what a price? It was necessary to call up rural equipment operators and graduates from the technical schools who are so essential now in the national economy.

We argue and argue for social justice, but in fact the reverse develops. Our law is entitled "On Universal Military Service." Universal! But in fact service or nonservice of today's fellow more and more often is determined by the social position of the parents. It is perfectly clear who will be admitted as a student and who will be accepted for assembling and disassembling the Kalashnikov assault rifle and learn to fire it in the event of the need to defend the intelligent, well-read brother intellectual. It is clear who, in showing courage and self-sacrifice and even sacrificing their lives for rescuing the Armenian and Azerbaijan families from extremists and nationalists, after 15 January 1990, carried out all the demands of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Declaring a State of Emergency in the Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Area and Certain Other Regions." The men of the Soviet Army and the troops of the USSR MVD during that difficult time for the nation did not let their people down and did everything to defend the legitimate interests of the motherland and its citizens.

The Past Is Not Complete Stalinism

No, even now the most dependable sons of the motherland are the military. They understand what is what and what is the price of the poison-pen evil which has been poured on them by the proponents of "pruning" who rave in evil nihilism. But the latter will never cut down the tree of the fatherland as long as it is defended by two realistically thinking forces which rely on the working people: the party and the army. For precisely this reason, all the verbal—for now!—thunder of the radical liberals is directed against these social institutions.

There are pseudofighters, pseudosoldiers for supposedly the people's good among the writer fraternity. No sooner had perestroika begun in the nation when they raised the slogan "the past is complete Stalinism." For this reason, down with the past. Let us destroy it to the very bottom.

This, Mr. Extremists, has already been done. And we do not wish to build the future following such a model.

It is with good reason that the bylaws of the new association Fatherland state that a person who sincerely respects the Armed Forces of his nation and who has a good knowledge of the military history of Russia can become a member. The doors here are open for all and neither nationality, religious belief or party loyalty play any role. Writing in a principled and vivid manner is the member of the Artistic Council of Fatherland, Karem Bagirovich Rash, who has done a good deal to strengthen the Russian spirit in the minds of his compatriots but who by origin is a Kurd. But he thinks of himself, in following elementary logic, as a Russian and not a Russian-speaking writer.

As soon as Karem Rash raised his voice in defense of the Russian military and appeared in the journal MOSKVA with a "Word of Praise for the Russian Navy" and in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL with a vivid political work "Army and Culture" (we have reprinted it) when the specialists of Radio Liberty invented a special tag for Karem Bagirovich, "Rashism." The big experts there in Munich like to think up "crushing" synonyms. And they have been willingly supported by certain homegrown fans of "freedom of speech" (see OGONEK, No 8, 1990).

There was a certain local echo in our Belokamennaya. On 29 October 1989, on the birthday of the Komsomol, Leonid Krasner broke out in MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS over the issue of Rash in a solid (in truth, only in volume) article. This mosquito bite is not worth mentioning and I give it only as an example that a Kurd evidently cannot be completely Russian, and possibly may not be seen as a joke by the rabid adherents of unbridled russophobia.

At present, those writers on whose passports and on the titles of books give the name, for instance, Ivanov have ceased to be Russian. The Russian language is now only partially used, and it is called a lingua franca, an auxiliary language for interethnic contact and is employed to humiliate and slander everything Russian.

And unjustly seeking state power are historians and political writers, literary critics and agricultural essayists, semipolitical scientists, semiwriters and semi-intellectuals. Never has such a wide group ruled a state and it never will be able to. They are shatterers! That is what the people call them. No, they also use other words, but we will refrain from giving them here and will not follow the example of the printed and radio defamer Vasilii Aksenov.

Lenin spoke about this in March 1919 at the Eighth Congress of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], using the words petty intelligentsia. And this insignificance, coupled with universal ambition has already been recognized by a majority of the people. There was criticism of the party and belittling of the

party bureaucrats and then that was it, not understanding that individual party members are certainly not the party itself.

And then when they set to defaming and slandering the army, it became clear from what direction the wind was blowing. And how bitter it was for me when I heard bewildered questions from American officers who headed a group of inspectors to the sites where the medium-range strategic missiles were being destroyed: "Have the Russian people really ceased to respect their army? Our military schools still say that the Soviet Army is strong precisely in its link with the people...."

And from them I learned how the Pentagon had regained respect for itself among ordinary Americans after the Vietnamese War, how society was healed but certainly not spontaneously from the notorious syndrome.

And it was precisely an American lieutenant colonel who repeated to me at the Kapustin Yar Test Range the wise words that those who do not wish to feed their own army are doomed to feed the army of someone else.

Why must we remember this phrase, although it was said by an overseas visitor? Certainly the words that we must keep our powder dry—a most urgent appeal—were said not by Prince Potemkin, although the very lucid Grigoriy said much that was good. Oliver Cromwell used these words in helping his troops across a river and we at present are obliged to adopt them.

Strong state power and precisely state power...this is what can change the situation for the better.

But the most amazing thing is that on the team of what I have conditionally called the "pruners" there are specialists on foreign life, even from the very interesting group of workers from the U.S.A. and Canada Institute. They are well aware that in the United States the state regulates the market, and incidentally, it regulates it rigidly, there is a very strong tax and control service there, and that the notorious free farmers are clearly controlled by the same state.

They are perfectly aware of all of this. Why then do all their proposals for their own nation in one way or another come down to weakening the role of the state in the administering of society? Can you explain this, dear people? Give some thought to the posed question.

I am not speaking about the army. Generally, in America it is an extremely privileged position.

In our country, things have reached the point that on the eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day in Moscow provocative leaflets were glued up by some radical party which urged the Muscovites on 23 February 1990 to demonstrate under the slogan "Eliminate the Criminal Army—There Is No Alternative!" They, for example, asserted: "The army is a tool of USSR imperialist domination...it is at present almost the last refuge for supporters of enslavement, annexation and intervention.... Violating the conscience of the 18th-year-old inductees, the Soviet

Army for 72 years has triumphed over the crushed moral drives for freedom and independence and over the rejection of lies." This was written when the entire world was preparing to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the victory over Nazism, the victory of the Soviet Army and the Soviet people.

Constantly ask yourselves like the ancient Romans did: "Cui prodest"? Who stands to gain?

When They Rammed Russia

I intended to end with this, but then my eye was caught by an excerpt from an article. Let us quote it, I thought. The readers might wonder when it was written.

"Everyone has rammed Russia, everyone has pushed it to the abyss, everyone is speaking about its demise and everyone is waiting not for a miracle but for its calm end.

"They have stripped the people bare, they have deprived it of religion, family and state, they have rained curses on its soul and have created an unbelievable confusion in its head.... The aim of the coup and long-awaited revolution has remained somewhere far forgotten, and long-since vanished, the experiments of the self-styled committees, the misled workers, the lost peasants.

"The property of the nation, agriculture, industry, trade, labor and capital—everything has been confounded.... Rich Russia has become a pauper. Its granaries are empty, its factories are on the verge of collapse, its railroads stand idle, its people are beginning to starve.... Concepts are confused, maps are bogus; traitors and spies are called the friends of the people, the leaders of democracy and the saviours of the revolution. And those who have not sold out and those who have not lost their conscience, in whom a love remains for the people and the tortured country—they are being held responsible and depicted as enemies of the motherland and freedom...."

This was written on 22 July 1917 in an article by Al. Ksyunin entitled: "Before the Decision," and published in the newspaper *VECHERNEYE VREMYA*. It gave a general assessment of Russia's position.

Doesn't the situation then seem familiar to you, dear compatriots? There is something there....

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1990.

Officers Discuss Multi-Party Systems in Socialist Societies

90UM0551A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 7, Apr 90 pp 22-28

[Articles by Major General N. Meshcheryakov, professor and doctor of historical sciences; Captain 1st Rank P. Povesmo, candidate of philosophical sciences; and,

Colonel A. Sytezhev and Lieutenant Colonel A. Panibratskiy, candidates of historical sciences: "A Multi-party System. Are We Prepared for It?"

[Text] The Party-wide national discussion of the draft Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress reveals the diversity of ideas, views, and proposals on Party policy issues. Including with regard to the decision to repudiate constitutional consolidation of the Party's leading role. It is receiving ambiguous assessments in military collectives and is causing profound doubts. We are publishing several opinions.

We Must Defend the Right to Leadership.

By Major General N. Meshcheryakov, professor and doctor of historical sciences.

"It really is not much to call oneself the 'vanguard' and the leading detachment, we also need to act so that all remaining detachments see and are compelled to recognize that we are moving forward. And we are asking our readers: Are the representatives of the remaining 'detachments' really such fools that they take our word concerning 'vanguard'?" These words of Lenin's are literally asked in the epigraph to the conversation about how the CPSU must act under conditions of an open struggle to preserve the position of the ruling Party and the votes of the voters. And it is already clear right now that this struggle will be quite intense. A significant portion of the newly arisen movements, unions, and associations, while covering themselves with sentences in defense of perestroika and democracy, are not only not helping to resolve the problems that have accumulated in society but are also consciously complicating them. Political slogans of an extremist complexion are increasingly loudly heard and activities are becoming increasingly perceptible that lead to destabilization of society and collapse of the economy and the country's political system. Dozens of formations—beginning with the Democratic Union and ending with the confederation of anarchists and syndicalists—are already conducting a campaign to influence various strata of the population.

It is quite understandable that to suppress all of these forces—means to jeopardize perestroika itself. And this, in my opinion, is not a mythical danger but a real one. But it seems to me that it has been passed over in silence in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform. The neutral sentence that states that the democratization of our society is being accompanied by the rise of new socio-political associations of citizens does not nearly serve to mobilize healthy Party forces. The additional statement that the activities of organizations pursuing anti-communist goals must be legitimately banned does little to clear things up. Fine, they will be banned. But this does not mean that they will immediately cease their extremist activities. And then: How will we treat those political formations that do not fall under the ban but whose goals are sharply different from our ideological

positions? I think that the Platform needs to say something quite specific about this.

Obviously, this cautious wording also does not entirely correspond to this moment: "The development of society does not preclude the possibility of also founding parties." But we are actually already living under conditions of a multi-party system. The only thing is that it must be formed in a legitimate manner. And we need to prepare for this even now so that we do not get caught unawares.

The Social Democratic Association was established not so long ago and its founding congress took place in Tallinn in January 1990. The aspiration to participate, as an organized political force, in searches for a way out of the country's crisis situation was directly proclaimed at it. Approximately 280 people participated in the congress' work, including about 130 delegates from more than 70 organizations, 10 USSR People's Deputies, and about 80 observers and guests. During the congress, Ukrainian Social Democrats decided to prepare their founding congress, a coordinating bureau of the Social Democratic Movement of the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East was formed, and a declaration was made about their intentions to found an RSFSR Social Democratic Party and to form a founding congress organizing committee.

In October 1989, the establishment of the Union of Constitutional Democrats [SKD] was proclaimed. The SKD, according to a statement by one of its leaders, would like to see itself as one of the centers of crystallization of a future party of a liberal democratic bent.

I repeat, today it is already very important to honestly and openly say what the consequences of the existence of various parties that will inevitably conduct a fierce struggle for power can bring for the country and for all of the people. It is true that the draft states that the CPSU is prepared for a political dialogue and cooperation with everyone who advocates renewal of socialist society. However, I think that a great deal of definitiveness is needed on this issue. For right now, advocates of more decisively democratic transformations, extremists, forces that are sincerely fighting for the renewal of national self-consciousness of our country's peoples, zealous nationalists, and fighters for perestroika and its opponents who cover themselves with innovative slogans are practically being placed on the same plane in the absence of a reliable legal basis that prevents the rise of "extreme" movements.

The entire course of the future development of society essentially depends on how successfully the Party completes the difficult school of joint work and life with other socio-political formations. And, unfortunately, we do not now have experience in this type of cooperation. The CPSU has existed for too long in conditions of ideological comfort.

But then again, it is useful to look back during this responsible moment. According to one scale of calculation, up to 35 different parties existed in 1917-1920. Just

what did not exist: Anarchist-individualists, anarchist-communists, anarchist-syndicalists, the party of leftist socialist-revolutionary-internationalists, revolutionary communists, etc.

Of course, direct analogies in history are a risky business. But the possibility has not been excluded that the political map of the country can turn out to be no less diverse in our time. And today the Party's fate depends on the same thing that it did a little over 70 years ago: How completely it is able to express the interests of the main strata of the workers.

Naturally, it does no good to excessively dramatize the situation. It is entirely obvious that there is no other political force in society today that would be capable of totally assuming responsibility for what is occurring in the country and of playing the role of the political vanguard. Attempts to solve urgent problems without the CPSU will only result in greater destabilization of the situation. But the CPSU can only become a constructive and consolidating force of our state under the condition that it totally renews its internal activities and acts ahead of time to unite and constantly strengthen its close ties with the masses.

Furthermore, in my opinion, some very substantial provisions of the draft Platform are set forth in a very simplified manner. First of all, I have in mind the problem of unity of Party ranks. I stress that I am not talking about identical thinking but about unity of goals. If we face the facts, we must admit that various trends exist in the Party today. There are radicals and there are conservatives.... There are adherents of social democratic ideas and there are individuals who oppose the socialist basis of our society.... But they are all considered to be CPSU members and they speak in its name in their agitation and propaganda activities which confuses people. It is no coincidence that the word "split" is hovering in the air.

In my opinion, there is no weighty basis to talk about a split for the time being. Although some would like to present the formation of various trends in this light. The following cases are presented as the argument. For example, the establishment of a "Democratic Platform" within the framework of the CPSU. Or the Leningrad Oblast and City Committees CPSU Plenum Resolution "On the Platform of the Leningrad Party Organization Under Modern Conditions." But let us examine the basic principles and demands of these platforms. Transfer of power in its entirety from the Party apparatus to democratically elected Soviets; submission of the CPSU legislative initiative about repeal of Article Six of the Constitution and preparation of a draft Law on Political Parties; renunciation of the principle of democratic centralism and its replacement with party-wide democratic principles that insure true democracy in the Party and a guarantee of the rights of the minority and freedom of platforms and groups; and, introduction of direct, equal, alternative elections using a secret ballot

throughout Party districts at political forums ("Democratic Platform"). Increase the rights of leading Party organizations and Party committees; intensify CPSU contacts with social organizations, movements, and workers formations; preserve the people's heroic traditions and use all ideological tools to educate the younger generation in readiness to defend the Homeland; and, do not tolerate anyone who discredits the role of the Army in socialist society, etc. (Platform of the Leningrad Party organization).

As we see, many provisions coincide or are close to those that are set forth in the draft Central Committee Platform. They are first of all directed at restoring the Party's prestige. Contradictions in it mainly concern the rates and methods for implementing reform. Nevertheless, this should not serve as grounds for complacency. It is quite obvious that polarization will occur with the approval of the Platform at the Congress: Those who do not accept its main positions will be forced to leave its ranks. In my opinion, that is why two provisions contained in the draft are advisable—about clearing the Party ranks of those who refute its ideological-political and organizational bases and warning about formation of factions—to bring us together as one. And I must precisely and unequivocally say that a possible reduction of Party ranks (not excluding the possibility that it will be quite significant) should not be viewed as a tragedy and that the CPSU's unity and purity are the primary conditions for the CPSU to win the political leadership.

This issue is no less important: The political campaign is beginning with a struggle of ideas. But, it seems that lately a clear preference is being given to the organizational side of Party work at the expense of the ideological side. This is also noticeable in the Army. Former ideals have for the most part been lost and not nearly everyone is able to discern the new orientation points. And today the losses that we suffer due to our inability to disseminate the essence and sense of Party policy to the people are being more keenly felt. Is this not one of the causes of crisis phenomena in the CPSU? Furthermore, the Party's ideological activities are very vaguely discussed in the draft Platform.

And finally, the last thing. While talking about the need for true democratization of internal Party discussions and the decision-making mechanism, we cannot forget about discipline. It has become noticeably slack recently. Some are calling for "tightening of the screws." But we have already passed through this stage. For example, monetary fines began to be widely used for violations of Party discipline when anarchist moods penetrated the Party in 1919. People were fined for drunkenness, failure to attend assemblies, card playing, etc. The RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] Central Committee had to explain to Party organizations that, not fear of losing several dozens rubles but, consciousness of membership in the Party and of having assumed a leading role and awareness that each mistake or careless attitude toward Party work must become the stimulus for accomplishing Party responsibilities and that definite

forces "are attempting to use counter-revolutionary goals to interpret and accuse communists of 'only talking' while they themselves are in a state of not 'doing' anything."

This sounds quite contemporary. It is precisely this awareness that many communists acutely lack today. I think there is a need to enter into the draft Platform that the Party associates its capability to fulfill the vanguard role with the personal exemplariness of each communist, his moral purity, and personal modesty. And recently it is as if we are ashamed of these words.

"The Pretenders"—Who Are They?

By Captain 1st Rank P. Povesmo, candidate of philosophical sciences.

Analysis of the activities of certain "unions," "societies," and "groups" shows that the people's misfortunes do not nearly trouble the people who head them. No matter how much they disguise themselves in the toga of "selfless fighters for justice and democracy," their activities and program precepts clearly show that seizure of political power is their main goal. I stress precisely seizure since these associations (some of them are already calling themselves "parties") are using unconstitutional and illegal methods in the campaign for political popularity, recruitment of supporters, and ideological indoctrination of the population. As they say, you cannot hide a wolf in sheep's clothing. It is no accident that the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress stresses that should legally ban the establishment and activities of organizations and movements that advocate force and inter-ethnic discord and pursue extremist and unconstitutional goals.

The position of the leaders of the so-called "Democratic Union," who calculate that they will manage to take the "helm" of the State under a multi-party system, are the most ambitious and aggressive. All the Democratic Union's work is essentially directed precisely toward this end and its supporters are concentrating their efforts on this. The Democratic Union consists of open and secret members whose duties include conducting secret recruiting operations, including in military units and at military schools. The Democratic Union, as it is obvious from its documents, is persistently attempting to spread its influence to the Armed Forces.

The Democratic Union calls itself an "opposition party" and "an alternative to the CPSU." Furthermore, when you become acquainted with the organization's program documents, the impression is created that the majority of ideas there have been borrowed precisely from the Communist Party. As for human rights, political and economic reform, and problems in the area of education, culture, and interrelations with the church, it is as if the Democratic Union "ideologues" have simply extracted important provisions from the materials of the 27th [Party] Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Congress, and the Congress of People's Deputies. And is it not clever: The leaders of this organization have a wonderful

feel for the competition and they know what to use to win the minds of poorly oriented young people in the most complex interweaving of recent political events.

Nevertheless, the quintessence of the Democratic Union "program" is the elimination of the CPSU from the political arena and the complete replacement of the social order. According to its leadership, all methods are suitable to accomplish this. Unscheduled rallies, distribution of provocative or openly biased leaflets with inciting texts, and arrangement of all sorts of gatherings are in their arsenal.

For example, on the day the 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies convened, Democratic Union members gathered at one of the capital's central squares. Furthermore, they carried placards with the following slogans: "Soviets—without communists," "Down with the CPSU!" and they shouted "Let us hit communism with perestroika.... Let us help the people attain freedom." Twenty-two participants of the unscheduled rally were detained. But this hardly distressed the gathering's organizers. They gathered crowds of the curious and once again demonstrated their "uncompromising attitude" under the glare of foreign and Soviet journalists' flash bulbs.

We cannot hide the fact that the ranks of Democratic Union supporters are not becoming smaller. The pseudo-revolutionary nature of the organization's slogans attracts some and others think that it is making a weighty contribution to the collapse of the administrative-command system. However, few people know with whose voice the Democratic Union's leaders are singing. The U.S. CIA's open instruction to Soviet "dissidents," and first of all to the Democratic Union, assigns the following tasks during the period of perestroika: Immediately impart a national direction to each social uprising or discontent; national and national-political goals should be dominant in all undertakings; and, reduce social discontent to national motives even if this is not the initial cause.... All processes must come down to one goal—concentration of efforts on armed clashes and it is necessary to form a rebel army to do this....

And these appeals find a responsive chord in the Democratic Union's ranks. Its activists are attempting to create groups of fighters, they are also increasingly recruiting servicemen to join them, and they are seeking contacts with extremist minded nationalist elements in various regions of the country. In short, foreign patrons have weighty bases to be satisfied with the leaders of the Democratic Union.

Besides the Democratic Union, such associations as Helsinki-86 (Helsinki-87), and the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth that has declared itself to be the direct descendant of the Banderovskiy sect youth organization, and others are also vying for the role of political oracle. They are attempting to use the processes of democratization and glasnost to push their ideas onto

the masses and impart an openly nationalist or anarchistic spirit, and they are appealing to all informal forces to "unite in the struggle against the CPSU," and stop at nothing to defame the socialist idea and to destabilize our society.

We are building a rule-of-law state and we are not going the same way as the "revolutionaries" of the Democratic Union type.

We Will Not Make Policy Through "Tracing"

By Colonel A. Sytzehev and Lieutenant Colonel A. Panibratskiy, candidates of historical sciences.

Today, there are political parties in practically every country of the world. And no matter how different they are as far as ideological outlooks, organizational structure, and interrelationships with the government, the party system in the majority of states is not in final [form] and is even more standardized. Therefore, direct attempts to build a political system of any society by "tracing it" or according to a pattern are hopeless. We need to consider that a multi-party system in and of itself still does not serve as a panacea for social upheavals, economic crises, unemployment, the increase in crime, etc. Moreover, it frequently leads to political confrontation and plunges a country into the depths of a coup d'etat or a military dictatorship.

Let us recall that the presence of a multi-party system did not prevent the National Socialists headed by Hitler from coming to power in 1933 and is not currently a factor of stability in El Salvador and Nicaragua. At the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's, a real wave of terror and force in the political lining passed throughout Italy. And the large number of Italian Parties could not oppose extremists from the Right or Left that have operated within the framework of the so-called "strategy of tensions plan." Bombs have exploded, murders and kidnappings have been committed, and underground power structures in the form of Masonic Lodges have been formed throughout Italy.

However, there are some undoubted advantages in a multi-party system that also make it so attractive in the eyes of radically minded representatives of the intelligentsia, working class, and peasantry. It assumes political competition, independent criticism of the ruling party or party coalition and this creates impediments to adoption of incorrect decisions and abuses of power. Yes and, as a rule, various factions will appear within the framework of one party under the most minor distortion of democratic principles and standards of party activities and competition will occur between them. At the same time, these factions [can] work out a temporary mechanism of cooperation. They unite a number of recognized leaders and affect the development of solutions made by the party as a whole.

The experience of constructing socialism in the countries of Europe, Asia, and Latin America has demonstrated the ambiguity of the approach to the role and place of

parties in the political system of each state. The leaders of socialist countries were frequently oriented only on the example of the USSR and copied many elements of its state and socio-political system. Thus, after the appearance of the new Constitution of the USSR that was approved in 1977 and Article Six where the CPSU's leading role was legally consolidated, similar articles were introduced in the fundamental laws of socialist countries. This mechanical copying of our steps, also including mistaken ones, became one of the causes of the obsolete model of socialism crisis in a number of the countries of Eastern Europe.

We must not forget that each state has its own specific national-historical features of development. Until recently, a one party system existed in Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and certain other countries. Furthermore, there were three parties in Poland, five parties in the GDR [German Democratic Republic], five in Czechoslovakia, and two in Bulgaria. However, the multi-party model that existed there was formal and limited in nature. Communist parties occupied the dominating and legally consolidated role. Another role—"to unanimously support" the decisions of the communists—was allocated to the other parties. This situation substantially deformed socio-political activity, limited opportunities for political competition and, the main thing—did not eliminate one party's monopoly of power. Of course, this gave rise to contradictions that increasingly worsened with the passage of time. All of this, taken together, caused a stormy process of renewal in many countries of Eastern Europe.

The changes that took place first of all affected the communist parties of the socialist countries who, after long years of individual rule, found themselves in a state of deep crisis. In some cases, the communists were forced to repudiate a monopoly on power under the fierce pressure of circumstances (Poland, GDR) and in others—relatively voluntarily (Hungary, Czechoslovakia). And this occurred as a result of a bloody revolution in Romania where the party was the foothold of totalitarianism.

As we can see, repudiation of a one party monopoly on power and the transition to pluralism in political life is occurring with some difficulty. The socio-political situation has become significantly complicated both in Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and in other countries of Eastern Europe. Various opposition associations (forums, fronts) have arisen and continue to arise and tensions have increased between certain strata of the population. The prestige of communist parties has sharply fallen. Incidents of dismissals and persecution of communists have increased based on their political convictions alone.

All of these consequences of a transition to a real multi-party system require study and reflection. It is quite obvious that parties taking a stand on socialism will be able to maintain and strengthen their positions only if they find ways and means to reestablish partner

relations with other political forces. And here everything depends on the specific socio-political situation in each country. Really, they cannot make policy "through tracing."

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil," 1990.

Turkmen Political Worker Predicts End to Political Departments

90UM0539A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian 9-15 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Mulyar from Turkmenia: "A Cement of Dubious Strength"]

[Text] I have carefully read the interview with Maj Gen Avn G. Benov "In Unity Lies the Guarantee of Renewal" (SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, No 8). I cannot agree with his viewpoint on the advisability of the existing political bodies in the Armed Forces. And precisely the existing and precisely the political bodies. Why do I so accentuate the focus? Let me explain. The very word "political body" harmonizes with a number of others such as politically reliable and unreliable, political prisoner and so forth. Ultimately, the army as a state body (and a state of the people) should serve the interests of only the people and not the interests of a political party, albeit a leading one. It seems to me that if this were the case, there would not be so many complaints about the army, there would not have been Afghanistan and Tbilisi. I am not accusing just the political bodies of all the disorders prevailing in the army, but certainly they have the lion's share of the blame.

The currently existing political bodies, I feel, have outlived themselves. They have outlived themselves primarily due to failure and low efficiency of work. If one adds to this the enormous staff of political workers and the low technical level of political work, it becomes clear that we must immediately set out on reforms, and radical ones. All the more as the events of recent days provide grounds to expect in the near future amendments in Article 6 of the Constitution. What line will be carried out by the deputy leader for political affairs? That of the CPSU, the social democrats, Memory or the Democratic Union? Possibly, no line is needed? Possibly what is needed is high combat readiness, skill, dedication to one's people, to one's motherland? Certainly we exist for this.

As for ideology, our "probable opponents" have great experience in this. I doubt that a U.S. soldier loves his motherland or his people any less than I or such as I. I do not feel that he is a monster, as we have been told for so long and continue to be told. Actually, work is needed to maintain high morale and psychological stability. But certainly "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth], in its time, and the plenums and congresses in being continuously studied, do not increase this morale. There must be services of psychologists, information, lawyers, medics and so forth.

As for the cement, I can tell you, comrade general, that the political bodies are not a cement or are no longer the cement, as you wish. Authority is not increased by a declaration. I say this as political worker to political worker. Whether we want this or not, I am certain that in the near future the political departments will disappear from the scene. I have no doubt that it would be better to understand this oneself and promptly find a new focus which does exist.

Participants' Reactions to Events of Komsomol Congress

90UM0539B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Kovalev and Maj V. Zyubin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "Life Gives the Grades; The 21st Komsomol Congress Has Ended Its Work"]

[Text] The Congress completed its work when dawn was breaking over Moscow on a new day, 19 April. By this time, finally, it had been possible to adopt a congress declaration and new bylaws.

A first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee was elected on an alternative basis from six candidates. He was Vladimir Zyukin. He is 36 years old, a member of the CPSU, and has been in public work since the end of the 1970s. Since 1989, he has worked as the secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee.

Much is seen from a distance and the truth is known. But the experience of life also suggests something else: at a close distance one often does not see anything at all. What place will be assigned in history to the 21st Komsomol Congress? Will it be remembered as a turning point in the nation's youth movement or will it be forgotten as soon as the passions abate?

At present, hot on the trail, it is still too early to provide exhaustive answers to these questions. And later the most correct grades will be given by life.

For now, let us listen to the congress participants.

[Natalya Popova, a medical worker from Yaroslavl Oblast]: "I have been a delegate now at two congresses. I recently participated in the work of a congress of Komsomol organizations in Russia. It is a pity that the mistakes which were made there have been repeated at the all-Union forum. I had assumed that secondary questions could take up a lot of work time, but not so much!

"All the same, happy feelings still predominate in me. The healthy forces at the congress succeeded in defending the word "Leninist" in the name of our League. Lenin is now under attack, they are seeking out his errors and even crimes. But can they really be called the 'seekers of truth'? They are simply political pygmies!"

[Sr Lt Aleksandr Uvarov, USSR people's deputy from the Komsomol]: "The congress delegates showed themselves to be thinking people. Independently thinking ones. Take the discussion of the so-called Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee. Personally, I take a negative view of it. I feel that possibly it is a major mistake and we still do not know what the consequences will be. I, of course, can be mistaken. But a majority of the delegates also viewed it unapprovingly."

[Lt Col Igor Kovalev, chairman of the council of Komsomol organizations in the Transcaucasus Military District]: "The congress justified my expectations. In the sense that I did not expect from it effective, constructive and creative work. And that was the case. Virtually all days were taken up with procedural questions and at the last moment, so to say, during the last night, like negligent officer candidates and students, we settled the most important problems for our youth.

"The decisions themselves were in part rash and poorly conceived. The congress simply bogged down in populist demagoguery. Many delegates, as they say, were making political mischief, or not to put it more harshly, they were out for trouble. They endeavored in every possible way to prove that we are a force under no one's control. Neither the government, nor the president, nor the politburo. The discussion of the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee was carried out precisely in this vein. There was no time to recollect or study. The document is profound, very essential and consolidates the healthy forces of our society. Possibly, even before such an appeal to the Communists could have been made. And the youth here had their own weighty and wise word to say. And in the form of the congress delegates, the word was said. Only I do not support it, it is not the word I would use....

"The congress again clearly demonstrated that nothing constructive is to be expected from such measures. They do not move forward real perestroika only apparent. It is moved forward by persons who are concerned for it, persons involved in real undertakings. But at the congress we were engaged in mere talking. Let us get a rest from it in our work."

All-Army Komsomol Conference Forthcoming

90UM0540B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major S. Kalinin: "The Times Demand Actions"]

[Text] The Second Plenum of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations has been held. The council discussed the preliminary results of the Twenty-First Komsomol Congress and the question of when to hold the All-Army Komsomol Conference. It was decided that the conference should be held this year and in connection with this, the bureau of the All-Army Council has been tasked with setting the specific periods of time for

holding the conference, the agenda, the standard for representation, and the procedure for selecting the delegates.

The Plenum also adopted the Regulations on fiscal means and auditing commissions of the Komsomol organizations of the armed forces. It also discussed issues having to do with the formation of a young peoples' political structure in the army and in the navy and the prospects for the activity of the Komsomol organizations in conditions of political and military reforms. It was decided to prepare and hold a scientific-practical conference on the urgent issues of Komsomol construction.

It was also proposed that the All-Army Council of the Komsomol Organizations be given juridical powers in accordance with the new status of the Komsomol organizations of the armed forces as the subject of the federation of the USSR Komsomol, having the same powers as the Komsomol organizations of the union republics.

Turkestan MD Encouraging 'International Education'

90UM0540A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Major I. Korotkikh: "Priority Trend"]

[Text] The Turkestan Military District is rightfully considered to be a multinational area. Not only are there soldiers of dozens of nationalities serving there, but the district itself is spread over the territory of five different all-union republics. The problems of the international education of the servicemen serving within the military district are of the highest priority for ideological work.

In recent years within the district more attention has been given to the culture of international relations, to the cohesion of the soldiers' collectives, and to strengthening ties with the local population. More and more often round table discussions, meetings of the soldiers' mothers, ten-day all-union republic festivals, open door

days, national kitchen days, meetings with the creative intelligentsia, and fairs featuring craft collectives are being held.

Representatives of the commissions and groups on international relations held a seminar to discuss their experience in organizing and conducting this work and the prospects for further work along these lines. Noting what has been achieved in this direction, in the report of General Major V. Stryapnin, Deputy Chief of the Military District Political Directorate and in speeches of officers M. Sarkisyan, A. Rashidov, M. Mikhaylovskiy and others, special attention was focused on still unresolved problems.

In the seminar it was noted that in the work of the commissions and groups on international relations little has been done to conduct sociological and psychological research not only on matters having to do with international relations but also with studying public opinion, the views of the servicemen, various categories for realizing a program of national politics, and the urgent issues of perestroika and the democratization of public life.

Growth of Veterans' Movement Noted

90UM0540C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Reserve Colonel R. Shtaf: "The Movement is Gaining Strength"]

[Text] In February of this year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported on the creation in Moscow of a union of USSR Armed Forces veterans. At that time those who lived outside the capital were not included in the new organization.

Recently a constituent assembly of USSR Armed Forces veterans from just outside of Moscow was held. And it was decided to create an organization similar to the one in Moscow. Reserve Colonel B. Dubin, a resident of the city of Odintsovo, was selected to be its representative.

The veterans' movement is expanding in other regions of the nation as well. According to recent data there are already more than 80 city-level and three republic-level unions of USSR Armed Forces veterans.

Moiseyev Responds to Readers on Perestroyka in Armed Forces

90UM0371A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, 1990

(Signed to press 01 Feb 90) pp 3-10

[Interview with Army General M. A. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces, by VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL chief editor Major General V. I. Filatov, on the occasion of the 72nd anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Armed Forces: Perestroyka, Problems, Goals"; place of interview not given; first two paragraphs are VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL introduction]

[Text] Requests are often made in readers' conferences and letters to the editors for information on the defensive military doctrine of the USSR, the prospects of military construction, restructuring of the Armed Forces to the new quality level, and tasks presently facing the General Staff.

On the eve of the 72nd anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, Major General V. I. Filatov, chief editor of the VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, met with Army General M. A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, for the purpose of an interview on topics of interest to readers.

[Filatov] Mikhail Alekseyevich! On 18 October 1989, USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman M. S. Gorbachev, in an address to the Main Military Council, made the statement that the basic steps have already been taken to implement the defensive military doctrine of the USSR.

What are the fundamental political guidelines for the doctrine, and what approaches are planned for its implementation?

[Moiseyev] Our defense construction has been organized and is being carried out on the basis of decisions made by the party and the government. Its nature and intent are determined by the new political thinking, developments in the international and internal situations, socio-economic capabilities of the country, and requirements levied by the military doctrine. It is generally realized that our doctrine rests on a foundation not of preparing for war, but rather of preventing the latter; on the assurance of peace; reliable defense of the USSR and its allies; maintaining combat readiness of troops and fleets at a level sufficient for a guaranteed repulse, in combination with allied armies, of armed aggression. That is, the doctrine is intended expressly for defense. I consider its major guidelines and new approaches for their implementation to be as follows: The Armed Forces are to be employed only to counter an aggression launched from without; we are not to be first to initiate a war, if we or our allies are not the target of this aggression; under no circumstances will we be the first to employ nuclear weapons; at an outbreak of a war, the Armed Forces are to base their activities on defensive actions.

The practical implementation of the above guidelines confirms the peace-loving foreign policy aims of the Soviet state and serves as a powerful counterbalance to the myth of the Soviet military threat.

The military-technical aspect of the doctrine is closely associated with the political. It largely determines the kinds of Armed Forces required, their composition, strength, disposition, equipment needs, and nature of personnel training.

With the established priorities of the new political thinking, the stress is not on acquisition of armaments, but rather on reduction in the latter to a level of reasonable sufficiency required for defense. In this connection, in peacetime it will be possible to maintain the Armed Forces at reduced strength, by so doing effecting personnel and fiscal economies.

Implementation of the Soviet military doctrine is proceeding along the following major lines.

First. We are consistently observing the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. As of 31 December 1989, the Soviet Union had eliminated 1,498 intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (81.1 percent of the initial number), and 555 launchers for the missiles (67.2 percent). The USA had eliminated 451 missiles (53.3 percent) and 92 launchers (31.8 percent). In this connection, in 1989 both sides completed the destruction of their shorter-range missiles and launchers. The first step of practical nuclear disarmament has been taken.

Second. The Armed Forces are undergoing reduction on a unilateral basis; the first phase has been completed. Troop strength has been reduced by more than 260,000 men; plans call for a total reduction of 500,000 men. In addition, a USSR Supreme Soviet decree has resulted in the discharge of more than 173,000 students. The Central Asian and Ural military districts and an army directorate have been abolished, with the abolishment of two more nearing completion. Reductions have been effected in command and control agencies of the central administrative staff and in directorates of military districts in the amounts of 20 to 40 percent. This process is continuing.

Third. We have completed the 1989 planned withdrawals of our combined units and units from groups of forces and from the Mongolian People's Republic. We have already removed more than 50,000 men, 3,200 tanks, and large numbers of armaments and military equipment. Of six tank divisions earmarked for withdrawal, three have been removed. The remainder will be withdrawn this year. All six divisions are being inactivated. Being removed at the same time from groups of forces are tactical nuclear weapons, and entire landing assault and river crossing assault combined units and units.

Fourth. More than 50 combined units, units and sub-units of the Missile Forces and the Ground Forces, Air

Defense Forces, and Air Forces stationed on the territory of our country have been inactivated. About 7,000 tanks, a large amount of artillery guns and river crossing equipment has been taken out of service in the Ground Forces; about 600 combat aircraft from the Air Forces; 12 submarines and 28 surface ships from the Navy.

Fifth. A considerable amount of military equipment that has been pulled out of military service is being modified for use in the national economy. It is sufficient to say that several thousand tanks are about to be disassembled; some of them are being modified for use as auxiliary equipment; more than 7,000 motor vehicles have been turned over to the national economy.

Unilateral reduction is the implementation of our radical revision of the defense doctrine. Its defensive nature has been greatly intensified. This kind of deep restructuring of our Armed Forces is a product of the general logic of the new political thinking. It is closely linked with other unilateral initiatives on our part. Let me list just a few of them: We observed a moratorium on nuclear testing for a period of 18 months; last year we withdrew 500 tactical nuclear warheads from allied countries; we ceased production of chemical weapons and initiated destruction of their stockpiles; we are phasing out production of highly-enriched uranium for military purposes. In 1990 we will shut down a reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium, without introducing new capacities. Two years ago we shut down another reactor of this type; another one in 1989.

Our military budget will be cut back by 14.27 percent (amounting to 10 billion rubles) in the next two years, with more than an 8-percent reduction earmarked for 1990. We plan to effect a considerable cut—by a factor of 1.5 or 2—in defense expenditures by as early as 1995. This will be possible only if the international situation so permits, of course.

We plan to complete all reduction measures by the end of 1991. As a result, the Armed Forces will take on a marked defensive color. The General Staff is presently involved with working out prospects of further possible Armed Forces reductions to take effect upon attainment of agreement in disarmament talks. This is a complex problem—one requiring a thoughtful and all-inclusive approach.

[Filatov] What is the U.S. and NATO leadership's reaction to the peace-loving initiatives proposed by our country?

[Moiseyev] The peace-loving efforts exerted by the Soviet Union have not been received with due warmth and understanding by the leadership of the USA and NATO. An objective basis for this conclusion can be seen in the approach taken by the USA to the formation of a long-range policy with respect to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. The USA continues to adhere to the opinion that the ideological differences between the two world systems remain unchanged and will continue into the future, in spite of the complex of changes

wrought by perestroika. This being the case, in addition to the level of Soviet military and economic power and a number of other factors, the Soviet Union remains for an indefinite period of time as the major potential adversary of the USA both in the ideological and the military aspects.

The G. Bush administration has no intention of abandoning either its policy of negotiating from a position of strength in talks and or its strategy of "nuclear intimidation." It has not ruled out entirely the possibility of direct military confrontation under certain conditions. It displays caution in evaluating the prospects of developing its Armed Forces. It does exhibit a certain amount of willingness to cooperate, but it does not go beyond the interests of the USA.

The Bush administration attaches prime importance to reaching agreement with the USSR, but in a selective manner, one aimed largely at bending the strategic parity between the USSR and the USA to its advantage. The Americans are of the opinion that one of the major factors that will insure accomplishment of these long-term goals is the attainment of a vigorous program of growth in industrial production and the development of new kinds of weapons and military equipment by the application of high technology.

They continue to work intensively on striving for superiority in precision weapons, strike aircraft, Naval forces, and implementation of the SDI program in its various aspects.

The above actions are paraded as a measure intended to keep themselves from slipping into a vulnerable position in Central Europe with respect to the USSR's military power, which is purported to exceed theirs. In this connection, the announced USSR intention of revising its military doctrine and strategy is taken to be "Soviet rhetoric."

The USA and NATO have not cut back their training exercises, nor have there been any changes in purpose of the latter. The Armed Forces of the USA and NATO are virtually constantly conducting large training exercises on the entire perimeter of the land and sea borders of the USSR and its allies in Europe and Asia, the purpose being to work up realistic plans for the preparation and conduct of military operations against the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist community.

The G. Bush administration considers the Strategic Defense Forces to be a fundamental guarantee of national security and gives them the highest priority in the USA's military construction.

In addition, the USA steadfastly adheres to maintaining its Naval Forces as a means of defense of American interests in various areas of the world, and it has no plans for negotiating with the USSR on reduction of Naval armaments.

A regular meeting of the West European Union Council at the level of ministers of foreign affairs and defense, held in Brussels on 13 and 14 November of 1989, expressed its general approval of these approaches on the part of the USA; supported the concept of a "strong and united Europe"; and recognized the need to exercise careful monitoring of the events occurring in Europe. This cannot be ignored.

[Filatov] Much is being said and written about the prospects of military construction and perestroika relative to achieving a new quality level in the Armed Forces. What is being done in this regard, and what problems is the General Staff facing?

[Moiseyev] The perestroika processes being experienced by the country are reflected in the Army and Navy. The processes are evident in the Armed Forces in the following major areas:

First and foremost, the requirements set by the Soviet military doctrine and the defensive posture are being implemented.

Second, we are making a change in defense construction to total adoption of quality parameters with respect to equipment and military science and makeup of the Armed Forces. We are revising our concept of Armed Forces development, based on the reasonable sufficiency principle, while reducing military expenditures without causing harm to the country's security.

Third, we are improving the quality of training in the Armed Forces.

Fourth, we have mapped out specific improvements for application to military discipline, prevention of incidents and crime, and strengthening of observance of regulations in line units.

Fifth and last, we are effecting improvements in party political work in the Army and Navy and in the setting of personal example of Army and Navy communists; the party line is being implemented more actively in the Armed Forces.

I consider it necessary to conduct closer scrutiny of our efforts associated with implementing the indicated aims of perestroika; identify problems requiring special attention; and define the tasks assignable to the main directorates for the purpose of resolution.

We are presently reducing the Armed Forces. This is dictated by the times. Now we must subject to review the nature of troop training, our military-political policy, the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, and the composition and cadre training in the latter.

We are leaving no area untouched in the plan for implementing the present military doctrine guidelines. We are also carrying out a critical reevaluation of the structure of the Armed Forces. We are revising possible

employments to repel aggression and determining the optimum composition of forces and weapons in theaters and sectors.

On the basis of changing views relative to waging a war, we are organizing timely personnel training for defending the country. Much has been done, and much is being done.

There is only so much that we can do, since the process of reducing the Armed Forces is becoming considerably more complex, while the responsibilities remain the same. The problem may be resolved by effecting improvements in organization of line units and Naval Forces to endow them with an optimum structure, redefining various aspects of their development and technical provisioning, and providing suitable ratios between the branches of the service and the combat arms. However, there are additional difficulties. For example, one of the problems involves how we are to maintain weapons and equipment with a minimum number of personnel, and whence we are to draw personnel to service the equipment, etc.

We are also mindful of the fact that we must redouble our efforts in the area of training of ranking personnel and of staffs involved with combat readiness, command and control, and strengthening of military discipline. We are raising the level of demand for quality of operational training and combat training of staffs and troops.

Collectives in the leading directorates of the General Staff have accomplished a great amount of useful work, but in our evaluation of the latter from the standpoint of perestroika, we must not rest on our attainments, especially in view of the many problems yet unresolved. The time is not yet ripe to speak of perestroika processes as an accomplished fact. Analysis of the work completed by certain directorates indicates that not all resources and capabilities have been employed. The inertia of old approaches has not been overcome; the elimination of formalism in work is proceeding at a slow pace. Some generals and officers limit themselves to current affairs. We are demanding that they acquire skill in resolving current and long-range affairs; concentrate their efforts on major issues; and strive for a clear understanding of prospects.

There is a need for considerable improvement in organizational work relative to supplying the Armed Forces with personnel and preparing youth for military service in the presence of problems of interethnic relations. In this connection, particular attention attaches to ethnic peculiarities of the incoming contingent and the creation of balanced international collectives capable of accomplishing missions assigned to troops.

An urgent problem exists in the area of involving persons subject to military service in various special musters related to crop harvesting, cleanup operations after the occurrence of natural disasters and large-scale accidents, and also in serving tours of active duty exceeding the terms of service set by the Law on Universal Military

Obligation. It is necessary to accelerate the resolution of this problem so that it can be endowed with the force of law.

In the last two years the General Staff has put through a number of measures designed to effect organizational restructuring of the central administrative staff, headquarters and line units. It should be noted that while we have carried out a general reduction in central administrative staffs, we have at the same time reinforced responsible sections of headquarters staffs. This has raised the question of reinforcing the combat training directorates (sections) at other levels. This problem requires additional work. This kind of task cannot be resolved in a hasty manner. It is also clear that the existing structure of the Armed Forces does not yet reflect completely the new defensive doctrine; it must be improved. We are facing a major task in this area. I would like to bring your particular attention to the realities of the approach to resolving this kind of task. It is dangerous to pass off the desirable for the actual.

Major importance in outlining the prospects of developing the Soviet Armed Forces attaches to timely and accurate information on a potential adversary.

In general, we presently require from General Staff officers not simply a statement of facts and trends relative to an enemy, but rather a careful and critical analysis of the facts performed in collaboration with officers of other armed services; and the most rapid possible determination of the most dangerous strategic military and military-technical threats. We must keep in mind that many areas of modern science may produce discoveries which if put into practice can bring about radical changes in kinds of weapons employed. It is for this reason that we must possess a guarantee against any kind of surprise.

Of particular concern is the need to focus the attention of General Staff officers on the analysis of military-political and military-technical aspects of the USA's position on arms reduction and disarmament. The timely receipt of this information will provide us with a broader and more accurate basis for formulating our position for presentation in talks and international conferences of various levels.

An acute need has come about to improve the efficiency of Armed Forces command and control. A great amount of work is in progress in this area. The communications system structure is also undergoing modification. The office of the chief of Armed Forces communications is faced with complex and responsible tasks, the resolution of which will entail carrying out a large number of organizational and technical measures at the level of the Armed Forces and the country as a whole.

The restructuring of international relations, in combination with the new political thinking, levies fundamentally new requirements on military cooperation with foreign countries.

Military cooperation continues to constitute a substantial part of the interrelationships between the Soviet Union and friendly states, and it exerts a definite influence on our position in various areas. The world situation is such that military cooperation will continue to exist. The primary role in improvement in this area lies with the General Staff.

It is thought that the main approach to implementing perestroika in military cooperation should be one of close coordination of the latter with the Soviet Union's foreign policy and tasks of radical reform in the USSR's foreign trade activity. In this connection, we must lay a foundation that consists of our long-term political, economic, and military interests.

In the area of military cooperation, we apparently should make a change to an advisory capacity. We should cooperate on a close interrelationship basis with the central administrative directorates of the Ministry of Defense, the branches of the Service and the combat arms, working with the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers, the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations], and with other ministries and departments.

We should learn whatever lessons we can from the past in carrying out our practical work. We should deal with all tasks that arise so as to afford a greater depth of resolution, with consideration of long-term prospects, so that we can anticipate problems the USSR Armed Forces may encounter in the future. We should learn in this process to **acquire skill in dealing with both current and long-term tasks.**

The above conditions are such that **military science assumes increasing importance.** It should not only help us to resolve problems without committing any major errors, but also employ the optimum variant, especially in the case of prospects of the more distant future.

We are presently modifying many theoretical military concepts; and looking at new approaches in military science, fundamental changes in strategy, operational art and tactics. However, there also are problems in this area.

The adoption of economic accountability and self-financing by institutions has generated a number of new problems that may exert a considerable influence on our military-technical policy. This is not the time to permit lags in the development of promising types of weapons and equipment. A narrow departmental approach cannot be permitted here.

However, it should be kept in mind that military science is the province of everyone. Unfortunately, as yet there is more talk than action in this regard. All General Staff directorates are to take an active part in dealing with basic and applied problems and effect improved analysis and utilization of advanced experience. Only in this manner can the General Staff base its work on the

findings and recommendations issuing from science. For this reason, one of the aims of perestroika in our work should be a closer bond between science and practical activity.

A special aspect of the General Staff in the present stage that I would like to point out is its **increasing role in resolving international problems**. This is a natural consequence of the situation in which we are living.

It is essential that we improve our work in support of the negotiation process; maintain our position in a convincing manner; display flexibility; and seek solutions via compromise. We must exercise foresight in evaluating possible solutions; look for proper responses to actions committed by a potential adversary; defend our interests; and find compromises.

[Filatov] Mikhail Alekseyevich! The resolution of these complex problems facing the General Staff apparently requires improving, and, perhaps changing, the style and methods the staff employs. What is your opinion in this regard?

[Moiseyev] Let me say that the majority of General Staff officers do good work; they put forth their best efforts. They cannot be cited for inactivity or irresponsibility. However, even though the quality of work is high, some officers fail to come to grips with important problems and may be prone to employing a stereotyped approach. I place major blame for this on the chiefs, who have little to do with their subordinates, failing to instruct them in problem solving at the General Staff level. Hence the need for major improvement in work with officers and **enhancing their professional training**.

The new requirement compels us to redefine the General Staff's structure to bring it more in line with the nature of the problems presently facing us. We believe that the perestroika in progress will result in more efficient work, eliminate duplication, and raise the level of responsibility for accomplishing assigned tasks. However, a reorganization cannot resolve anything by itself. Success has always depended upon people, and this is the aspect that requires special attention. We must not forget that only people can arrive at solutions.

We must struggle to the utmost to **root out bureaucracy in our directorates**. We are to dispense with excessive organization; refrain from taking on functions that are the province of subordinate organs; discontinue practicing petty tutelage; and move away from generating multitudes of reports and all kinds of formal accounts, briefs, summaries, etc.

A poor item is the habit of second-guessing the "management" in an attempt to please the latter. This gives rise to a weak will, even indifference at times; to a tendency to "fend off" a matter or covering oneself with a piece of paper addressed to a neighbor. The consequence is the existence of dozens and even hundreds of problems—most of which could and should be resolved at the local level—being shuffled aimlessly through the

chain of command, even from directorate to directorate, augmenting the river of paper that threatens to drown us. This undesirable practice must be eliminated.

In this connection, also in need of a new approach is the **organization of collaboration between all structural sub-units of the General Staff in routine work**; we must hold more personally responsible the chiefs of main and independent directorates, who would be more instrumental in resolving problems by way of personal contact, thus dispensing with the creation of a paper merry-go-round when at all possible.

Now a few words about another aspect of perestroika: **strengthening of military discipline**.

It is very important that we realize that substantial change for the better in the case of discipline depends not only on marked improvement in the work accomplished by command and political staffs and headquarters of line units and fleets, but also on restructuring of work performed by central administrative staffs, including the General Staff. Deserving of greater attention is more diligent observance of orders, directives, and all our instructions. Quite a bit of progress must be made in this area.

[Filatov] We look upon the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] as the carrier of perestroika's program objectives, a uniting and consolidating force. What would you like to see in the work performed by General Staff party organizations under conditions of perestroika?

[Moiseyev] Let me start off answering that question by remarking that at this time there could be no perestroika in the Army and Navy if there were no solidarity and unity of communists with their leading role. This has been confirmed by the progress and conclusions reached by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the December (1989) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party.

The General Staff collective consists entirely of communists. There is complete understanding of the role party organizations are to play in the restructuring of its activity. The main issue here is **work with each communist and close ties between all party measures and specific tasks assigned to directorates**.

It is necessary to effect improvement in judging personnel and in educating them; there should be no traces of formalism in this endeavor. Party organizations should more actively take up specific matters and strive for a high sense of responsibility on the part of communists in the area of implementing defense-related decisions made by the party and the Soviet Government.

Chiefs of directorates and secretaries of party organizations must be more responsive to suggestions and criticism submitted by communists, accepting them not as a mere formality, but rather as a service and direct party obligation.

It must be realized in the nurturing of communists that the General Staff's activity differs radically from the kind of work carried out in other control organs. We require from our officers the highest responsiveness, self-discipline, honesty, highest levels of performance, and exactingness. In the General Staff, as nowhere else, it is necessary that chiefs develop a respectful attitude toward their subordinates, including their opinions and suggestions, and a sense of helpfulness and mutual understanding.

General Staff communists are obligated to render for line units an example of **pronounced organizational ability**. Unfortunately, there are many shortcomings in this area. The efficiency of our officers is mediocre, as far as work at the local level is concerned. We do not always take note of major faults; we tend to avoid looking at their causes. Greater stress should be placed on rendering line units and fleets assistance of a quality nature. Work should be conducted such that line units would look forward to visits by General Staff officers, with the intent of presentation of local problems for open exchanges of ideas between line unit commanders and General Staff representatives, on a basis of confidence in the belief that the problems will be properly understood, reported to higher authorities, and followed up with corrective action.

We have undoubtedly accomplished much in the last two years. However, certain problems have not been given the attention they deserve, while others have not been taken up at all. This is especially noticeable in the implementation of quality factors in Armed Forces construction. There is a reason for this. Several generations have been brought up on the basis of quantity factors. However, the present is a time when we all must learn how to think and work in a new way; look ahead more boldly; and seek nontraditional solutions. Stated briefly, we should be more active in effecting reconstruction and take more vigorous action in the practical implementation of matters on the local level; exert greater efforts in total abandonment of stagnation elements; and seek more effective solutions to problems facing the Armed Forces. It is up to us to wage a decisive struggle against departmentalism and strive for more complete utilization of internal resources and capabilities. We must place greater demands in the resolution of these problems on main headquarters of the Armed Forces, main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense, chiefs of the combat arms and services, commanders and staffs of military districts, groups of forces, and fleets.

I consider it necessary to emphasize once again that perestroika in the Armed Forces is not a matter of a single day. For the General Staff to occupy a superior position, we must constantly—day after day—increase and improve our work. We must constantly learn how to employ a forthright approach in the accomplishment of our tasks.

The most responsible phase of preparing for the 28th Party Congress lies ahead of us. We all must take a

definite stand and take action such that every day we can forge ahead—perhaps by one step—to produce definite practical results.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-Istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1990.

Moiseyev Interviewed on 45th Anniversary of WW II Victory

90UM0371B Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 1990 (Signed to press 26 Feb 90) pp 14-16

[Interview with Army General M. A. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces, by Major General V. I. Filatov, chief editor, VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL; on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War: "The Price of Victory"; place of interview not given; first paragraph is VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL introduction]

[Text] The editorial office has been receiving many letter requests for information on losses suffered by the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. On the eve of the 45th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in this war, Major General V. I. Filatov, chief editor of the VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, interviewed Army General M. A. Moiseyev, chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces, on this subject.

[Filatov] Mikhail Alekseyevich, a number of recent publications (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, No 5 (5279) of 31 January 1990, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 24 January 1990, and others) cites various figures on losses suffered by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In this connection, the "scatter" of these figures is fairly broad: from 10 to 12 and up to 22 and more million men. What can you tell us in this regard?

[Moiseyev] I am familiar with those publications. I can say only that their information is based on conjecture, not documentary materials. We are partly to blame here: We kept data on the casualties secret for a long time. The facts were known to few people—those who were cleared for access to sensitive documents. In addition, we had not analyzed the pertinent documents available to the General Staff. In 1988 and 1989 there were two commissions involved with the analysis and computation of losses suffered by the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. One dealt with personnel, the other with armaments and military equipment. The results of the work accomplished by the commissions have been reviewed and approved.

I would like to preface my presentation of the figures by stating that they are less than the ones you cited as appearing in the press, but they nevertheless are substantial.

The Soviet Armed Forces lost during the years of the Great Patriotic War (including the Far East Campaign waged against imperialist Japan in 1945) in the form of killed in action, missing in action, taken prisoner and never returned, dead as a result of wounds, illness or accident, a total of 8,668,400 men. Of this number, the Army and Navy lost 8,509,300; internal troops, 97,700; border troops, 61,400. In addition, the total number of those that suffered gunshot and other wounds, concussion, frost, and illness amounted to 18,000,000 men (including men that suffered one, two or more wounds), with the overwhelming majority returning to duty or civilian life after therapy. The above figures have been derived from reports submitted by fronts, fleets, independent armies, and rear installations, and have been collated with figures compiled throughout the war by the General Staff.

It should be noted that the above amounts are the maximum possible, since some of those listed as missing in action and taken prisoner did return.

[Filatov] Why were the data on losses not published for such a long period of time?

[Moiseyev] As you know, until recently a general ban was in effect. Documents dealing with casualties were stamped TOP SECRET, with access closely controlled. We have recently removed that classification. However, the documents are one of a kind; many exist in only a single copy. For this reason, access to them will apparently be restricted until pertinent information can be published.

[Filatov] Please tell us in which periods of the Great Patriotic War and in which operations Soviet troops suffered the heaviest losses.

[Moiseyev] Citing the casualties year by year, they were a maximum in 1941, amounting in a six-month period to more than 20 percent of total losses suffered for the entire period of the war. In 1942, we took about a third of the total number of irrecoverable losses suffered in the war. In other words, we suffered the heaviest casualties when Soviet troops were forced to fall back, were encircled, and abandoned their defensive positions under pressure of superior enemy forces on the main axes of enemy advance.

Relative to operations, I can cite the Battle of Smolensk, and the Kiev and Moscow defensive operations, in which our troops suffered the greater part of irrecoverable losses (about 1,500,000 men) in 1941. The heaviest casualties of 1942 occurred in the Battle of Kharkov, and the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad, Stalingrad, and North Caucasus defensive operations: about 1,000,000 men. They were also extensive in other operations during these two years of the war.

[Filatov] Can it be said that the depth of casualties taken by Soviet troops was due largely to quality of leadership, planning, and decision-making?

[Moiseyev] There is no doubt about that. The experience of the Great Patriotic War attests to that. Let me cite an example of an event that was minor compared to the entire war: the Lyuban Offensive Operation on the Volkhov Front. It was launched in January of 1942 with the commitment of two fresh armies, the 2d Shock Army and the 59th Army. Both armies were moved forward from the deep rear; the troops took up the attack position on the eve of the advance. They were short of ammunition, and the enemy had not been reconnoitered. In the first 36 hours of combat, the 2d Shock Army alone lost more than 3,000 men. Subsequently, after managing a narrow breach in the enemy's defense, troops of the 2d Shock Army fought bitterly after being partially encircled, then completely encircled. In six months of fighting, the 2d Shock Army took losses of more than 66,000 men dead, missing in action, and taken prisoner.

More serious miscalculations in troop command and control led to even larger losses in personnel, armaments, and materiel. Thus, in the Battle of Kharkov fought in the spring of 1942, the enemy encircled troops of the 6th Army, elements of the 57th and 9th armies, and the operations group of General Bobkin to annihilate them in a short period of time. The consequences of this were tragic for our troops: The front had been breached for a distance of more than 100 kilometers. Efforts by Soviet troops to reinforce the front were unsuccessful. The German-fascist troops were able to mount a powerful assault through this gap. That marked the beginning of the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Defensive Operation I spoke of above, in the course of which the Germans launched their offensive toward the Volga and the North Caucasus.

Soviet troops suffered heavy casualties in penetrating the prepared enemy defense during the initial phases of the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, and other offensive operations. Unfortunately, our historians have not studied well all the aspects. The end result of these operations tended to overshadow the price paid for victory in these operations.

In the course of the war, Soviet commanders, generals and staffs generally acquired experience in conducting both defensive and offensive battles and operations. Our troops took fewer casualties. Skillful direction and leadership of troops entrusted to them did play a part in attaining victory.

[Filatov] Mikhail Alekseyevich, what can you tell us about irrecoverable losses of armaments and materiel?

[Moiseyev] They have also been computed. In absolute amounts and as a percentage of the resources (total of that available as of the beginning of the war and that received from all sources during the period of the war: industry, lend-lease, and other sources), the losses were: small arms—almost 15,500,000 units, or 53 percent; tanks and self-propelled artillery—96,500 pieces, or 73.3

percent; artillery guns and mortars—317,500 pieces, or about 50 percent; combat aircraft—88,300 units, or 31.8 percent of the resources.

A look at the figures indicates that tanks and self-propelled artillery constitute a high percentage of the irrecoverable losses. This is due to the fact that the Soviet troops had lost almost all their tanks (20,500 out of the 22,600 available in the Soviet Army before war broke out) in the beginning of the war, in the year 1941. I must qualify the last statement by saying that of the 20,500 tanks that were irrecoverably lost, 16,500 were in need of major or medium repair and had a limited range. Some of them were obsolete.

A large number of tanks was lost in 1943-1944, a period that marked the major turning point of the war, when the Soviet Army mounted a broad offensive on the entire Soviet-German front and generally penetrated the enemy's prepared defenses.

I would like to highlight an important situation experienced toward the end of 1941 by the army in the field, which by that time had suffered the following losses stated as a percentage of materiel available before the war broke out: small arms—67; tanks—91; artillery guns and mortars—90; combat aircraft—90. In the last half of 1941, industry could replace the following losses stated as a percentage: small arms—only 30; tanks—27; artillery guns and mortars—58; combat aircraft—55.

Thus, at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, armament availability was not only insufficient to restore combat readiness of the army in the field, but was so poor that it could not support deployment of Supreme High Command reserve units, which in accordance with Supreme High Command plans were to participate in routing the enemy forces. The result was that the winter offensive of 1941-1942 that had been launched had no chance of a successful outcome. The greatest advance made (150 to 250 kilometers) was made by troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts. In other sectors of the Soviet-German Front—near Novgorod and Kharkov—the advance terminated, as I said above, in substantial setbacks for the Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1942.

[Filatov] What can you tell us about losses suffered by fascist Germany? Some published accounts insist that they were negligible compared to those of the Soviets.

[Moiseyev] It is unpleasant to compare casualties numbering in the millions. Nonetheless, the losses suffered by fascist Germany were just as large. The fact is that the fascist High Command was forced to call for a total mobilization toward the end of the war. That should be kept in mind. Documents in our possession indicate that fascist Germany's casualties amounted to about 5,500,000 men. In this connection, it should be kept in mind that the count of irrecoverable casualties provided

in the documents refers to only combat units and personnel of German nationality. The losses suffered by Hitlerite Germany's satellites are calculated to amount to 1,200,000 men.

[Filatov] Now for the final question. Has the analysis of losses the Armed Forces suffered in the Great Patriotic War been completed, and what remains to be done in the near future?

[Moiseyev] The work is continuing, of course. First, preparation for publishing of the All-Union Book of Remembrance (with Army General I. N. Shkadov as chairman of the editorial committee) has touched off a vast project dealing with compiling a list of names of those who gave their lives in defense of our Motherland. This raises hopes that the effort will result in the compilation of more accurate figures on irrecoverable personnel casualties.

Second, work has been initiated, in collaboration with party organs and social organizations, to search for unknown or little-known graves of soldiers killed in action; rectify communal graves and cemeteries; and erect monuments, including the determination of names of persons interred therein.

The above work in the Ministry of Defense has been assigned to the Unofficial Coordination Center for Perpetuating the Memory of Defenders of the Motherland, which is headed by my deputy, Colonel General A. N. Kleymenov. Participating in this effort are the Military Archives.

The Unofficial Coordination Center coordinates its actions closely with local party and soviet organs, the Central Committee of the VLKSM [All-Union Komsomol], military commissariats, and military councils of districts, groups of forces, and fleets.

I would like to emphasize that the noble activity of perpetuating the memory of Soviet soldiers is a matter for all the people. It should play a role in serving one of the goals of perestroika: effectively nurturing our people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalism.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-Istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1990.

Lack of Good NCO's

90UM0379A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 1990
(Signed to press 02 Feb 90) pp 18-19

[Letter to editors from Maj I. Panchenko under the rubric "Opinions, Suggestions: The *KOMMUNIST* VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Mail": "I Have a Suggestion: Should the Officer Sleep in the Barracks?"]

[Text] In one of the issues of *KOMMUNIST* VOORUZHENNYKH SIL I read the article "Once More About the Army's Prestige." I have the impression that the debate surrounding the army is not dying down but is actually heating up—dangerous debate from the

standpoint of public opinion. The situation which has developed in the army is well known to everyone. And it is good that this was made possible. Many people today are talking about the release of students, for example. In my opinion, this was a hasty act. Perhaps those soldiers whose civilian professions are truly needed by the nation should have been released first. The best trained group of soldiers were discharged, those capable of grasping modern military information well and being real junior commanders.

This means that in the near future the corps of NCO's and lower ranking personnel will deteriorate significantly in quality. The load on company- and platoon-level commanders will increase, and we can anticipate a new wave of requests for discharge from the Armed Forces. Our officers are patient and hardy, to be sure. They accept years of poor housing and low pay, but they are most dissatisfied with their lack of personal life and leisure time opportunities.

This is in part a result of the fact that the NCO has practically disappeared from our army. More correctly, he exists, but not as a commander. And nature, as we know, abhors a vacuum. The NCO/commander has disappeared and been replaced by the so-called "ded."

It is certainly no coincidence that the debate includes many suggestions for combatting "dedovshchina." All of this is understandable. But then the battle has been underway a long time. Just what have we not tried? And what are the results? The subunits have now begun another round of establishing "peaceful coexistence" among soldiers at different stages in their service. Sooner or later, however, we will have to face up the problem of the junior commanders, because this problem is troubling us more every day.

And the following statement has to be made.

A third of the personnel in the reduced units are junior commanders. The personnel are swamped with house-keeping tasks, just as they are everywhere else. There is no distinction between commanders and subordinates. They all work as equals.

I therefore feel that at the present time the companies do not need a lot of NCO positions. Four or five junior commanders are perfectly adequate. However, they must be at least a year or a year and a half older than their subordinates, well developed and better trained. Another thing: If we cannot establish a professional army, then let us at least scrape up some crumbs for the NCO. Let us raise his prestige materially and morally and guarantee him leave time.

I believe that if this matter is brought out, there will be many worthwhile suggestions, and they will not tax the budget greatly. We are losing more now, after all. No one calculates the loss in rubles from accidents, deaths or maiming of personnel. It is all due in great part to the fact there is no real junior commander. The officer continues to pay for everything. And his patience is not

infinite. Certain mamas and papas propose removing officers because there is "dedovshchina" in the subunits. But how they beg not to have their offspring taken to court when the latter are involved.

The officer needs to be defended today. And that defense should involve, among other things, protecting him from being punished for the infractions of subordinates. A thorough investigation is needed, and not a search for shortcomings in the commander's performance. He should bear blame only for failing to take steps when preconditions for an accident are revealed, when a serviceman comes to him with a complaint, and so forth. I also believe that the officer needs to be relieved of unnecessary paper work. He will be able to work far more productively. We should look at existing positive experience for achieving this.

In certain fraternal armies, for example, the officers are issued prepared conspectuses for political classes, with margins for citing additional examples and outlining the progression of the class. We too could produce paid or free supplements to KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL. Why draw up extra conspectuses? This could also be done for the technical training.

We also have numerous other problems we need to think about. How to strengthen military discipline, for example. I feel that legal experts subordinate only to their own organs should be added in the units in the near future in order to establish order in the forces. The legal work could then be conducted more effectively. This would eliminate the flow of letters and complaints from the units to other echelons about the illegality of certain instructions and orders.

I also consider it essential to establish the position of instructor for the youth. We allocate beggarly funds for working with the youth. Leisure time facilities for the youth are modest, and even they are mostly made by the personnel themselves. But then at least some support and incentives should be provided even for this kind of endeavor.

I also want to say that it is time to establish a centralized system for supplying the troops with bulletin boards, orderly's logs, legal information sources and a great many other things which exist in the barracks. This will relieve the commander of the need to search for supplies and eliminate illegal earnings and the constant alterations.

One more suggestion: In view of the increasing numbers of unofficial associations and the fact that many of their members are inducted into the army, perhaps we need to acquaint the current future officers with the activities and give them an opportunity to take part in the debates of these associations. We need not fear suffering some defeats in the debates at first. This will provide practice for the future work. Here is something else I want to say. I believe that the political study groups should be separated according to educational level. The instructor would then be able to maneuver his efforts better and

devote greater attention to the weaker soldiers. All the more, since he has a shortage of time, and not everyone can give extra classes or set up groups for the study of the Russian language.

The military is also a sort of production process, in which the officers are the organizers. They need to be trained. The time has come to have specialists. The dilettantes have cost us too much. By making the officer sleep in the barracks, we did not solve the problems of getting closer to the soldier. We only made people mad. I believe that we must either do something about the NCO situation or we need compensation—official compensation—for the vigil of the OIC's, for the large number of details and so forth.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1990.

Military Deputies Interviewed on Current Problems of Armed Forces

90UM0379B Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 1990
(Signed to press 02 Feb 90) pp 36-49

[Interview with Maj V. Zolotukhin, Col N. Petrushenko and Col A. Tsalko by Maj S. Temirbiyev, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL stringer, under the rubric "Platform for the People's Deputy": "We Are Not 'Superfluous People' in the Parliament"]

[Text] During the period of the congresses of people's deputies of the USSR and sessions of the nation's Supreme Soviet, one heard nothing but "Did you watch...?" "Did you listen...?" "Did you read...?" And it could not have been otherwise. Fateful issues of the restructuring were being decided, after all. In the unabated, acute debates one constantly heard the constructive, deliberate voices of those chosen by the people from the Armed Forces. Just who are they? What is their vital, civic stance? How do they manage to combine their duties as deputies and military men? Three of them—Maj V. Zolotukhin, Col N. Petrushenko and Col A. Tsalko—are interviewed here by Maj S. Temirbiyev, our stringer.

Biographical data: Vladimir Petrovich Zolotukhin, major, permanent SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondent for the Red Banner Turkestan Military District and the republics of Central Asia; born in 1976; Russian; completed Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni V.I. Lenin; served as platoon commander, secretary of unit Komsomol committee, assistant chief for Komsomol work of school political section, deputy commander for political affairs of motorized rifle battalion, correspondent/organizer for Turkestan Military District's newspaper FRUNZEVETS; performed international duty in Afghanistan; awarded medals.

Elected from Tashkent-Kuybyshev Territorial District 599 in Tashkent Oblast, Uzbek SSR.

[Temirbiyev] Vladimir Petrovich, various opinions are heard about the army today. What do you think of them, in view of the fact that some of them are unjustifiably aggressive?

[Zolotukhin] As a military man it is naturally unpleasant for me to hear bad things about the army. But the word "unpleasant" is from the realm of emotions. As a deputy I therefore always try to heed and draw conclusions from objective criticism. I try to convince those comrades who are not objective that their point of view is incorrect. When it comes to direct attacks, I try to issue a fitting rebuff in each specific case. But I also dislike overly eulogistic comments about the army. We do have a lot of deficiencies, after all. And we are combatting them.

I especially have to point out the following, though. One cannot fail to see that some people are attempting to depict the army as something alien, even opposed to the society. Especially since the well-known events in Tbilisi.... I therefore see my job and that of the other military deputies primarily as one of seeing to it that the army is not perceived as something in opposition to the society. It is a part of the latter, a segment of it. Any attempt to "separate" it from the society brings me to protest.

The main thing is to expose such attempts with solid reasoning. For example, one has to react to attempts by individual deputies to resolve "branch" problems at the army's expense, forgetting that the army also has many problems. It seems that the army has ceased to be an object of concern of the entire people.

You no doubt remember the articles in the central press which proposed that that part of the units' life which does not have to do directly with ensuring combat readiness be placed under the control of the local soviets. So that the local soviets feel responsible for everything occurring in the military collectives. I feel that this would be a good thing. But how was it regarded by certain officials in the Ministry of Defense? As an encroachment upon their sacred pillars. They opposed it. As a result the army and the people have not become closer and the gap separating them has not been reduced.

[Temirbiyev] So perhaps there should be a common organizational and political platform from which the deputies from the Armed Forces could operate?

[Zolotukhin] Yes, it is time for us to work out a unified position. We are not having much success for now, however. It was suggested that a club of military deputies be formed under the aegis of the Main Political Directorate. It was planned to hold the first session this September. It did not take place until the middle of October, though. As a result there was a delay in beginning the development of the unified program, and it has proceeded very slowly. We have therefore found ourselves somewhat scattered for purposes of making important decisions.

[Temirbiyev] Could you cite some examples?

[Zolotukhin] Take the decision to release students from the army. I agree that they should not be drafted. Since this was a reality, however, it should not have been ignored. Particularly since many former students occupied positions of responsibility in the units and on the ships. And then, out of the blue... this decision.... Was it completely thought through? Hardly. The effects are presently being felt in many military collectives.

[Temirbiyev] And there are many such problems requiring a deliberated approach in our army reality, aren't there?

[Zolotukhin] Of course. We recently conducted a sociological study through FRUNZEVETS. We calculated the family budget of a young officer. It turned out that he receives less than 70 rubles per family member, which is below the subsistence level. And this is in a situation of scarce goods and monetary inflation! And then many of them do not have apartments. The officer spends days on end on the job. The wife does not work. Arrangements cannot be made for the children; there are no kindergartens or nurseries.

Is it surprising that there is a sharp increase in the divorce rate among young officers? That these officers do not want to serve in the army? That the Ministry of Defense has been flooded with requests for discharge? They are now being discharged only for discrediting the rank of officer. But we are soon to adopt a new Law on Defense, which will contain a statute on the procedure for serving. There will apparently be a point permitting an officer to leave the army after a certain period of time has elapsed. I am confident that the flood of officers wanting to be discharged will increase drastically. We must take the most resolute steps right now, before it is too late, to prevent the army from "disintegrating." We need to increase interest in the service.

[Temirbiyev] Vladimir Petrovich, it is strange to hear you say "apparently be a point." Do you, a people's deputy of the USSR, actually not know at least the approximate substance of this law?

[Zolotukhin] Of course I do. But just look at what is happening at the sessions of the Supreme Soviet and in the congresses of the nation's people's deputies. How can one guarantee that the law which is passed will not differ drastically from this draft?!

[Temirbiyev] Yes, it would be difficult to guarantee that. But interest in the service still has to be increased. How do you think this should be done?

[Zolotukhin] By considerably improving the material situation, of course. I believe that we shall do that in any case, and fairly soon. In addition, we need to go to work to establish a normal infrastructure at the military posts. We need to provide the officers with furnished apartments (containers of furniture "roaming" our enormous nation from one end to the other, even abroad—Is that helping anyone?!). We need to give all members of servicemen's families the benefit of paid travel to and

from their place of leave. And what about those food rations worth R20? Just try to live a month on such a ration. We must also considerably improve the medical support, particularly for children, and so forth.

And who do we have entering the military schools today? Among the graduate students there are many who earned "twos," irresponsible people. And these are the people to whom we will entrust the homeland's defense some day!

If we do not think about this now, in five years we will have to pay officers five-seven times as much to get people to join the army from "civilian life."

And how the prestige of the service has fallen! I recently attended some assemblies of secretaries of party organizations in Alma-Ata. A major, secretary of a regimental party organization, whose name I do not recall, spoke. The man was apparently fed up. "Don't give us more money," he said, "Give us more prestige!"

[Temirbiyev] But one does not build prestige with appeals alone....

[Zolotukhin] That is right. We need also to think about the officer's material situation and about the fostering of prestige. And to remember that the military man is socially protected, so that he cannot become the victim of a chief's liking or dislike.

[Temirbiyev] But some things are already being done, are they not? Take just the decree passed by the USSR Council of Ministers on the provision of housing for servicemen, the recent raise in the officers' pay, a large number of other benefits....

[Zolotukhin] It is all moving at a turtle's pace. Radical measures are needed. Is it not ironic to have a super-modern fighter piloted by a man worried about whether he chopped wood for his wife or brought in water from the well, or about the fact that the baby has to be taken to a doctor, and he is stationed 70 kilometers from the rayon center?! Can a country count on a reliable defense without taking care of the person who provides that defense?

[Temirbiyev] That is certainly not a rhetorical question, of course. And you are obviously posing it for yourself and the people's deputies and for the nation as a whole. I would like to ask you this in that connection. There is serious concern in the army today that certain forces, hiding behind the concepts of renewal, are in the final analysis leading toward the society's political and ideological destabilization. The mass media are increasingly being used for furthering these efforts. The cutting edge of the attack is focused on eroding the process of military-patriotic indoctrination and on defaming the Soviet Armed Forces. In the opinion of the authors of the Vzgl'yad program the Orlenok and Zarnitsa [military sports games] are a throwback to stagnation and instill militaristic thinking in the children. The protest against the sports games and preparation of the youth to serve in the army is turning into a protest against the army itself.

[Zolotukhin] It is only normal that views which seem unconventional to many people are being expressed in the press and on television. We live today in a situation of pluralism of opinions. It is not the job of the ideological workers to run down the point of view presented on *Vzglyad* but to defend their own, intelligently and with solid arguments. Remember what Voltaire said to one of the deputies in the French parliament? "Your viewpoint is profoundly repugnant to me, but I am prepared to give my life to defend your right to express it."

It is the greatest gain of the restructuring when every individual can have his own view on things and not fear that he will be defamed or sent to prison or to a psychiatric hospital!

[Temirbiyev] A grave accusation was made against the army following the events in Tbilisi. A lot is being said and written about that. The military also have their opinion on the matter. For some reason it does not interest the authors of articles and the TV producers, however. The commission will get to the bottom of it, they say. In the meantime, however, the military have to shake it off and vindicate themselves.... How can they protect the homeland without the trust of the people?

[Zolotukhin] Who gave the order to use the Armed Forces? That is the question. To be honest, I feel sorry for the military personnel who took part in the events in Tbilisi. They were carrying out orders! I understand, of course, that the order was unlawful. And now, if you recall, the deputies from Georgia have been capitalizing on that. Nor are the deputies from the Baltic area remaining on the sideline. But the events in Tbilisi taught us something else. It is unlikely today that anyone would dare to use the army as a tool of intimidation.

[Temirbiyev] Vladimir Petrovich, now something about combining the duties of journalist and deputy....

[Zolotukhin] I am frequently asked to do that. I should probably begin by saying that every journalist is something of a politician. It therefore seems like a harmonious combination to me. Every official reception day one receives visitors, 50 to 60 people. One has a leaking roof; apartment repairs were performed poorly for another. Roads have to be built, a new bus route opened.... And I have to engage in all of this, of course, since the soviets actually have little real authority locally....

I see my job differently, though. I have to do everything within my power to see that the soviets pass laws which are carefully thought out, to see that the local authorities themselves decide whether the city's people need another bus route, and so forth. The mentality of the people is presently changing before one's eyes. Many are beginning to understand that they cannot count on a generous uncle, that they have to believe first and foremost in themselves, in their own abilities.

[Temirbiyev] Vladimir Petrovich, I am confident that you have some vivid impressions also of the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies. Could you share them at least briefly?

[Zolotukhin] There are a lot of impressions, of course, both joyful ones producing optimism and sad ones. Among the former I would mention the impression created on me by the meeting of officers/people's deputies of the USSR with N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. It was held in an atmosphere of extremely open exchange of opinions on the situation which has developed today in the Armed Forces.

We expressed to Nikolay Ivanovich our concern about the fact that the restructuring is occurring too slowly in the army and navy (the nation's Supreme Soviet has divorced itself from the development of a precise concept for the military reform underway). We underscored the fact that this reform cannot be left up to the Ministry of Defense alone, that it must be one of the main tasks of the entire deputy corps.

N.I. Ryzhkov said that he is deeply troubled by the drop in prestige for the Armed Forces and spoke out in favor of outlining a system of measures to develop an attitude of respect for the people in uniform. He also promised to help us officers/people's deputies of the USSR to solve the problems facing us and advised us to enter more boldly into open dialog and direct communication with the people.

The deputies commented that the Committee for Defense and State Security, as it is presently constituted, performs apathetically and is frequently far removed from current problems. N.I. Ryzhkov responded by saying that the committee's composition needs to be optimized. In the opinion of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the committee should have competent people truly concerned with the restructuring in the Armed Forces....

Biographical data: Nikolay Semenovich Petrushenko, colonel, instructor for propaganda and agitation in political section of large unit; born in 1950, Belorussia; CPSU member since 1972; served in Armed Forces since 1969; completed Kharkov Tank Command School as external student, Sverdlovsk Higher Military Political Tank-Artillery School by correspondence; served as secretary of Komsomol committee, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, unit propagandist, chief of school for party aktiv; awarded medals.

Elected from Leningrad Territorial District 622 in East Kazakhstan Oblast, Kazakh SSR.

[Temirbiyev] Nikolay Semenovich, the restructuring is no doubt "to blame" for the fact that discussions of so-called forbidden subjects, relatively rare "private" discussions in the recent past, are now turning into hundreds and thousands of letters sent to the most

diverse authorities, even to the party Central Committee and the UN The Semipalatinsk Test Range, for example....

This issue already has its own history. The so-called "Semipalatinsk disturbances" occurred back in '68. Today we all know about the Nevada society in Kazakhstan, which demands a complete ban on nuclear testing, and Doctors of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War are trying to get the test range closed....

Everyone is aware today that a critical situation has developed in the area of Semipalatinsk. The residents of the region, your electors, naturally want you to be on their side. The department in which you are employed naturally counts on your loyalty....

[Petrushenko] I managed to resolve the conflict between the interests of the department and the electors to some degree back at the stage of the preelection campaign. It was the keystone not just of my election campaign. My foes kept saying: Petrushenko is a "militarist"; he will work for the interests of the military. The people trusted me, however, and more than two thirds of the electors voted for me. I have to say, though, that some candidates did not always demonstrate responsibility in informing the people. Comrade Lobov, among others. He announced during the preelection campaign that the test range would be closed. The news was greeted with thunderous applause. And many candidates withdrew in favor of Comrade Lobov.... I then had to take a closer look at the problems surrounding the test range and study prospects for halting nuclear explosions.

[Temirbiyev] And what is your position on this matter?

[Petrushenko] I try to look at things soberly. I recall the recent situation pertaining to the moratorium on nuclear explosions. It was asserted in the newspapers at that time that explosions did not have to be performed in order to check the combat readiness of nuclear warheads, that this could be done in a laboratory. Some time later—that is, today—however, we have suddenly discovered that the detonations cannot be halted, that there is no alternative.

At every preelection meeting a mandate was approved to close the test range.... What was the fate of those mandates? In my naivete I thought in the beginning, after being elected a people's deputy of the USSR, that right away the Central Electoral Commission would inform the electors of all the mandates received, and we would make a decision on them. I assumed that the most important of them would be included in a plan for implementation. This did not happen, however. The bureaucratic apparatus, from the bottom up to the Supreme Soviet, screened out mandates, including those having to do with the test range at Semipalatinsk.

[Temirbiyev] But why do we need explosions if, as you maintain, there are laboratory methods?

[Petrushenko] They are needed primarily in order to work out the technological principles for a fundamentally new weapon, a laser with nuclear pumping. The Americans have been working on such a weapon for a long time under the SDI program, and we do not want to fall behind. Unfortunately, however, neither the USSR Supreme Soviet nor the deputy corps in general is adequately well informed on the need for this. I have the impression that Academician Velikhov, a deputy whom I respect, is performing the theoretical research himself and himself financing and controlling the expenditure of the funds. That is, few people can say just what the program of nuclear explosions is, what we are exploding, and why. This is why voices are heard at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet calling for a unilateral halt to nuclear explosions.

[Temirbiyev] Nikolay Semenovich, as a military man it would be very simple for you to take a dosimeter and measure the radiation level in the area of the testing range, would it not?

[Petrushenko] Yes. And I do that. I have visited the testing range and met with the scientists. But this creates certain complications. I believe my own eyes, and I can see that the radiation level is not dangerous, that it is within the natural background range. But just try to prove this to the electors! After all, explosions—both hydrogen and atomic—were conducted there. Just try to prove today that the emission of so-called noble gases is harmless. Our East Kazakhstan Oblast is directly adjacent to the nuclear testing ground. And, according to the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Health, our oblast has the highest incidence of deaths from cardiovascular diseases and malignancies.

This situation stems from the overall ecological crisis, but that does not make it easier. People understand that we can not go on this way.

[Temirbiyev] But something is being done at the sites to solve the problem, is it not?

[Petrushenko] It is. An ecology meeting was recently held, at which a people's deputy spoke. Comrade Nosikov, first secretary of the Ust-Kamenogorsk city party committee, made a speech. The audience started to whistle. He came up with a simple solution. He proposed that they approve a letter to M.S. Gorbachev. The prestige of the leader of the restructuring had its effect, which was what [Nosikov] was counting on. The crowd quieted down, and a party official read the letter containing a request that the nuclear explosion center be closed. Do you see what that amounted to? He was thereby giving the people to understand that all their troubles stemmed from the testing range. I myself know, however, that the testing range is only part of the problem. What about the open mines, the industrial giants which emit dozens of tons of toxic substances into the atmosphere—the lead and zinc and the titanium and manganese combines, and the nuclear engineering works?

The people have been deceived and kept in ignorance long enough. Incidentally, this applies also to us military people. I believe that the Ministry of Defense would benefit considerably from setting up the production of personal dosimeters. The tension has dropped markedly where the rural soviets have these instruments. We need to address the people more extensively and send specialists to talk to them. Perhaps even send a special lecture group....

[Temirbiyev] Nikolay Semenovich, there is extensive discussion about the army in our mass media today. There are many reasonable ideas among the different opinions. It is obvious that most Soviet people want to see the army strong and capable of protecting the peaceful labor of the people. One also encounters criticism for the sake of criticism, though, even defamation of the Armed Forces. Who benefits from this?

[Petrushenko] There are real forces in our society attempting to drive a wedge between the army and the people. On the one hand, there are people who sacredly believe in the need to democratize the society and are doing a lot to achieve this: historians, writers, members of the creative intelligentsia.... Educated people, they allow of the possibility of military interference in politics. This is how I explain their efforts to remove from the army the halo of "sacredness" with which it was surrounded until recently.

Another force consists of right-wingers who are interested in returning to the old ways and halting the process of democratization and restructuring. They turn first of all to the military in their search for allies, which seems perfectly natural to them. By inciting hatred for the army, they want to lead the higher military circles to the very specific idea: Look at you. Just yesterday you were perhaps the most highly respected segment of the society. Brezhnev himself wanted a marshal's uniform.... But who are you now, if anyone can sling mud at the army in passing, if some kid from Vzglyad can talk as an equal with a marshal, even argue with him?

Finally, there is a third force, perfectly real and powerful. This is the Mafia. It was convinced by the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic, in Fergana, Tbilisi, Novyy Uzen, Baku and other areas that the army is that organized force which is capable of resisting it, of halting the spread of that fire which the Mafia is fanning in its own interests. The corrupt elements are therefore more interested perhaps than anyone else in weakening and discrediting the army.

All of this is to one degree or another influencing the army and contributing to anti-army sentiments. This is why we are having a hard time of it today.

[Temirbiyev] In your opinion, how can we get out of the situation which has developed today with respect to the cadres, particularly the young officers? After all, it could come to a point at which there would be no one to serve tomorrow....

[Petrushenko] The causes are clear. There has been a decline in the prestige of military personnel, the prestige of the service and finally, the prestige of professionalism. And then the material situation of the officers does not stand up to any kind of criticism. I have dozens of letters. You can look at them. What are the authors writing about? The fact that people have stopped appreciating the officer as a professional—a tankman, a pilot, an artilleryman. The fact that they work at all sorts of things, but not at their real jobs. There are housekeeping tasks, the harvesting of the crops, the infamous feverish preparations for a visit by a superior commander. They write about favoritism and nepotism, things which are fairly widespread in the army but little studied. They produce indifference in the young officers. The honorable but "hamstrung" ones know that whether or not they work hard, it will not be properly appreciated. And the so-called "fair-haired boys" can rest easy: When the time comes they will receive the colonel's or general's shoulderboards. Why put oneself out?

With respect to the present impasse, I believe that the way out is through democratization of the army and in the future, enhancing its professionalism. We need reform. What specifically should it consist of? I believe that this should be determined primarily by us military people, the readers of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL—that is, democratically, taking into account the opinions of all categories of servicemen. The reform must occur at both the top and the bottom. Few people have faith in reforms only from the top. How many "drastic" measures we have already had! Remember the manning by inductions? What did it produce? And the release of the students? Why is it that the opinion of the professionals—that is, those who work directly with the personnel—does not interest the military leaders, including the deputies?

[Temirbiyev] Nikolay Semenovich, Tell us something about the urgent areas of the deputy's work. What especially concerns you today?

[Petrushenko] I believe that the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy are exhibiting unforgivable passivity in consolidating the forces of the deputies, who should and can defend the interests of the homeland's defenders. I see the agricultural specialists, workers in education and others get together after sessions to discuss their problems and work out their position, which they then present from the speaker's platform. And we? Perhaps we have no problems? If we do not resolve them, others will do it for us—to the detriment of the army.

[Temirbiyev] And now this question. All of us are aware of the important role played by the mass media in the restructuring. Because of this, it would be interesting to learn, among other things, what you as a deputy and a reader think of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL.

[Petrushenko] Based on my observations, the newspaper's prestige has grown perceptibly. In great part primarily to its new content. You are doing the right thing. You need to delve into life more boldly, to reflect to the maximum degree the processes occurring in the army, taking into account the diverse interests of the reading public. The magazine continues to enjoy little popularity, however. As a propagandist I can talk about an interesting and useful publication, and I will get a response in the people... until I say I am referring to KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL. It seems to me that you also need to explore a new format with equal boldness. The magazine's appearance is outmoded, I think. And then there are the same old type face and illustrations.... But those are your problems, and you apparently know best how to draw today's reader.

I want to discuss something else. It seems to me that the magazine today should be the initiator and organizer of all-army discussion on problems of the restructuring of party-political work and the structure of party and political organs. Why are we afraid to discuss these things openly? Many ideological workers sometimes have opposite views on the same matters. But do we know how to treat one another with respect? The recent All-Army Conference of Ideological Workers demonstrated that we do not. Deputy Podziruk took the floor at the conference, bringing an alternative point of view.... I want to say that the stamping of feet with which certain conference participants greeted Comrade Podziruk's address is no argument in a debate. We have already gone through this in the "primary classes of our democracy." We need to learn how to defend our views. And the magazine must help the reader with this.

Biographical data: Aleksandr Valeryanovich Tsalko, colonel, unit commander; born in Belorussia in 1946; member of CPSU since 1971; served in Armed Forces since 1963; completed higher military school, military academy; performed international duty in Afghanistan; awarded orders of Red Banner and For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR, 3rd degree, and medals.

Elected from Kalinin Territorial District 12 in the RSFSR.

[Temirbiyev] Aleksandr Valeryanovich, is it difficult to be a deputy and a unit commander simultaneously?

[Tsalko] You phrased it correctly: simultaneously. No one relieved me of my duties as a commander. Furthermore, I need to perform them at least as well as prior to my election. Otherwise, it would be difficult to count on the support of the people. And there are still just 24 hours in a day, six of which, no matter how you work at it, you have to spend resting....

[Temirbiyev] What is the key?

[Tsalko] Packing the hours as full as possible. Cutting out everything extraneous and unnecessary. Relying more

than in the past on the community, on the collective wisdom. I have to monitor more and trust more.

[Temirbiyev] Do you not have the feeling that a deputy's job is bigger than that of a commander?

[Tsalko] You know, there is that feeling. Perhaps because much of it is still unfamiliar and unaccustomed to me. One can work for days at a time, and still not get around to a lot of things. There is a mountain of local problems: roads in the Nonchernozem area. I have three oblasts: housing, ecology.... One cannot do it without relying upon public opinion and the collectives—scientific and labor—willing to help. There is a huge plant producing nitrogenous fertilizers in Novgorod, for example, and five kilometers west of there the Greens are fighting desperately for the ecological purity of the region. Many of the issues are beyond their understanding, however. The trouble is that with a practically constant westerly wind, the combine dumps more than 20 tons of emissions onto the city annually. There are also two insulated 10,000-ton containers of liquid ammonia, a highly active toxic substance.... With prompting from the Greens, the city residents sounded the alarm. But the local authorities said the plant is needed, and that was the end of it!

With the help of scientists I thoroughly studied the situation and agreed with the conclusions of the community. The city faces a real danger from the nitrogen monster. A deputy's query was sent to V. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman for emergency situations of the USSR Council of Ministers. I attached a petition from residents of the area and their conclusion that the city could be wiped out if urgent steps were not taken. As a result the quantity of ammonia stored in the containers was sharply reduced, one of the production lines was curtailed, preventive measures were carried out to preclude an accident at the combine.... The amount of harmful substances emitted into the air was reduced by 25%, and the city's residents noticed it immediately. Furthermore, while there was a shortage of workers at the plant in the past and labor discipline was therefore poor, the work stations are now manned and discipline is stronger. And so, with a single act it was possible to resolve a number of problems.

[Temirbiyev] And just who helped you?

[Tsalko] Military chemists, as an example. They made an extra-departmental expert appraisal, so to speak. A very thorough and objective one.

[Temirbiyev] Aleksandr Valeryanovich, many of the magazine's readers are concerned about the problem of the army air cadres. Isn't it ironic that a practice takeoff in a helicopter costs the state R800, while the pilot is paid less than half that per month?

[Tsalko] Excuse me, but a takeoff costs more than that, and pilots are paid even less, although their pay rates were recently raised.... One has to admit, of course, that the cadre problem has intensified markedly also for us. To a lesser degree for flight personnel, because of their

devotion to their profession. But things are not all so simple even here. To the age of 27 years or so a pilot can be retained with enthusiasm, so to speak. As long as he is developing professionally, he will tolerate it all. Just let him keep his hands on the controls. During that period the material and living problems seem to remain in the background. But this is "deferred demand, and there comes a time when it will manifest itself. The interests of the pilot's family will also make themselves felt.

[Temirbiyev] And that time comes?

[Tsalko] Inevitably. Toward the age of 30 the pilot "suddenly" discovers that he has no money, no housing.... He is in poverty! Things couldn't be worse! I recently spoke at a meeting of a defense committee. Look at the Americans, I said. Their pilots last up to the age of 47, 10 years longer than ours. This costs us millions. We are forced to keep spending to place youth onto the line. At the age of 37 the pilot can see that his children are growing up, expenses are increasing, money is losing its value.... His job is not taking care of his family. He concludes that he needs to leave. He will have his pension plus what he can earn in civilian life. He still has his hands and he is a professional, thank God, a real one.... But this is madness! A highly rated pilot leaves. What could be more costly?! And we let him go.... What is there to do?

[Temirbiyev] Indeed, what can be done?

[Tsalko] We need to retain them with more than just material benefits, although that is the main thing. Prestige is also important. It has many aspects, incidentally. You might have wondered, for example, why the aviator is esteemed by the people. Because when he exchanges his headgear for an Aeroflot cap, he doesn't cease to be a pilot, does he? In general, however, prestige is determined by public opinion, which is in turn shaped in great part by the mass media. I feel that the journalists, including the military journalists, have a lot to make up for when it comes to the army. They need to explain simple things to the people. People are as infected as can be with pacifism today.

There should be no war, that is true, but there could be. We must not confuse an immediate threat with a possible threat. There will be no attack today, probably tomorrow as well.... But look at how our nation has been ringed with bases, millions-strong armies are kept armed, weapons are constantly being modernized—both high-precision and conventional. And then we have such naivete.... It seems to me that our mass media have overshot their target. And now let us ask ourselves how the army could enjoy prestige in this situation as long as we are called parasites.

And take the reduction. It is obvious to me, a professional and a deputy, that this act was poorly thought out and prepared for. In addition to all else, it has produced psychological instability in certain categories of servicemen. I have already mentioned the pilots. Aeroflot will gladly take them tomorrow. But what about the

weapons specialists and those in the Air Force Engineer Service, those who service the weapons? Theirs is a limited specialty....

[Temirbiyev] You mean that it is more difficult with respect to the technical personnel?

[Tsalko] Of course. There are no clear prospects, their pay rates are lower, they are not first in line for housing.... We have taken the warrant officers today over the brink, as we say. And they are our pillars. We must not forget that. The lower-ranking soldiers and junior specialists work to themselves. A unit has around 100 soldiers, let us say. Five of those will be on detail, five are preparing to go on detail, and there are various kinds of patrol duty, traffic control, KP.... The commanders do not even see those soldiers.

[Temirbiyev] Do you have any suggestions?

[Tsalko] Of course. Otherwise, I would not be discussing it. Let there be 100 warrant officers instead of 100 soldiers. They do not need a barracks, a messhall either.... Our problem is not the soldier but the pilot. First of all we need a differentiated, common-sense approach to the professionalization of the army.

[Temirbiyev] Aleksandr Valeryanovich, it would appear that many of the thoughts which you have expressed came to you during your service in Afghanistan, did they not?

[Tsalko] I agree. I was in a war in Afghanistan. The helicopters worked day and night there. So that many of my opinions are based on experience. I do not claim to possess the absolute truth, but I will say that success is achieved where there is responsibility, personal and collective. What do we have today? The commander is responsible for everything; his subordinates for nothing. There should be a precisely defined hierarchy of responsibility. It should not be shifted from one to another. And being accountable does not mean that if there is an accident within the area under your control you will be hanged for sure. Responsibility is achieved with independent, objective demandingness.

I remember how a pair [of aircraft] would go on a combat mission in Afghanistan. I would not assign a controller to them. The commander was responsible for the completion of the assignment. His life was at stake, and there is no greater responsibility than that. Before releasing the pair, however, I would run through all sorts of possible and impossible situations with them. If not I, then that echelon which was required to do it. Even a situation in which the pilot could be shot down and captured. They prepared professionally—from takeoff to landing, at their own airfield. They practiced every move.

Another thing: I had a wide range of material and moral incentives. I could recommend a promotion in rank, a leave to the homeland, even though this was not strictly legal (Incidentally, no one was ever late returning by even an hour. A commander's trust creates an enormous

sense of responsibility in subordinates!), choice of a station after Afghanistan.... That is, total concern for the individual. On the other hand, I could also mete out the harshest of punishment: return to the Union (there was nothing more shameful than this) or bring them to administrative or even criminal account.

[Temirbiyev] And whom did you cross-check your actions against? Or did you operate without looking over your shoulder?

[Tsalko] There was no looking back. Cross-checking, with the collective serving as a kind of mirror, was another matter. When a person has a lot of authority, people begin trying to find ways to equal him. And sooner or later they do. That is the trouble. It is therefore very important not to lose one's ability to be self-critical. In Afghanistan we had something like an officers' assembly. I have to say that in general the people assessed situations very objectively and corrected me in good time when I was wrong. One needs to listen to the collective....

Much is different today, in "peacetime life." Do you know what is causing the most harm today? The leveling [of pay]. Pay rates are equal, regardless of performance. And then the regimental commander has no authority with respect to assignments. It has reached the point of being illogical: The army commander does the appointing. Let it be even the division commander. Does the Minister of Defense appoint the regimental commander so that no one can then remove him? How can he appoint someone he does not even know? And all the same, everything has to be entrusted to the commander of the district, the army....

[Temirbiyev] Once again, do you have any suggestions?

[Tsalko] Why not shift everything "to the left," for example, so that the division commander would appoint all commanders up to the battalion inclusive, and the army commander would appoint the regimental commanders. Authority to remove them would rest an echelon higher.

[Temirbiyev] And what would this give us?

[Tsalko] It would drastically reduce possibilities for favoritism, since everyone at the site would know each person well. The collective will simply not accept an unsuitable person as commander. And then why not introduce a pay-rate incentive (for obvious reasons I am not considering the so-called 13th pay period)? The officer's current pay rate could be taken as the basis, as the minimum. If he truly puts his all into the service, increase it by 50% or so. If, on the contrary, he performs poorly, he receives no increase. This evaluation of the officer's performance should be made on a monthly basis. Demandingness should increase markedly, of course. I agree with the way it is done in the American military. If a person fails to pass the physical, he is out. A professional should be a professional in all respects.

[Temirbiyev] Is the lack of responsibility also a result of the leveling?

[Tsalko] You know, it is in great part. The commanders need to be given real authority. They are closest to the personnel and they work with the latter, so hold them accountable. Why this high degree of centralization? When an accident occurs today, for example, the minister of defense himself gets involved. How expedient is that? The accident occurred in a regiment, so let the regimental commander handle it. There are exceptions, of course—when there is great damage.... In all other cases, there is a commander and a judge advocate. Let them get to the bottom of it.

[Temirbiyev] Have you had such instances?

[Tsalko] We have. A soldier was shot at his post. And the stir that ensued! We looked for the causes in the collective. I knew for sure that we do not have such people. In the aviation the soldiers are treated particularly well, almost like family. There are few of them, and they are visible. The blunders we made, the extent to which we got on one another's nerves and the clashes we had before we discovered that a mentally ill person had done it! This was convincingly confirmed by an expert medical examination.

[Temirbiyev] The difficulty also obviously stems from the fact that the law does not cover such situations. Is that so?

[Tsalko] That is absolutely correct. The officer is legally unprotected in such cases. Not to speak of the common soldiers. Here again, incidentally, we have the same levelling, with all the consequences stemming from it.

[Temirbiyev] Aleksandr Valeryanovich, what do you think about the release of students from the Armed Forces?

[Tsalko] In my opinion, a student should not serve. I am basically in favor of that. The action was not thought through, however. There was not enough time. There was great political pressure....

[Temirbiyev] They say that criticism is good when it is constructive....

[Tsalko] I understand. Specific proposals for eliminating the military departments. Let the student study and nothing distract him. But bear in mind that the time for military training will come—after the studies at the VUZ. Therefore get ready for it, physically and morally. The "military stuff," as the students call it—I have in mind the assemblies—should be conducted not in the regular units, where they will be directed by officers crippled by idleness, but at military schools, where an assembly line for turning out officers has been set up and adjusted. And they will be trained those three months for the position of junior commander. Then, into the ranks! Serve a year. If they are worthy of the officer's rank at the end of their term, they receive it. If not, let them serve some more, try hard and earn it!

There should be incentives, including material incentives. The NCO who undergoes military training after completing a VUZ is ordinarily a family man. He should therefore receive at least 100 rubles per family member. Everything would then fall into place. The NCO would be a real junior commander, higher intellectually, older, vested by law with real authority and with an interest in serving conscientiously. The platoon commander would then also cease to be a shepherd. And the soldiers would look upon him differently.

If we could make this a reality, I believe that we could start moving on our greatest problem, military discipline. Then we would not have the lack of order and discipline, and we would not have the losses: So many kids, so many young lives are lost due to our muddling! We would have real and not imaginary reserve officers. Real and not imaginary junior commanders. I believe that this would have a noticeable effect also upon the soldiers. Who is going to defend the homeland better, a person imbued with a sense of his own worth or one with the rudimentary slave mentality which gives rise to "dedovshchina"? The platoon commander would then not be afraid to leave the barracks. He would be backed by three real junior commanders who could be counted upon.

[Temirbiyev] The interim between the 1st and 2nd congress of the nation's people's deputies was filled with hard work by our parliament. What stuck in your mind?

[Tsalko] I can still not forget an incident pertaining to the formation of the Defense and State Security Committee. I am a professional military man. I have considerable practical experience in directing a large military collective and supporting the combat training process, including that acquired in Afghanistan. In short, I have something to tell and suggest to the committee. All of my attempts to become a member of the committee were steadfastly frustrated by P. Nishanov and Ye. Primakov, however. Ye. Primakov kept me waiting almost 40 minutes to use the microphone, preventing me from speaking. When he finally let me speak, he immediately began interrupting me—and fairly abruptly at that. They never did permit me to put my candidacy for membership on the committee to a vote....

I believe that the committee's poor performance in the interim between congresses—a fact which we deputies-and-officers pointed out to N.I. Ryzhkov, head of the Soviet Government, during a recent meeting—is due in great part to its makeup. It is dominated by inadequately competent and energetic people.

I also have to mention another impression from the 2nd congress. I was frankly disappointed by the fact that practically all of the progressive ideas were torpedoed by a "collaborating majority." I would even call it "organized and controlled".... There were frequent yells from the auditorium: "We need to get down to business! The economy!" Many people do not understand that it is not the economy which is hampering the restructuring but

the system of administration by command, with its ideological superstructure. We need first to resolve general issues and then move on to the specifics. Otherwise, as V.I. Lenin said, we shall constantly become mired down in those specifics....

[Temirbiyev] What would you like to say at the conclusion of our interview?

[Tsalko] Something about the need to consolidate the efforts of the military deputies. The process of getting elected differed for us, that is true. It was easier for some, more difficult for others. Irrespective of that, however, we are all concerned about the Armed Forces. None of us is indifferent. We cannot work as separate entities. We must get together, debate and work out common viewpoints and unified platforms. Each of us has his own acquired experience. We need to combine it, to multiply and divide it in order to arrive at common sense and aggressiveness. We missed out on the formation of the Supreme Soviet, and problems of state importance are being resolved there. Do the military have nothing to say in the matter? I feel that my job as a deputy is more important today than my work as a commander. I have someone to take my place in the unit, but is there anyone who can do my deputy's job for me? I am more needed here. And it is more difficult here. One has to study ideas and alternatives, meet with the deputies and fight for prestige. One has to move! Water does not flow beneath a stone lying on the bottom. In short, we deputies are not "superfluous people" in the parliament, as some people assert.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1990.

Report on Latvian Draft Law on Alternative Labor Service

90UM0444A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 2

[Report on the draft Law of the Latvian SSR on Alternative Labor Service by Deputy L.L. Bartkevich, chairman of the Commission for Developing the Draft Law of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet and deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, at the 15th session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation]

[Text] Respected deputies, implementing the decree passed by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet on 10 November 1989, the commission has worked out the draft Law on Alternative (Labor) Service, as well as pertinent amendments to and changes in the Administrative Infractions Code, the Code of Labor Laws, the Civil Procedure Code and the Criminal Code of the Latvian SSR and is submitting them for consideration to the Supreme Soviet deputies.

Developing the draft law as one step toward practical realization of the Declaration of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet on the State Sovereignty of Latvia, the

commission took into account the Constitution of the Latvian SSR, the standards set forth in international documents and the positive experience of other states in this matter, as well as the republic's specific conditions.

Legal experts, members of the Armed Forces, representatives of religious persuasions and philosophers—everyone with a desire to express his thoughts—were invited to attend the commission session. It also considered and took into account in many respects proposals from public organizations.

The draft law was discussed in the Commission for Youth Affairs and the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet and at a session of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The pacifist and religious convictions of citizens which do not permit them to serve in the Armed Forces were an object of the draft law in accordance with the second part of Article 61 of the Constitution.

At the same time, the legislator specified that only pacifists or religious convictions are a basis for performing alternative labor service. Therefore, no other reasons, including ideological or political convictions, can be taken as a basis for performing this service. This desire of the legislator was binding on the commission.

Similar laws of other nations also do not list ideological or political convictions as a reason for performing alternative labor service.

Pacifist and religious convictions are defined in the draft law. The fact should be stressed that the laws of other nations do not contain these definitions.

The standards set forth in the draft law apply only to those individuals who are deemed suitable for military service based on health and social situation.

Added to this stipulation is the provision that full-time VUZ students, students at clerical institutions and ordained priests are completely exempted from the performance of alternative labor service.

The fact should be mentioned that the working group which, at the assignment of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, worked out the draft Law of the USSR on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations offered this proposal: "For individuals who for reasons of religious convictions cannot perform active military duty, it can by decision of a court in each individual case be replaced by other civilian duty or service."

We also believe that artificial difficulties should not be created for the individual but that people with these views should be given the opportunity to perform their constitutional duty to the society in a different way.

In order to make the alternative labor service commensurate with active military duty, the commission considered it necessary to set the term at 36 months (18 months

for VUZ graduates)—that is, half again as long as the term of active military service. Other states also have this ratio of service terms.

The performance of alternative labor service is based on the principle that during this period citizens will perform low-skill (auxiliary) jobs extremely necessary to the society in areas of production indicated by law. This particularly refers to the provision of assistance for elderly and ill single people.

For the performance of the alternative labor service the citizens do not change their permanent place of residence except in cases specified in Article 9, when it is necessary for them to help mop up after natural disasters or accidents. Freedom of movement is limited only in certain cases.

While observing these basic provisions, the commission believes that the state should accordingly not concern itself with maintaining the people, their daily schedule, the provision of food and clothing, and so forth. While working in a specific field near his place of permanent residence and receiving wages, the citizen provides for his own material and spiritual needs entirely.

The mechanism and the effectiveness of the draft law will in the initial stage depend somewhat upon the work of rayon and city military induction commissions. This will be done in accordance with the Law on Universal Military Duty.

The draft law states that a citizen's request for alternative labor service suspends his induction for active military duty.

The suspending of induction is based on the actions of the following preventive mechanisms:

—Upon receiving a request, the induction commission is required to begin processing it, while simultaneously suspending the citizen's induction for active military duty. But even if the induction commission finds that the request has no legal basis, there should still be no basis for holding the citizen criminally liable for draft evasion.

—While the induction commission is considering the substance of such a request, the citizen submitting it cannot be held criminally liable for draft evasion.

The draft law specifies that the task of the commission on alternative labor service consists only in ascertaining whether the citizen actually has pacifist or religious convictions preventing him from performing military service.

The commission's independence is ensured by the fact that it is formed by a legislative body and includes both deputies and representatives of the community.

It is assumed that there will be debate about whether to satisfy or reject a citizen's request for alternative labor service. In each controversial case, the commission's

decision is therefore reviewed in a court as the agency empowered to apply the law for resolving the matter.

The draft law specifies that the performance of alternative service in nonproduction fields is regulated in greater detail by the statute on such service developed by the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers.

The ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies decide on matters of assigning citizens to alternative service and monitoring it, exempting them from it or deferring such service.

The decisions of the ispolkoms in cases specified by the law are binding for the administrations of enterprises, establishments and organizations.

It is the duty of the administrations of enterprises, establishments and organizations, in turn, to provide the citizens with work and with the necessary tools, as well as to pay for the work performed.

The administration is authorized in case of violations of labor law to apply all disciplinary punishments, with the exception of those specified by the draft law:

- The performance of alternative service is based on an administrative act and assignment by the ispolkom. The citizen may be exempted from such work only on the basis of an administrative act. A labor agreement may be abrogated only by a decision of the ispolkom.
- The administration is not authorized at its own initiative to exempt a citizen performing alternative service from such work without a decision from the ispolkom, even in cases specified in Article 33 of the Labor Laws of the Latvian SSR. If a citizen performing alternative service violates discipline—unjustified absenteeism and other infractions—he is committing administrative as well as disciplinary infractions.

The commission also submitted a draft of pertinent additions to that part of the Latvian SSR Code of Administrative Infractions, as well as additions to the Criminal Code.

Determining liability is a compulsory measure essential for effective implementation of the law.

The draft Law On Alternative Labor Service does not regulate any conditions pertaining to martial law or military operations, and it was therefore developed for peacetime needs. In case of martial law or war, any action of the law may be rescinded or suspended.

Our commission attempted to carry out its assignment honorably. It is now your turn to apply your heart and your intellect to see that the people receive the law demanded of us by the times for the spiritual and moral health of the young generation.

Discussion of Latvian Draft Law on Alternative Service

90UM0444B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 21 Feb p 2

[LATINFORM report on the draft Law of the Latvian SSR on Alternative Labor Service from the 15th session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation]

[Text] Deputy Ya. Duda began his speech by announcing that both he and most of the officers under him agree that the time has come to pass the Law On Alternative Service. It cannot be adopted in the form in which it was submitted, however. The fact is that the Constitution of the USSR states that matters pertaining to the Armed Forces are under the jurisdiction of the USSR. Matters of manning the Armed Forces remain under the jurisdiction of the nation's Ministry of Defense. As a representative of the military department, the republic military commissar must submit to orders from the minister and to the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty. The draft Union Law on Defense has now been worked out, however, and Article 38 provides for alternative service.

The speaker also commented that the draft law On Alternative Labor Service does not state specifically what constitutes pacifism or list the jobs for those who are to perform alternative service as was done in the FRG, for example. Nor have we defined the procedure for drafting students and individuals with disabled parents or the followers of precisely what religious teachings cannot take up arms because of their convictions. Ya. Duda also does not agree that alternative service should last 36 months. The naval units have the same service term, after all. In other nations the alternative service involves the most unattractive, difficult and dirty work. In the FRG it is performed at leper facilities, psychiatric hospitals and the like. In France it lasts 24 months instead of the usual 12, and the law absolutely forbids demonstrating against military service. We should not rush the passage of the law. We first need to think it all out thoroughly.

Ya. Duda said that we possibly need first to adopt only a resolution, which would be sent with our people's deputies of the USSR to the nation's Supreme Soviet in order for a decision on the matter to be made as rapidly as possible there. We could then avoid confrontation and would not have to put our young men into prison for nothing.

This spring the induction into the Armed Forces will be carried out not at the order of the Ministry of Defense, as in the past, but on the basis of a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and, correspondingly, the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet. This means that the matter will be handled by local soviet organs, and this will change some things. We do not know today how many young men will be performing alternative service.

The republic's military commissar also offered a number of suggestions for restructuring the Armed Forces. He

said that we need to draft young people not at the age of 18, as we now do, but at the age of 19 years. This will help to improve discipline in the forces. In addition, the 19-year-old youth have already settled things with the educational institutions, and there will be no problems because of this. In the opinion of the deputy, the draft should be conducted once a year, in the spring. This would make it possible to simplify the delivery of the draftees to their stations, reduce the cost of the draft and make it easier to accustom the soldier to army life. Ya. Duda called upon us to improve conditions at the republic induction center, where we need a club, a mess hall, a bath, a hotel and other things, as well as a health clinic which is well equipped and meets the modern requirements. After all, 20 or more draftees are returned from the army due to doctors' errors each year.

People's Deputy of the USSR V. Skudra commented in his speech that the question of alternative service for draftees is not a new one in the Soviet Union. Alternative service was a possibility even after the October Revolution. The Law of the USSR on Mandatory Military Service adopted in the '30s specified that citizens born and raised in families belonging to sects whose teachings forbade them to carry weapons and serve in the army could be exempted from mandatory service in the army by decision of a court. It was not until 1936, following the ratification of the well-known Constitution which proclaimed but did not guarantee civil rights, that alternative service was abolished.

Today, the deputy said, we can therefore talk not about establishing but about restoring alternative service, grounds for which can be not just religious convictions but other factors as well.

Under the republic's Constitution alternative service must be provided for those citizens whose pacifist or religious convictions prevent them from serving in the army. This is stated also in the draft law on alternative service, which briefly explains what constitutes pacifism and religious convictions. The draft law does not indicate, however, what criteria a commission on alternative service or a court will use in questionable cases for determining whether the specific individual's views conform to the principles set forth in the Constitution.

The legislators have still not succeeded in working out and passing a law which completely satisfies everyone. Any law, however, has a specific objective which would more or less satisfy the society's demands while regulating specific relations between citizens and the society and identifying specific rights and duties for both sides.

Article 2 of the draft project being discussed, the deputy noted, states that the objective of alternative service is to provide freedom of conscience for the individual, while meeting his obligation to serve the society by performing vital work. That is, the primary objective is to ensure freedom of conscience. If this is so, the deputy commented, then, returning to the first article in the draft law, which states that alternative service applies only to

citizens with certain religious or pacifist convictions, it is reasonable to ask whether this actually covers the entire essence of freedom of conscience.

Just what is freedom of conscience? It is the individual's right freely and deliberately to form his own world outlook—that is, independently to draw his own conclusions on processes occurring in the world, on the society and the relationship of the people to the laws of that society, including the Constitution.

I must point out, V. Skudra stated, that many people today believe that the list of principles in accordance with which alternative service may be chosen is inadequate. You, respected deputies, must decide at this session whether the words "ideological conviction" should be added to this list.

I want to cite just one example from Sweden's laws, which states that citizens may be exempted from serving in the army if this is not consistent with their personal convictions. I want to say, however, respected deputies, that, regardless of whether you vote for the draft law in its present form—that is, at the second reading—or improve it, this will not resolve the issue. The draft law on alternative service was conceived for purposes of guaranteeing observance of the constitutional rights of citizens to freedom of conscience. Residents of our republic feel differently, however: that it is to protect our youth from those numerous disorders which are occurring in the Armed Forces of the USSR. It needs to be pointed out right off, V. Skudra said, that the proposed draft law does not justify this concept. Certain specialists believe that the number of people who would fit into that group allowed to perform alternative service could be minimal and that there could be disagreements about whether they meet the aforementioned criteria set forth in the law. It should be noted that this draft law will in any case be in conflict with the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty. While such conflicts are possible in economic life today, in matters of securing the defense capability of the USSR it seems that we have up to now been unanimous, acknowledging that they must be governed by the Law of the USSR. The Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty does not provide for alternative service. Quite the contrary, it states that all citizens of the USSR are required to serve in the Armed Forces, regardless of race, nationality or attitude toward religion.

If new legal norms were worked out in the legislation of the USSR today which still permitted alternative service for certain categories of citizens, the right to decide on the matter would belong exclusively to the parliament of the USSR. This gives rise to a sort of hopelessness.

Is the Latvian parliament truly incapable of helping its young men?

The deputy said that he did not consider the situation to be so hopeless. Let us take as our basis the aforementioned Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty, to which the workers in the military departments are quick

to refer. This law does not regulate the procedure for serving, but Article 13 gives the USSR minister of defense the authority to define it. We know that he considered it necessary to send young Tajiks and Uzbeks to serve in Latvia and to send Latvians out of Latvia.

It follows from this, V. Skudra said, that although we do not have the right to violate the Law of the USSR, the republic's parliament can demand that one official stop issuing orders inconsistent with the republic's interests. It could do this even now. Recall the order issued by USSR Minister Konarev that all railway workers in our nation must perform all clerical work in Russian. Lithuania's parliament did not recognize this order within its territory, and the law is not in effect there today.

It is the same with the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty, the deputy said. Point 5 of Article 97 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR authorizes the republic's parliament to suspend the implementation of enactments by state organs of control of the USSR if they do not conform to the Constitution and the laws of the Latvian SSR. The republic's Constitution does not contain an article which specifies how the question of where the draftees are to serve is handled. The deputy therefore proposed adopting a new edition of Article 30 of Latvia's Constitution to state that republic citizens have the right to perform their military service within its territory, while not in any way ruling out the possibility of serving in other areas of the USSR for those who wish to do so.

We need to put an end to the prejudice that the local population can be entrusted with nothing and that only Union representatives or troops are capable of securing Soviet power in the republic. There is also the point of view that as soon as the republic's youth are given the right to serve in Latvia, they will almost immediately conquer the entire Soviet Union or overthrow Soviet power.

In a law-governed state the state structure should be defined not by means of force but by parliamentary means. I believe that by using Article 30 of our Constitution, we could move a step closer to a law-governed state.

Today, respected deputies, we are to decide what the institution of alternative service is to be like in our republic, Deputy Ya. Nesaule said in his speech. This has been debated a great deal already. The draft law on alternative service was thoroughly discussed in the Supreme Soviet Presidium's Commission on the Military Service of Republic Youth. We deemed it to be the optimal in the actual situation and feel that it should be implemented as rapidly as possible. At the same time, we do not reject the possibility of further improving it. For this purpose we need to establish a legal system which would guarantee human rights—freedom of conscience and conviction, choice of religion—in accordance with international norms. Today we have neither such a system nor the mechanism for implementing it. At the same time, I do not agree with assertions that another

illegal enactment is being created, since there is not yet a corresponding Union law. We have already submitted our proposals to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Certain representatives of the army feel that we are interfering in the affairs of the Armed Forces. Alternative service is civilian service, however. This means that the republic's Supreme Soviet has the authority to define it. The number of young men who will meet the requirements for alternative service will not be great enough to have a substantial effect upon the army's strength. Particularly since the numerical strength of the army is being reduced. In my opinion, many representatives of the Armed Forces are not even trying to get to the bottom of the problem or to understand the essence of alternative service.

We have been "complimented" by Comrade Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, for discussing far-fetched problems at our session. He pontificates that it is not logical to form the 43rd Guards Latvian Division or any other new formations, since the Armed Forces of the USSR are being reduced.

The problems of the army and military service are disturbing the entire society today, and the wave of dissatisfaction is growing. The society has no knowledge of any sort of substantial changes being made in the army's internal life. Inductions into the army are carried out under the Law on Universal Military Duty passed more than 20 years ago. The present disciplinary regulations do not guarantee respect for human dignity or the national self-awareness of the soldiers and does not guarantee protection of their health and life. Work on the Law on Protecting the USSR has been underway for a long time in secrecy from the people. In this situation parents are justifiably worried about the fate of their sons. More and more draftees are refusing to serve.

Our commission has discussed the unlawful actions of these youth. At the same time, however, we are unable to achieve anything specific to improve the situation in the army. Nothing will come of frightening the youth with criminal liability, however. The army itself and its commanders must raise the army's prestige among the people. Here is one example. To our inquiry into the death of Maris Karklinsh we received a reply signed by Maj Gen Justice Kurinovich. It left many things unclear. Although more than three months have gone by, the circumstances of his death have not been explained, and his parents therefore do not have the right to assistance.

A question arises about whether such an army will participate in the building of human socialism. I am of the conviction that as long as there are such officers in the Armed Forces of the USSR, we cannot expect radical changes in army life. At the same time, I have to admit that there are many progressive-minded commanders of various ranks serving in the Baltic Military District. I believe that the Baltic District has real possibilities for

becoming an experimental testing ground for the democratization and fundamental restructuring of army life. The same can be said also of the republic's Military Commissariat and its workers.

We all want the law being discussed to take effect before the spring induction. For this purpose I propose that we pass it today in its final edition, taking into account the opinions expressed by other deputies. Furthermore, we must urgently develop the machinery for applying this law. Experience has shown that this will also take a long time.

In his speech Deputy E. Lavendel devoted the main attention to questions on alternative service for students which are not resolved in this draft law. The draft law indicates that after graduating from VUZs the young men will still have 18 months of alternative service. The deputy focused attention at the session on the fact that only those graduates who have not undergone training in the military departments are drafted for the service after graduating from VUZs, even though the republic has a large number of VUZs which lack military departments. The draft law on alternative service bypasses them.

Several years ago the students were given the right to combine service with training and then to work at their occupation without being drafted into the army. The proposed edition of the draft law deprives students of the right to perform alternative service. Furthermore, the national economic factor needs to be taken into account. If a young engineer performs alternative service as a hospital attendant for a year and a half, he will lose his skills and essentially be eliminated from participation in the national economic life. Why did we train him in the first place?

All matters at VUZs, including those pertaining to the military department, are decided by the rector, E. Lavendel noted. A student can be ordered to train in the military department. He can be exempted from this service. The decision has to be grounded in the law, however. The deputy introduced an amendment to the draft law, which is essentially the following: A student will submit a request to perform alternative service when he enters a VUZ. If the commission exempts the student from military service, he will perform 18 months of alternative service during his studies, prior to receiving his diploma. The deputy presented arguments that this arrangement is perfectly feasible. Almost 70% of the students in the final years are working even now. We should not deprive the students of the rights they have already gained or infringe upon the interests of the national economy.

We have a unique state and a unique army like no others, People's Deputy of the USSR A. Eyzan said in his speech. We need also to find unique solutions in order somehow to approach the status of the state and the armed forces of the civilized world.

The people's deputy of the USSR expressed his desire that the Law On Alternative Service be passed at this

session of the Supreme Soviet. However, he said, this is only a small part of those big problems which have woven a knot around our army. We must therefore continue to reduce the army in accordance with our real needs and not those of the military departments, and in the future to have a professional army with national-territorial formations. Accordingly, with respect to Point 2 of the draft resolution, we do not need to turn to Yazov. We know who Yazov is, and we also know what kind of people he has. We must go directly to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and resolve this matter of working out the concept for a professional army and establishing not national but national-territorial formations.

The speaker then commented that the passage of the Law On Alternative Service would greatly complicated the life of those young men on active duty today and those who will be drafted. He therefore requested that the Supreme Soviet send a protest to the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is unable to ensure humane service conditions in the military formations and permits the denigration of human dignity, violations of human rights and the mutilation and destruction of soldiers. When an individual's health has been impaired or he has died, civilian legal experts from the republic from which the citizen was drafted into the Armed Forces must take part in the criminal investigation.

With respect to servicemen who have deserted from their units, the republic's Supreme Soviet needs to demand that the USSR Supreme Soviet relieve those who deserted as a result of inhuman pressure of criminal liability until an investigation clarifies all of the real circumstances surrounding the desertion. A. Eyzan objected to the republic military commissar's assessment of Article 38 of the draft law as fairly innocuous. This is a terrible article. It calls for those who have evaded the draft because of their convictions to be grouped with dangerous criminals serving out their term and, by decision of the USSR Council of Ministers, to be sent wherever it is considered necessary to perform construction and restoration work. If there still exists some sort of order and officials who can be held accountable at the prisons and in the colonies, and while the situation is the same in the construction battalions, just who can be held accountable for the situation which will undoubtedly arise if these two groups are combined?

The speaker called upon the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet to pass a resolution to halt the sending of Latvian draftees to serve in other areas, with the exception of those who themselves express a desire for this. It is also sad to hear that 20 draftees deemed suitable for military service by local medical experts have turned out to be unsuitable. I am ashamed for my colleagues, and I hope that the Society of Doctors will have something to say about this, the people's deputy of the USSR concluded.

E. Repshe, member of the Duma of the Latvian People's Front, said that the republic's highest agency of power must protect the interests of Latvia's youth. Protect them

primarily from the senselessness and the moral and physical degradation in the ranks of the Armed Forces. The Women's League has collected a lot of information on such cases, and it is available to the public. In the military service our youth are subordinate to other authorities and, carrying out criminal orders, are forced to interfere in conflicts on other territories, thereby coming into moral conflict with the elementary principles of humaneness. In this context pacifism takes on a different, additional meaning. Therefore, he said, I support those deputies who have indicated here the need for total realization of the principles of freedom of conscience and the inadequacy of the concept of pacifism for defining all cases in which the individual has the right to refuse to serve in the military, to avoid a potential likelihood of killing. If at this session we can get the law to specify ideological conviction and change Article 61 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR correspondingly, then we need to do so. If this is technically impossible and could prevent passage of the Law On Alternative Service, then we need to do it at another convocation of the Supreme Soviet session.

This issue has been raised in Moscow, but there are still no results. The orientation toward results at the center, as People's Deputy of the USSR A. Eyzan pointed out, is unacceptable. The republic's Supreme Soviet has the right to suspend the action of both the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet and orders from the Ministry of Defense on Latvian territory. And in order to combine alternative service with these orders, they may be accepted with restrictions.

The speaker spoke out in support of specific proposals from Latvian SSR Minister of Justice V. Skudra on military service matters. His only objections had to do with the inference that freedom of conscience does not protect the interests of Latvia's youth. If the principle of freedom of conscience is implemented in the introduction of alternative service, then those who want to serve will enter the Armed Forces. And this is the right of every young person. We do not need to over-emphasize the experience with alternative service in the world. It has already been said that we have a unique situation. Perhaps the laws of other nations do not have "ideological convictions," but they have other similar criteria such as moral convictions. The term "ideological conviction" figures in the context of freedom of conscience in the UN resolution.

With respect to protecting those young men who have already been drafted into the Armed Forces and to the fate of those who were forced by circumstances to abandon their service station and are now called deserters, this concept is unacceptable in the given situation. We have such youth now, and perhaps there will be more of them. They will not be tried under Latvian laws but will be tried in the area in which the unit is located. We do not have any possibility for influencing the decision of the court there, of course. Furthermore, there is a military procurator's office there. The session of the Supreme Soviet presently underway in

Lithuania has adopted a specific decision: The case of each of these youths will be considered separately in a Lithuanian court, and the military procurator's office will not be permitted to interfere. The Supreme Soviet in Latvia can no doubt do something like this.

In his debate with Deputy E. Lavendel, E. Repshe precisely defined the procedure for drafting students for alternative military service. He then discussed amendments to the draft Law of the Latvian SSR on Alternative Service proposed by the Duma of the Latvian People's Front. He proposed adding a second part to Article 4, in which the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet would determine other instances in which a citizen will not be assigned to alternative labor service. This is specifically intended to shield some occupations under certain conditions. It would be absurd, for example, to send a peasant to serve as a hospital attendant merely because there is such a thing as alternative service. Given the current conditions of life and the changes occurring these occupations need to be specified and protected. Then there is the amendment to the article on the duration of alternative service. It is proposed that the service last 24 months as in the ordinary service; 12 months for VUZ graduates. Claims of great difficulties in the military service are not entirely correct. They are merely a result of failure to observe regulations and of absurdities, which must be eliminated. If we compare only the expedient work within and outside the army, the civilian occupations are frequently more difficult. Furthermore, we certainly must not try to punish people for selecting alternative service over the military. Nor is it acceptable from the state's point of view to take extra time away from the individual's studies or professional training. I also propose adding the following to Article 8: In the performance of alternative service a citizen must perform work conforming to his skills (if it is feasible in the specific situation) or menial, auxiliary work at municipal facilities, within the public health, social security or nature protection systems at his place of permanent residence.

An amendment was made in the definition of the procedure for requesting alternative service. The law calls for the draftee to submit a request with justification. Not everyone who lacks an education in philosophy can justify pacifism or anything else, however. Let a competent commission determine the justification after the request has been submitted.

Latvian Resolution on Draft Law on Alternative Service

90UM0444C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 2

[Resolution of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet on the draft Law on Alternative Labor Service and the Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Enactments of the Latvian SSR"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, having discussed the draft laws submitted by the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet on the establishment of alternative labor service, resolves:

1. to approve in the first reading the draft Law On Alternative Labor Service and Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Enactments of the Latvian SSR, and to consider the draft laws in their second reading at the next sitting of the 15th session, 11th convocation, 1-2 March 1990;

2. to instruct the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet to ask the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to accelerate consideration of the matter of establishing national-territorial formations of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Union republics and simultaneously to consider the matter of reorganizing the Armed Forces of the USSR on a professional basis.

3. to protest to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet the violation of the right of Union republics to legislative initiative as specified in Article 114 of the Constitution of the USSR with respect to the appeal of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet for an amendment to the Constitution of the USSR to include alternative labor service, which has not yet been reviewed;

—to send to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet the draft Law of the Latvian SSR on Alternative Labor Service as the basis for working out a corresponding Union law.

4. to instruct the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet to present by the next sitting of the 15th session a proposal for the composition of a commission on alternative (labor) service of the Latvian SSR.

A. Gorbunov,
chairman of the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet
I. Daudish,
secretary of the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet

Riga, 16 February 1990

Latvian Law on Alternative (Labor) Service

90UM0463B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 5

[Law of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic on Alternative (Labor) Service]

[Text] The law defines the basic economic, social and legal provisions for alternative (labor) service in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Law is aimed at ensuring freedom of conscience and convictions as guaranteed by the Latvian Constitution, linking this with the duties of a person toward society and the equality of all citizens before the law.

Alternative (labor) service is not related to the Armed Forces or other paramilitary organizations.

Section 1: General Provisions

Article 1. According to the Latvian Constitution, Latvian citizens whose pacifistic or religious persuasions do not allow them to serve in the troops must undergo alternative (labor) service.

Pacifism is a system of humane principles which includes a categorical protest against war and any violence, depriving them of support in any form.

Religious convictions are based upon love of fellow man and a belief that war and violence are an absolute evil, in repudiating the use of weapons in any forms.

Article 2. The aim of alternative (labor) service is to ensure freedom of conscience and convictions of the individual and the service of society in carrying out necessary tasks while observing the rights of the citizens.

Article 3. Alternative (labor) service may be served by the persons designated in Article 1 of the current Law, if there are no circumstances indicated in Article 4 of the current Law.

Article 4. Not to be sent to alternative (labor) service are the following:

- 1) Citizens who because of state of health are not fit for active military service;
- 2) Citizens who have a deferment for active military service;
- 3) Students in the regular departments of institutions of higher learning, if they wish to serve after completing the institution of learning;
- 4) Students in church schools;
- 5) Ordained priests.

The Latvian Council of Ministers has the right to stipulate other instances of releasing a citizen from alternative (labor) service.

Article 5. The Law on Alternative (Labor) Service applies to persons who have reached the age of 18.

Article 6. Upon reaching the age of 27, a citizen cannot be called up for alternative (labor) service.

This provision does not extend to persons for whom the term of alternative (labor) service has ended after reaching the age of 27 as well as for persons for whom the term of alternative (labor) service has respectively been extended on the grounds of a ruling of the executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet for the failure to report to work without valid grounds for persons for whom alternative (labor) service was deferred.

A person after reaching the age of 50 is removed from the rolls of alternative (labor) service.

Article 7. The period of alternative (labor) service is 36 months and for persons completing a institution of higher learning, 18 months.

Article 8. Alternative (labor) service provides that the citizen will perform unskilled (auxiliary) jobs or jobs corresponding to his skill in the sphere of the municipal economy, public health, social welfare or conservation at the place of his permanent residence or study.

In instances where there is no opportunity to provide work in the designated sectors, the Latvian Council of Ministers is to stipulate another sphere of employment.

Article 9. By a ruling of the Latvian Council of Ministers persons who are to undergo alternative (labor) service can be employed to eliminate the consequences of catastrophies or natural disasters.

Persons who have undergone alternative (labor) service can be called up again by the Latvian Council of Ministers for alternative (labor) service for a period of up to 6 months to eliminate the consequences of catastrophies or natural disasters.

Article 10. Citizens who have undergone alternative (labor) service are not to be called up for military assemblies and exercises.

The designated procedure extends also to persons designated in Article 1 of the current Law who previously have undergone compulsory military service.

Section II: Procedure for Resolving Question of Alternative (Labor) Service

Article 11. A citizen whose pacifistic or religious persuasions prevent him from serving in the troops submit a valid request for this to the induction commission of a rayon (city).

Article 12. The request for alternative (labor) service can be submitted not earlier than the reaching of maturity but no later than the day of presenting notification of call-up for active military service.

In submitting to the induction commission a request on alternative (labor) service, the citizen simultaneously refuses acceptance of notification of induction for active military service.

Article 13. The induction commission of a rayon (city), having received the request of a citizen for alternative (labor) service, immediately forwards the appropriate materials to the Commission on Alternative (Labor) Service under the Latvian Council of Ministers or to the Commission on Alternative (Labor) Service in the same rayon (city), if such a commission has been formed in the rayon (city) in accord with Article 18 of the current Law.

Article 14. The request of a citizen for alternative (labor) service halts his induction for active military service until the review of the given request on its merits.

Article 15. In the event of the rejection of the request, the resubmitting of such a request and the review of it on the same grounds is not permitted for a period of two years from the time of rejecting the first request.

Section III: Commissions Settling the Question of Alternative (Labor) Service

Article 16. A request from a citizen on alternative (labor) service is reviewed by the Commission on Alternative (Labor) Service under the Latvian Council of Ministers.

Article 17. The Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service is to be created by the Latvian Council of Ministers and it also established the size and personnel of the committee.

Article 18. In the event of necessity, upon the recommendation of the Commission for Alternative (Labor) Service under the Latvian Council of Ministers a rayon (city) soviet has the right to form a rayon (city) commission on alternative (labor) service.

The provisions of the current Law also extend to the operating procedures of the rayon (city) commission on alternative (labor) service.

Article 19. The membership of the commission for alternative (labor) service includes deputies, representatives of public organizations including participants of the movement for the defense of peace and representatives of religious sects.

Article 20. Requests for alternative (labor) service should be reviewed within 20 days from their receipt by the commission on alternative (labor) service.

When necessary this period can be extended by a separate decision of the commission on alternative (labor) service.

Article 21. A commission on alternative (labor) service has the right to invite to its session witnesses or any other citizens and demand the necessary materials.

Article 22. The review of requests in the commission on alternative (labor) service is conducted openly.

Article 23. The applicant is informed as to the time and place of reviewing the request by the commission for alternative (labor) service.

The applicant and his representative have the right to participate in the commission session.

The failure of the applicant to appear at the session of the commission on alternative (labor) service is not an obstacle for reviewing the question on its merits.

Article 24. In reviewing the request for alternative (labor) service the commission on alternative (labor) service keeps minutes and takes a decision with justifying reasons.

Article 25. A commission for alternative (labor) service has the right to take a decision with at least two-thirds of the commission membership present.

Article 26. The decisions of a commission on alternative (labor) service are taken by a simple majority of votes of the entire membership of the commission and are signed by the commission chairman and secretary.

Article 27. A copy of the decision on the question of alternative (labor) service (regardless of whether the request has been granted or rejected) within a three day period is issued to the citizen against his signature and is forwarded to the executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet and the appropriate military commissariat.

Section IV: Procedure for Resolving Disputes

Article 28. A decision of a commission on alternative (labor) service involving a refusal to grant the request for alternative (labor) service can be appealed by the applicant or his representative to the rayon (city) people's court within a period of 10 days from the day of receiving the copy of the decision.

The rayon (city) people's court reviews the appeal of the refusal to grant the request for alternative (labor) service within the procedures set up by the Latvian Civil Procedural Code for reviewing appeals and complaints against illegal actions by the state bodies or officials who infringe the rights of the citizens.

Article 29. The question of reopening the time for submitting an appeal in the event of contesting the decision of a commission on alternative (labor) service is settled by the rayon (city) people's court.

Article 30. The decision of the rayon (city) people's court can be appealed or protested to the Latvian Supreme Soviet, the ruling of which is final.

Article 31. If the question of alternative (labor) service is initially settled by a rayon (city) commission on alternative (labor) service, the appeal of the decision from the given commission can be submitted to the Commission on Alternative (Labor) Service under the Latvian Council of Ministers and can be appealed to the rayon (city) people's court only after its review by the Commission on Alternative (Labor) Service under the Latvian Council of Ministers.

Section V: Serving Alternative (Labor) Service

Article 32. The decision of a commission on alternative (labor) service or a court ruling is the grounds for being sent to alternative (labor) service.

Article 33. The executive committee of a rayon (city) soviet issues the papers against a receipt for undergoing alternative (labor) service to a citizen who has been called up for service.

The citizen is obliged to report to the enterprise, institution or organization designated in the document at the stipulated time.

Article 34. The administration of the enterprise, institution or organization where the citizen has been sent for alternative (labor) service is obliged to provide him with the job indicated in the order.

Article 35. The administration is obliged within a 3-day period to inform in writing the executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet on the hiring of the citizen for the job as well as the failure to report to the job without valid reasons.

Article 36. The firing of citizens who are performing alternative (labor) service is possible only with the approval of the executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet.

Article 37. In undergoing alternative (labor) service the citizens have all rights and duties stipulated by the labor legislation, with the exception of the fact that:

- 1) They cannot be dismissed from the job at their own request;
- 2) They are not paid for training leaves;
- 3) The failure to report to work without valid reason is not included in the time of alternative (labor) service;
- 4) They are not given regular leaves.

Article 38. The period of alternative (labor) service starts as of the day the citizen is hired for the job.

Article 39. During the period of undergoing alternative (labor) service, a citizen cannot hold a leading position.

Article 40. During alternative (labor) service a citizen has the right to request in writing the serving of obligatory military service. The request of the citizen is reviewed by the executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet and the ruling of which is final.

Article 41. Supervision over the undergoing of alternative (labor) service is carried out by the executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet.

Section VI: Procedure for Terminating Alternative (Labor) Service

Article 42. Alternative (labor) service is terminated at the designated time, not including the period during which alternative (labor) service was deferred or the periods of the failure to report to work without valid reason and administrative arrests.

Article 43. The executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet no later than 10 days before the termination of the period of alternative (labor) service informs the enterprise, institution or organization of the terminating of alternative (labor) service by the citizen.

The informing of the enterprise, institution or organization by the executive committee is obligatory.

The administration of the enterprise, institution or organization is obliged immediately to inform the executive committee of the dismissal of the citizen at the stipulated time from further undergoing of alternative (labor) service.

Article 44. Should the citizen state a request to continue work, a labor contract is drawn up on the general grounds in accord with the labor legislation.

Article 45. A citizen may be released ahead of time from alternative (labor) service in the event that he:

- 1) Has been condemned to prison for more than three years;
- 2) Has become the sole provider in a family;
- 3) Has become disabled in group I or II;
- 4) On the basis of his request has been called up for active military service.

Article 46. Deferment of alternative (labor) service may be granted if the citizen:

- 1) Has been condemned to imprisonment for a period of not more than three years;
- 2) Has been condemned to corrective labor.

Article 47. The executive committee of a rayon (city) soviet in the instances stipulated in Articles 45 and 46 of the current Law approve the appropriate decision which is obligatory for the administration of the enterprise, institution or organization.

Article 48. The procedure for undergoing alternative (labor) service is set out by the Regulation Governing Alternative (Labor) Service as approved by the Latvian Council of Ministers.

Article 49. Liability for refusal to undergo alternative (labor) service occurs in accordance with current legislation.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet

A. Gorbunov

Secretary of the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet

I. Daudish

Riga, 1 March 1990

Estonian Law on Labor Service

90UM0463C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 22 Mar 90 p 4

[Law of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic on Labor Service in Estonia]

[Text]

I. General Provisions

Article 1. Labor service is compulsory work at enterprises, institutions and organizations in Estonia within the procedures and dates stipulated by the current Law.

Labor service is not subordinate to the USSR Armed Forces.

Article 2. Labor service is alternative in relation to military service and it is obligatory for citizens residing permanently in Estonia at an age of 18-27 years who are registered as draftees (subsequently citizens) and who out of valid reasons cannot serve in the Armed Forces.

Article 3. The length of labor service is 30 months and for citizens who have completed a higher institution of learning but have not undergone a military training cycle, 12 months.

Article 4. Labor service is carried out in Estonia, as a rule, at enterprises, institutions and organizations located on the territory of a district or a republic city at the place of residence; these enterprises, institutions and organizations may be in public health, social security, repair, construction, the social and cultural sphere, agriculture and other economic sectors as well as in the fire and rescue services.

II. Procedure for Admission to Labor Service

Article 5. A citizen desiring to be admitted to labor service submits a request giving reasons to the commission on labor service under the district or city (republic city) soviet at the place of his residence.

A request for admission to labor service, as a rule, must be submitted by 1 January of the year of induction for regular service.

Inductees of the year 1990 desiring to be admitted to labor service are to submit the requests by 15 April 1990.

Article 6. Under the soviets of the districts and republic cities, for resolving questions of labor service, a commission is to be formed consisting of at least seven members (subsequently a commission on labor service) with a membership set by the soviet.

Article 7. A commission on labor service:

1) Accepts a request on admission to labor service and informs in writing the appropriate military commissariat within three working days from the receipt of the request. As of the day of the submission of the request, induction of the citizen for regular service is halted;

2) It reviews the citizen's request for admission to labor service in his presence no later than within one month from the day of receiving the request and takes a decision on granting or rejecting it, informing the citizen on the day of taking the decision;

3) Over a period of three days from the moment of taking the decision, it sends written notification to the appropriate military commissariat, to the employment service of the executive committee under the district or city (republic city) soviet and to the citizen.

Article 8. A commission for labor service is a quorum if its session is attended by at least two-thirds of the commission members.

Decisions of the commission on labor service are taken by a simple majority of votes of the total number of commission members.

III. Resolving of Disputes Arising Over the Admission to Labor Service

Article 9. With disagreement with a decision by the commission on labor service, a citizen within a period of 10 days from receiving the notification from the commission on labor service can appeal it to the people's court.

Article 10. A decision by the people's court can be appealed by the citizen to the Estonian Supreme Court.

Article 11. In the event of rejecting a request for admission to labor service, the commission for labor service is not permitted to accept and review a request submitted on the same grounds.

IV. Procedure and Conditions of Labor Service

Article 12. Labor service is organized by the employment service of the district, city (republic city) executive committee (subsequently the employment service).

Article 13. A citizen is obliged to report at the time stipulated by the commission for labor service or the court decision to the employment service for being dispatched to labor service.

Article 14. The employment service:

- 1) Collects information from enterprises, institutions and organizations on the availability of vacant jobs in which the enterprises, institutions and organizations might wish to employ those admitted to labor service;
- 2) Issues to the citizen against receipt an order for admission to labor service at a specific enterprise, institution or organization.

Article 15. The citizen is obliged to report at the time designated in the order at the enterprise, institution or organization for concluding a labor contract.

The enterprise, institution or organization is obliged, on the grounds of the order, to conclude a labor contract with the citizen for the stipulated time.

The period of labor service begins as of the moment the citizen concludes the labor contract and the employment service is notified of this.

Article 16. The citizens who have been admitted to labor service are covered by Estonian labor legislation with the differences stipulated in the current Law.

Article 17. A citizen is prohibited from being dismissed from the job at his own request during the period the labor contract is in effect.

Article 18. A citizen has the right to petition the commission for labor service for the following matters:

- 1) For early dismissal from labor service;
- 2) For changing the place or locality of labor service;
- 3) For other valid reasons.

Article 19. Early dismissal from labor service may be granted for the following grounds:

- 1) Due to illness or disability impeding the continuation of work or residence in the given locality;
- 2) With the instituting of criminal proceedings making it impossible to continue labor service;
- 3) Upon admission to service in the Armed Forces;
- 4) For other valid reasons.

Article 20. Under a decision of a commission on labor service a citizen may be reassigned to a different place or a different locality for undergoing labor service or released from labor service ahead of time if the reason submitted in the petition are recognized as valid by the commission.

Article 21. A petition submitted on the grounds stipulated in Articles 18-19 of the current Law from a citizen, enterprise, institution or organization is to be reviewed by a commission for labor service within a period of 10 days from the receipt of the request. The commission provides notification in writing as to the adopted decision within a period of 3 working days from the day of the receipt of the request to the citizen, to the employment service and to the enterprise, institution or organization.

Article 22. Labor service is terminated at the end of the term of the labor contract and the enterprise, institution or organization notifies the employment service of this.

Article 23. If a citizen, enterprise, institution or organization does not request terminating of the concluded regular labor contract and labor relations actually continue, then the term labor contract is turned into a labor contract concluded for an indefinite period.

Article 24. The administration of an enterprise, institution or organization has the right under the grounds of parts 3, 4, 7 and 8 of Article 37 of the Estonian Labor Code, to terminate a labor contract at the end of its period and it is to notify the commission for labor service in writing of this. A commission for labor service reviews a received written notification and hands down

its decision within a period of 10 days from its receipt. A commission for labor service informs in writing the citizen, the enterprise, institution, organization and employment service and, when necessary, also the military commissariat of the decision taken within three working days from the day of taking the decision.

Article 25. A citizen who has undergone labor service is removed from the rolls at the military commissariat. He is not subject to call-up for regular service, for repeat and training assemblies.

V. Concluding Provisions

The work of the employment service in organizing labor service is governed by the enforceable enactments adopted by the Estonian government.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet
A. Ryuytel

Secretary of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet
A. Almann

Tallinn, 15 March 1990

Editor Opposes Change to Professional Armed Forces

90UM0524A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 1990 p 96

[Unattributed article from the Chief Editor's Page]

[Text] There is recent talk about a volunteer army. This is not surprising. If there is a shadow economy, there must be shadow politics, a shadow ideology and, naturally, a shadow army, otherwise known as a volunteer army. Adylov not only had his own guard, but his own prison, court and police. But first he had his own kolkhozes and sovkhoses. And they had to be guarded. From whom? From the people, of course. Adylov brilliantly proved that in our time it is possible to have our own army in an independent kolkhoz and in an independent cooperative. If only there was enough money.

The people do not have that kind of money. Bigwigs like Fedorov are proposing to pay their future soldiers 300 rubles per month. And at the very last moment in the journal Ogonek they raised this to 500 rubles. Is this realistic? For Fedorov's capitalists it is completely realistic. They will guard only him and others like him. "The money can be fleeced" from the Motherland. And it makes no difference whose Chukotka, or whose Alaska, or what sort of structure they have in the Baltic republics or in the Transcaucasus. One can treat eyes while simultaneously mutilating souls.

Well, and what about an army which must defend the people and the nation? For example, we know that the BAM [Baykal-Amur Railroad] extends for a distance of just over 3,200 kilometers. We also know that the western section was built by Komsomol volunteers and

that the eastern section—just over 1,600 kilometers—was built by soldiers of the railroad troops. The Komsomol volunteers received 1,000 rubles and more per month, while the soldiers essentially received nothing at all. Although the volunteers and soldiers worked on the same excavators, otherwise a bit worse. And even though the Komsomol volunteers were paid very well the contingent of workers changed every year by nearly 100 percent; in other words, they simply scattered.

We do not need an army to guard the cooperatives. I repeat that the cooperatives have settled down into what they are. But our Motherland exists on Ratmanov island, on Novaya Zemlya and near Kushka. Not a single soldier will go to serve in such places for 300 rubles or even 1,000 rubles. As they say in the Ukraine, it is the silence of the stupid [nema durnykh]. It would dirty their minds with thoughts of money to believe that we have people in this country who would go to defend the Motherland for rubles. The Komsomol volunteers abandoned the BAM project precisely because they had gone there just to make a lot of money. I visited the BAM several times and lived among those who were building it and I can declare: the BAM was not built by people who were obsessed with money, but by those who had something quite different in their hearts and souls. And it was precisely this that kept people living in tents when it was 55 degrees centigrade below freezing.

In this regard I am not speaking about our army and our navy. Without the army, or better still, without the navy, perhaps, Fedorov's ship would not have sailed to Kuwait or wherever else it is now sailing. This is simply the truth: no one ever would have sat down with us at the arms control negotiating table if we had not had a strong, national army. A country possessing a national army prepares a national war for the enemy, and no blitzes will take place. For those who already have their own transportation system, currency, open foreign passport, bank accounts, and true friends, and who on their first call can reserve a room in a hotel in New York, London, or Paris, it is good to do away with the army. But for those muzhiks with whom I froze and whom I met on the BAM, on the Yamal Peninsula, on Ratmanov Island, in Kushka and on Chukotka, in bad times they will rely on no one else other than their own army and navy.

Once near Perm in a long conversation with the power workers we spoke about the army and about the fact that enemies who are not foreign to our soil are very openly attacking it. And one of the workers with the full agreement of the others said: "You people in Moscow must see that you do not give in. We here are ready once again to put on our padded jackets, but you must make sure that 1941 is not repeated. Let the army know that it is our hope and our strength."

Who needs a volunteer army? Those who have the money for it. The workers and farmers do not have this kind of money. This is why they send their sons to serve

in the military. And no Adylovs or Fedorovs will convince them that the Motherland does not belong to them, which means that they themselves with their own hands and their sons must defend it. This is the price to be paid.

By the way, even the people of long ago knew that a large army is one hundred times stronger than a volunteer army. Read history, including that of Byzantium. Yustinian the First saved the nation from economic ruin and from destruction by foreign interlopers by abolishing the volunteer army and creating an army that was made up of all the residents of the nation. After this an "entire structure" was formed "which guaranteed the successive transfer of the military professions from generation to generation." And it is not from the volunteer soldier to someone unknown, but from generation to generation, just as the use of the land, forever. By the way, why did the great and powerful Rome fall? Because it permitted a volunteer army. It handed over the defense of the Motherland to the volunteer soldier.

People should not fool themselves by thinking that there is no difference between raising the pay of the soldier (who is opposed!) and his social status as a volunteer soldier. There is a difference! And we are speaking about different social relationships, which means about a different government structure.

Payment for the material contained in this article is to be made to account 700344, which is a fund for providing aid to wounded international soldiers.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1990

Rear Adm Kokotkin in Roundtable on Manpower, Military Reform

90UM0436B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Roundtable Discussion with S. Kokotkin, S. Yermakov, G. Kozin, Ya. Lyashuk, B. Polyakov, A. Fesenko, S. Tarasov and O. Mikhaylov led by correspondent Colonel V. Moroz: "Please Enlist Me as a Private..."]

[Text] The extensive military reform, the need for which was brought about by the state's new military doctrine, requires solution of a large complex of problems. One of the most important problems, one of the key problems, is the principle by which the army and navy are to be manned. It is already being actively discussed in the mass media, and it is generating debate. It was precisely on this problem that opinions were exchanged at our roundtable by navy personnel directorate deputy chief Rear Admiral Sergey Nikolayevich Kokotkin, by Major General Semen Mikhaylovich Yermakov, the deputy chief of the military financial and economic faculty of the Moscow Financial Institute, by navy personnel directorate division chief Colonel Gennadiy Grigoryevich Kozin, by Colonel Aleksey Trofimovich Fesenko, division chief at the Center for Research on Social and Psychological Problems under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by Colonel Yakov

Iosifovich Lyashuk, deputy division chief of one of the general staff directorates of the Air Defense Forces, by Guards Colonel Boris Nikolayevich Polyakov, commander of the Guards Motorized Rifle Sevastopol Brigade, by Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Gennadiyevich Mikhaylov, lecturer from the political directorate of the Air Defense Forces, and by Captain of Justice Sergey Petrovich Tarasov, an instructor from the military legal faculty of the Military Institute.

[Moroz] According to the mail received by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, there are many in our officer corps who are convinced proponents of manning the armed forces on the basis of the principle of volunteer selection, of making the army fully professional. They believe that the outlays associated with this will be compensated by the higher skills of all categories of personnel, by reinforcement of the authority of servicemen and by greater security of the country.

[Fesenko] Evidence of this can also be found in questionnaires and in individual interviews of officers by specialists from our center. Many with whom we spoke—respondents we call them—feel certain that combat readiness and skills would be higher and military discipline would be stronger in armed forces manned on a voluntary basis. We would be able to surmount and eradicate negative phenomena that trouble both the army and society today. Multinational military collectives will become more cohesive. The problems of the social protection and the material and personal sufficiency of servicemen will be solved better. It is interesting that a sizable part of the respondents feel that even reserve training will not suffer, that it will gain in quality.

[Polyakov] There are some other sentiments that I cannot remain silent about. A transition to fully professional armed forces would hardly be achievable in the foreseeable future for our country, which is currently experiencing serious economic difficulties. On the other hand talk of voluntary service and of the nonbinding nature (if I may use that term) of the military oath before the fatherland may reflect upon the military-patriotic indoctrination of the young, and it is already doing so.

[Kokotkin] I share the brigade commander's concern. Mutual or even unilateral reduction of the armed forces, elimination of any class of armaments and rejection of particular military programs would have less of an effect on the country's defense capabilities than an unjustified situation of outright pacifism, which is divorced from the realities of life. The pacifists, you see, are not just casting doubt upon the social significance of military labor and heroism; they are also attacking our history and memory, and they are striving to erase Ivan Susanin and Aleksandr Matrosov from the latter. And while equipment losses may be replenished, it is much more difficult to restore lost moral values, spiritual principles and popular traditions.

Today in the armed forces, one out of every three is a professional soldier: an officer, a seagoing or shore-based

warrant officer, or an extended-service serviceman. I am certain that the proportion of professionals will increase in connection with the greater complexity of equipment and armament and of the missions of the army and navy. I could tell the story of a submarine crew consisting entirely of officers except for a single warrant officer—the cook....

[Mikhaylov] Excuse me for interrupting. Last week I gave a lecture in an air regiment which also contained no privates or NCOs—there were only officers and warrant officers.

[Kokotkin] There is also truth in the fact that the crew of that submarine would never make it without the assistance of seamen remaining on shore. I know that pilots do not yet serve guard duty, for example. This extremely necessary part of military labor is carried out by privates from surface subunits. In a word, there are things in the troops and the navy which are only within the means of a professional, and there are things which a trained conscript is fully capable of doing.

[Moroz] Sergey Nikolayevich, I had the opportunity not that long ago to speak with seamen aboard the large antisubmarine ship "Tallinn" and the training vessel "Borodino." The officers were unanimous: The proposed reduction in the time of service of seamen and petty officers to two years would sharply reduce the combat readiness of ships.

[Kokotkin] Yes, not every ship specialist can be trained within two years. But judging from everything, in the not-to-distant future a two year term will be established in the navy as well. What is the solution? Apparently we will be the first in the armed forces to try to man crews with volunteers consenting to serve for three years. Half a year will go to training in a specialty, to be followed by two and a half years of service aboard ship. In this case privates will be placed in a position on par with extended-service servicemen: with the corresponding monetary reward for labor, material support and leave rights. We will perform the experiment in four formations, and it will cost 82 million rubles. And in general, reduction of the term of service of persons called up into the navy to two years will carry a price tag of half a billion in additional expenditures. New training detachments and around another thousand officers will be needed.

[Lyashuk] We will be waiting for the results of this experiment in the other armed services as well. We are not yet clear as to what it will take to get a young person to agree to serve for, let us say, five years as a private or NCO. This would of course be not just any person, but precisely one whom the army needs, one capable of becoming a real professional. In our preliminary study of this matter we became persuaded that not only the pay but also the place and nature of service have significance. We are currently not overrun by applicants for five-year stints somewhere beyond the Arctic Circle, on the islands and in the mountains.

[Fesenko] Our center has also studied this problem. We interviewed graduates of secondary schools, vocational-technical schools and *tekhnikums* in Bryansk and Smolensk oblasts and in Omsk and Moscow, as well as servicemen in a number of the military districts. Over half of the draft-age young people would want to sign a contract for voluntary service. Also according to the survey, one out of every two privates and extended-service NCOs would be willing to remain in the ranks as a private, a professional NCO, a warrant officer or an extended-service serviceman. With what terms? With pay from 200 (a figure to the liking of an insignificant number of respondents) to 400 or more rubles, the right to select the district and fleet (13.5 percent of the responding soldiers would have preferred to serve in the Moscow Military District for example), and with housing consisting of anything from a separate room, a family dormitory or a bachelor dormitory, to an ordinary standard barrack building, which was also acceptable to 12.8 percent of the respondents.

[Polyakov] I think that in real life the housing problem will be much more serious to those who agree to remain in the ranks for a relatively long period of time. Our motorized rifle brigade, which is stationed beside the walls of the capital and which is generally provided for better than many other units, has never been fully staffed with warrant officers. Even today there are vacancies in warrant officer positions as tank commanders. Everything comes down to housing. If you have the housing, you can assume that you have the man as well, even though he might not be fully satisfied with the pay.

[Yermakov] Having analyzed the problem from the financial aspect, we concluded that material and personal support of professionals (quarters, other parts of the infrastructure, food) will require expenditures approximately equal to half the wage fund. We will not be able to do without these expenditures. Beyond that, if under the new manning conditions we establish pay rates for NCOs and privates close to the present pay of officers serving as platoon and company commanders, we will inevitably find ourselves having to raise the pay of officers and shore-based and seagoing warrant officers. In other words were we to try to completely professionalize the army and navy we have today, we would have to add not less than 23-24 billion rubles to the defense budget just to maintain the personnel. If the situation allowed us to reduce the numerical strength of the armed forces to 2.5 million persons, given the same conditions the expenses of maintaining the personnel would be not less than 18-19 billion rubles. In other words they would remain at the present level.

[Moroz] But possible sources of economization in the armed forces—more competent care of equipment, lower cost of the training process, reduction of outlays in local military administrative organs and in transportation, and so on—have recently been discussed in a large number of publications. The American assertion that a professional army is costing them less than the previous one based on conscription is frequently cited.

[Kozin] But as I noted earlier, none of the authors citing the American experience present the raw data: about the pay and other norms of support enjoyed by the American soldier and seaman prior to the transition to a professional army. It is true that they did have to make some major increases, but we on the other hand are intending to increase the pay of a private by at least 50 times!

And things are not all that simple with imaginary sources of economization. I will agree that there will be fewer equipment breakdowns in a professional army. But the training process of the same American aviators is more intensive today than in our country. Their pilots fly more than ours. I know that seamen spend more time at sea, and tankmen fire and drive more frequently than ours do. The skills of a specialist, even if he is a professional, cannot be mothballed: He is obligated to increase and improve them, and at least constantly stay in shape. Such that there is hardly any sense in hoping for noticeable savings in this area.

Also strange to me are the assertions of some of our economists who say that the Americans were supposedly able to increase expenditures to maintain personnel by reducing expenditures on equipment purchases. The truth is something else: They were able to raise expenditures on personnel up to the level of armament outlays. But the logic of the development of military affairs is relentless: Every new model of combat equipment is much more expensive than whatever came before.

[Moroz] I have noticed that many officers who favor a professional army identify the concept "professional" with professionalism, with a level of preparedness. And yet much depends here on the nature of the training process, on the priority of combat training. Last week we published a letter from a Baltic petty officer fated to serve aboard an inshore minesweeper. The ship had exhausted practically all of its useful life, and its armament was worn to the limit. Three years of service were behind him now, complained the petty officer who joined the navy out of love for it, but he had acquired no real knowledge or skills. His entire service consisted of cleaning, loading and unloading, swabbing, raking and shoveling. Things being the way they were, there was no way he could become a professional in five years, or even in 10 years.

[Kokotkin] Yes, I can confirm that seamen who have spent 10 months wharfside are different from their peers who had served combat duty on the ocean during this same time. Real service, real training transform the individual. Here as well, the principle of manning and the amount of pay have in fact little to do with it.

[Polyakov] I personally am skeptical of the idea of a professional army in our country, which is perhaps why I read articles on this topic so especially critically.

Unfortunately, no one writes about the fact that the society is obligated to create conditions for a professional army under which it would do only what is

intended to do—concentrate on its fighting and professional improvement. If an assault rifle is to be in the hands of the soldier more often than a shovel, then someone will have to take this shovel from him. Do we really need a stoker wearing a soldier's shoulderboards and receiving a pay of 300 rubles? And are we really going to apply the term professional to a private specializing in subsidiary farming?

Two years is enough to assimilate most combat specialties in the ground forces, the largest of the armed services. And if we somehow come up with some extra money, I would spend it not on recruiting volunteers but on creating the conditions for normal planned training and to free combat units from administrative concerns and from despoiling self-help projects.

[Moroz] What is your view of the assertion that the high professionalism of American servicemen manifested itself clearly in Panama?

[Polyakov] I read something about that, and about the fact that the ability to conduct "surgical operations" is acquiring special significance to the army. But what I would ask the author is this: Is this something our army needs as well?

Panama, and Grenada before that, were more military-political actions than anything else. The world's largest professional army fought against a battalion. But if we are to talk seriously, then the U.S. Army is a mighty fist that is constantly clenched for a first strike. Only in the first strike would professionals have the advantage, while in a more or less lengthy war the advantage would lie with the army possessing the better reserves. Meaning that the present principle of manning the Soviet Army is fully consistent with our state's defensive doctrine.

[Moroz] Some authors feel that converting the army to a professional basis would suitably begin with selection of volunteer NCOs.

[Lyashuk] These proposals do not come out of a vacuum. As long as I have been serving I have personally been participating, and encouraging others to participate, in the struggle to increase the role and reinforce the authority and influence of junior commanders in the barracks. But the desired results are still absent. Sergeants play a very large role in training and indoctrination of soldiers and in maintaining order in Western professional and semiprofessional armies. There is good reason why it is said in the USA that sergeants rule the world. In our country, many purely NCO responsibilities have become a heavy burden upon officers. In addition to the difficult obligations that no one but an officer can fulfill. I once read that many engineers in our national economy are doing work that should be done by technicians. A certain shift has also occurred in the armed forces. As an example, would you take the risk of appointing an NCO to be a vehicle chief? If something bad happens, who will be responsible? I am certain that we need some sort of organizational measures by which to return the NCO and petty officer corps to its true role.

Selection of volunteers, longer terms of service? But consider how much difficulty we have in finding a competent company or battery NCO, when only one is needed for an entire subunit. In a word, there are plenty of problems.

[Polyakov] I read in one youth newspaper that NCOs need to be transformed into professionals immediately. I read this and thought that while it is easy to ponder about the armed forces as a whole from behind a desk, it is so difficult to implement the same proposal on the scale of a single motorized rifle brigade. It would take millions of rubles. And imagine the sort of construction that would have to be initiated! Are we ready for this today?

[Mikhaylov] It seems to me that we often overstate the material factors and understate the moral ones, that we discount the desire of young people to participate in difficult man's work, in which the unavoidable deprivations and burdens are overshadowed by the sensation of one's usefulness to society, and one's personal merit. It is said that young people are not like they used to be. But does everyone know that competition is highest for entry into airborne school, and that conscripts usually ask for marine infantry? Is this romance? It has something to do with it too. A beautiful uniform, an attractive appearance? Aren't they part of it by necessity? Announce selection of volunteers for marine infantry and military construction units under equal material terms, and you'll immediately notice the difference.

[Yermakov] I would add that we often understate the material factors as well. It may seem to some that the individual's natural desire to live in conditions corresponding to civilization's level of development and to have comfortable housing, the means to maintain a family and free time for work on oneself and for cultured leisure is incompatible with patriotism. There are reasons why the expression "service for hire" is alien to us in spirit. But this does not at all mean that the serviceman—the officer, the warrant officer and, possibly in the future, the private and seaman as well—is indifferent to the material side. Ideally, a military person—a professional defender of the motherland—should have no concerns other than service. In such conditions the state's demand upon the level of professionalism would be different as well.

[Moroz] In the opinion of many KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers the legal status of the officer and the degree of his social protection depend to a significant extent on the principle upon which the armed forces are manned.

[Kokotkin] In my opinion this status requires clearer regulation right now. Strange as it may seem, the legal status of the serviceman and his official importance are more strongly sensed abroad, far away from home. Much is guaranteed to the officer in other countries. And to the private as well, by the way.

[Tarasov] The legal status of an officer, who even now is a professional defender of the motherland, is in fact extremely undefined. This heightens the feeling of lack

of social protection. In connection with reduction of the armed forces and change in their structure, the state may discharge an officer into the reserves at any moment. But what might the state demand from an officer? What does he have to base even his most modest requirements on? He does enjoy certain benefits, but they are not at all guaranteed rights. May an officer be discharged into the reserves due to family circumstances or on his wishes prior to serving long enough for retirement pay? Words like family circumstances and one's own wishes seem to be absent from the officer's lexicon. And how long must an officer serve in order to justify the state's outlays on his training? These are not idle questions. In a legal state, everything must be qualified.

The army, about which this society is so concerned, will not become just a stepping stone to another career. Service in such an army will be treasured, and looked upon with pride. At the same time it will be purified, without any excesses, of all who do not belong in the officer corps.

I read a proposal in a certain KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article concerning the need for defining more clearly the mutual responsibilities between servicemen and the state. I think that this would not be asking too much. In a word, no matter what direction improvement of the system for manning the army and navy might take, it must have a dependable foundation beneath it, equally protecting the interests of both the individual and the state.

[Moroz] What conclusions is our exchange of opinions leading us to? Will we begin accepting citizens for military service on the basis of requests to be enlisted as a private?

[Kokotkin] We will. The proportion of professionals in the armed forces will grow, especially in those services and branches of troops possessing complex, expensive equipment and especially powerful armament. I think that it would be useful to carry out a kind of certification for combat specialties, so that we might determine what specialties a young person called up into the army or navy for a term established by law would not be able to assimilate. But on the other hand I am deeply convinced that we need to certainly retain the Law on Universal Compulsory Military Service, bringing it into correspondence with other laws presently being written. This will be in the spirit of popular traditions, in the spirit of our history. The concept of "military duty," and I mean duty, must not be blurred, no matter what means are used to man the armed forces. If a possibility for reducing them even further will arise in the future, we will also need to reduce the term of compulsory military service. But defense of the motherland has never been, and I hope it will never be, the lot of volunteers alone.

[Yermakov] My opinion is this: The professional stratum in our armed forces will increase to 50 percent in the foreseeable future. Mainly due to NCOs and petty officers and the most complex and important positions

held by privates. This faction of the servicemen will begin serving on the basis of a contract, with clearly qualified obligations on the part of both sides. The second half of the army will be manned, it seems to me, on the basis of selective conscription, which will also solve the problem of creating a sufficiently trained mobilizational reserve, and many other things.

Will this require additional outlays? Doubtlessly, and sizable ones at that. But there is no other way to raise the professional level of the armed forces and increase their combat readiness. It should be considered that the advent of privates and NCOs serving on the basis of a contract will compel us to also think about increasing the pay of conscripts. In the new conditions, in my opinion a compulsory-service serviceman should receive not 25 kopecks a day for personal expenses, as he does today, but 2-2.5 rubles.

[Kozin] As we improve the army's manning system, we are obligated to spend every kopeck sensibly, justifiably. The main thing is that we cannot forget about the conditions in which volunteers—officers and shore-based and seagoing warrant officers making up the basis of today's armed forces—live and work. Today in the air force, for example, there are a little less than 40,000 officers lacking housing space. Seven thousand seventy-two military pilots do not have a place of their own. My heart breaks over such figures. The first thing we need to do is make certain that we are in a position to solve this immediate, priority problem.

[Mikhaylov] I am in favor of completely professionalizing our armed forces. Were KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to support this idea, it would find understanding among military readers.

[Fesenko] The matter of reexamining the conception of manning the armed forces is difficult and extremely important. There should be one criterion by which to assess any proposal: the manner in which any particular innovation might reflect upon combat readiness. I think that in the final analysis we will confirm a combined principle of manning the army and navy—both on the basis of conscription and on a voluntary basis, coupled with a subsequent increase in the number of professionals. I recall that in the USA, a rich country, the transition to a professional army was preceded by intensive research from 1968 to 1973. I think that we also need to conduct research and experiments, the results of which will determine the practical steps we take.

[Moroz] Thank you for the discussion. I hope that our readers will wish to continue it.

Discussion of Future of Armed Forces: 'Professional Vs. Mercenary'

90UM0466A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 90
Second Edition p 4

[Article, published under the heading "Opinion of a Specialist," by Lt Col A. Turchinov, candidate of philosophical sciences in Moscow: "The Army: Professional or Mercenary?"]

[Text] What will be the tomorrow of the army? This is a problem which falls into the view of persons of different professions, positions, titles, ages, persons who are directly involved with the army as well as those whose relation is indirect and at times very distant. We feel that in the CPSU program documents it is essential to define this question as certainly it is of key significance for the defense of the fatherland and for the fates of hundreds of thousands of persons undergoing military service.

What has been characteristic of the debate over the army? In the first place, a constant, it seems to me, desire to show that the "nail has been hit on the head" precisely by that author who voiced his opinion on the given problem. Secondly, an attempt to implement new ideas without changing the existing structures of the army and leave everything as it is and limit oneself to a cosmetic patch-up. Thirdly, in a whole number of publications, whether the authors want to do so or not, the authors are led astray over a number of questions of the organizational structure, the manning methods or the quality characteristics of the army. Frequently, these publications are signed by well-known names in society or in the army.

One is also struck by the clearly expressed attempts to initiate hostility between the different social groups and strata of society such as by substituting the content of one concept with another the reader is frightened by "mercenary armies," "bigwigs like Fedorov and Adylov," or the army is presented as virtually the only hope of the workers and peasants ready for its sake to "again put on the military blouse" and the saviour of those "who have already made arrangements for their own transport, foreign exchange, a valid overseas passport and bank accounts..." (for the sake of interest, the readers might take a look at the page of the editor-in-chief in the February issue of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL).

In the heat of such verbal tightrope walking which identifies the hired bands of Adylov and similar operators with a mercenary army which supposedly is possible in our country, such supposed defenders of the Armed Forces do not notice how they thereby insult the servicemen and primarily the officers. According to their logic it turns out that the bandit formations guarding various actual bigwigs in the shadow economy and the officers are tainted by lucre as they receive rubles for the defense of the motherland. And so it is agreed that what turns out is that an officer is nothing else but a mercenary in his own fatherland.

On the latter circumstance I would like to have a special say. In my view, here there is a good deal of confusion. For the sake of persuasiveness of the arguments against a professional army, some want to find concepts which would from the outset carry a negative cast and thereby evoke rejection in the reader. One such concept is "mercenaryness," and next to it are "mercenary army," "mercenary" and so forth. I feel there is no need to explain that for a Soviet reader such terms have a permanent negative stereotype. For this reason, like it or not, the opponents of the idea of a professional army completely identify it with a mercenary one.

I feel this argument is not persuasive as at its basis is a confusion or mechanical bringing together of different aspects and properties of the same phenomenon.

Where does this confusion lie? Professional and mercenary armies are different things, different aspects and properties are characterized by these phrases. Mercenaryness, mercenary armies in the history of military affairs arose in deep antiquity, even before our era, in Egypt. The sense of mercenaryness is that an army was manned, as a rule, by personnel from other states, principalities and cities. For the mercenaries, military service was the main type of activity. A military profession and experience in fighting were the main thing for them and what ensured their existence. For this reason, the mercenaries sold their experience to those needing this. For them payment for this experience was the chief condition of service and it was a secondary matter of whom you were serving and for what you were fighting.

Mercenaryness is a principle for providing an army with soldiers who are not citizens of that state. A professional army is a qualitative description of this army. A volunteer army is an army manned with citizens from the state on the basis of a voluntary recruitment for military service. For this reason, a volunteer army is a characteristic of the army from the viewpoint of the manning method. It has nothing in common with a mercenary army just as a professional army does not.

What sort of army do we have: mercenary, professional or volunteer? Of course, we do not have a mercenary army. The Soviet people are capable of defending themselves with their own forces and man the Army and Navy with citizens of their own fatherland. I am convinced that we will never have an opportunity to convert to a mercenary army, as was assumed by MSU S. Akhromyev in his letter to the journal OGONEK, clearly confusing different concepts. Here certainly it must be said that we would never be able to entice any mercenaries with pay, at least with the pay which our professional military now receive.

Our officer personnel, and I for now will deal with it, came to serve the fatherland voluntarily, having submitted a request to be admitted to a school and thereby having accepted the conditions which the state in the form of the USSR Ministry of Defense offered. Incidentally, is not the same thing done by each citizen, in

submitting a request to be admitted to a VUZ, to a plant or factory, in voluntarily agreeing with the demands set by these organizations on behalf of the state? I feel that here there is one essence only the forms are different. They are expressed in different demands on the man in the form of laws, instructions, provisions, limitations, benefits and so forth.

As for the rank-and-file and the NCO personnel of the Army and Navy, they are called up on the basis of the Law Governing Universal Military Service.

Without going into an analysis of the entire diversity of reasons given by a number of authors for the inadmissibility of the idea of a professional army, I would like to take up just one of them. And not such a secondary one as it might seem at first glance. The idea of a professional army frightens those who proceed from the view that this must be realized under the established structures of the Armed Forces. Yes, this would truly be awful. Our economy would scarcely be capable of carrying out such a task. But, finally, it is essential to realize that if we now endeavor to fit the new ideas into the old structures, and assess them from the position of just previous experience, we will never move toward qualitative changes in the Army and Navy.

What causes, in my view, the need to create a professional army? Is it possible to reconcile the idea of a professional army and the principle of universal military service?

Much has been written and said about the fact that under the conditions of scientific and technical progress, the nature and content of military labor are changing, and there is a constant rise in the number of military professions and specialties which require profound knowledge and a high educational level. But having said "a", one must also say "b". Certainly, these qualitative changes in military service should also entail qualitative changes in the very organization of the army.

The main factor pushing toward a transition to a professional army consists in the greater complexity of military service. Not to see this means to further bless the existence of the old form which has come into contradiction with the new content. The loss of personnel due to their poor training, failures of military equipment, increased expenditures on the creation of training facilities in the units, the development of a network of higher military schools and the unjustified elimination of the secondary ones, the discrepancy in the level of education to the requirements of military practice, the various lengths of service in the Army and Navy and the reduction of the role of the rank-and-file and NCO personnel, particularly in those subunits where there is complicated equipment, to the level of an auxiliary and maintenance echelon and, as a consequence, their loss of interest in service. Finally, the reduced prestige of military service not only among the soldiers but also among the officers—here is a far-from-complete list of the problems which the army is presently encountering. All of this is a

bitter and expensive charge for the delayed awareness of the need for a profound and thorough inventorying of the principles of military organizational development as caused by the professionalizing of military activity.

Now on the possibility of combining the principle of voluntariness and the principle of universal military service for the rank-and-file and NCO personnel. At first glance, it seems scarcely possible to find an acceptable approach for the simultaneous realization of these principles. In actuality this is so if one does not go beyond the customary structures of the army. The reconciling of these principles is possible but only within different organizational structures, with the introduction of alternative service, with the elaboration of a system for service incentives for the rank and file and NCO personnel, with a reasonable combining of the extraterritorial and territorial principles for manning the Army and Navy and with the releasing of the army from economic functions not inherent to it.

For instance, take the attitude of a soldier toward the place of his service. This cannot help but be considered in practice. Even now, without waiting for a military reform, I feel it would be advisable to consider the attitude of a soldier to military training (and precisely to military training and not economic jobs) and the length of his stay in the army. For this we should introduce an obligatory minimum length of service, for example, 18 months and a maximum of two years. The inductees have different abilities but in my opinion it is essential to grant them an opportunity to realize them by social activeness, educational level, responsibility and orderliness. Why not realize also such an incentive as the introduction of a coefficient for the number of years served in distant areas where such a coefficient has been introduced for the officers and warrant officers ["*parorshchik*"]?

Combining the principle of voluntariness and the principle of universal military service for the rank-and-file and NCO personnel is possible only in those structures which will include both professional military formations from the rank-and-file and NCO personnel as well as those manned on the basis of universal military service. Here the principle of alternative service is possible for the latter.

Proceeding from the new approach to organizing the army, it is essential to adopt both a Law Governing Defense as well as amend the current Law Governing Universal Military Service. From all appearances this could be a law on the duty and obligations of the citizens to defend the nation, as each citizen should make his own contribution to this sacred undertaking.

Opposing Views on Professional Army Presented

Favoring A Professional Army

90UM0597A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 90
(Signed to press 23 Apr 90) pp 33-47

[Interview with Retired Lieutenant General Vladimir Vasilyevich Serebryannikov, professor and doctor of philosophical sciences: "What Kind of Army Do We Need?" under the rubric: "KVS [*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] Discussion Club"]

[Text] A discussion about what the Army should be has recently begun on the pages of central magazines and newspapers and on radio and television. Opinions have been divided. Some favor maintaining the currently operating Armed Forces manpower acquisition principle based on the Law on Universal Military Obligation. Others advocate manpower acquisition based on voluntary hiring. Still others defend the principle of mixed manpower acquisition.

Many of our readers ask: Just what is the truth? They simultaneously reproach the editors because the magazine has allegedly withdrawn this issue from discussion and do not offer space on its pages to those who wish to express their points of view. Well now, we accept the criticism. The selection offered is dedicated precisely to what our Army should be.

What Kind of Army Do We Need?

About the Author: Vladimir Vasilyevich Serebryannikov—Great Patriotic War veteran who spent 46 years in the Army. Served in various command and political positions and recently as deputy commander of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin for Educational and Research Work. Doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and RSFSR Distinguished Scholar. His work has been repeatedly published in this magazine.

This is our correspondent's conversation with Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor, Retired Lieutenant General Vladimir Vasilyevich Serebryannikov who has been involved with Soviet military structural development issues for a long time.

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] Vladimir Vasilyevich, about a year ago a number of military scholars, including you, were quite categorically opposed to our Army becoming totally professional during the course of military reform. However, a change of positions has been observed recently. In particular, you have already expressed a different opinion several times...

[Serebryannikov] A change of views on a phenomenon in science, including the military, is a natural process. We especially need dialectical thinking in our frantic times.

And my change of views was caused by a more thorough comprehension of those changes that have occurred both in the world arena and also within the country. For example, we must consider significant progress toward reduction of tensions in the world—the product first of all of Soviet peace initiatives, changes in a number of Eastern European countries, and at the same time the policy of Western states to qualitatively improve their armed forces. While recently studying and paying particular attention to the army structures of many states, I noted a trend toward professionalization of the armies even in such developing countries as India, Pakistan, and China.... Generally, there is something to ponder here.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] But really professionalization of the armies of a number of states has already occurred and has been occurring for several decades. Yes, and our Army is far from "amateur," excuse the sports term, according to a number of indicators.

[Serebryannikov] Yes, after the Second World War under the impact of the deepest transformations in the sphere of tactics, weapons, and combat equipment, the trend toward professionalization became sharply apparent in the armies of the developed countries. First of all, the ratio of those specialists within the composition of these armies has substantially increased for whom military service is a long-term occupation that is carried out through voluntary selection and that provides assets for their existence. Second, soldiers and sergeants were increasingly becoming professional along with officers and extended service enlisted personnel who always were professional. Third, armies have emerged in the West that totally consist of professionals or semi-professionals. The professionalization trend also encompassed the armed forces of some socialist states.

Our Armed Forces are essentially semi-professional: Military service is a profession only for officers, warrant officers, and extended service enlisted personnel, but privates, sergeants, and ranking noncommissioned officers devote only two to three years altogether. Furthermore, a trend toward total professionalization is also clearly being traced in our Army. First of all, there is a substantial increase in the ratio of Soviet Army officers, warrant officers, and servicemen, especially in the forces equipped with extremely complex types of weapons and combat equipment. Such equipment and weapons complexes have emerged whose maintenance objectively requires the total exclusion of nonprofessionals for the presence of even one of them in a vehicle or gun crew can not only reduce their combat capability to naught but could also lead to very serious accidents. According to the results of the investigation of the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets, the commission made the categorical conclusion: "...extended service seamen and petty officers were not able to properly master the submarine's operation in such short periods of time." And really there are many subunits in the Air Force, Navy, and Strategic Missile Forces and even in units that

almost entirely consist of specialists who have devoted their lives to military service.

Professionals total up to one third of personnel in combat units and combined units as a whole. Thus, approximately 100,000 officers and 50,000 warrant officers and extended service enlisted personnel are included in the 500,000 troops we have unilaterally reduced. An inevitable new reduction of Armed Forces strength in the very near future based on treaties and agreements being prepared with Western states will undoubtedly serve as the impetus for a further increase of the ratio of professionals.

The Army's level of professionalism is also increasing as a result of the improvement of military schools. Almost all officers graduate from military schools that provide special military educations. More than half of them are engineers. The percentage of officers who have graduated from military academies is increasing.

Professionalism of the Armed Forces is also increasing due to the withdrawal of troops from them that specialize in accomplishing missions that are not peculiar to the Army: Border, Railroad, Internal Troops, and others.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What specific causes, specific features, and "internal mechanisms" of our Army's professionalization could you name?

[Serebryannikov] You agree that the increase of professionalism, not only of officers and warrant officers, but also of soldiers, sergeants, and ranking noncommissioned officers, is one of the decisive factors of the Army's and Navy's high combat readiness and combat capability. An objective law exists that F. Engels wrote about: Terms of service of the main mass of personnel (that is, privates) with a given quality of training are the best yardstick of the fitness of armies for operations in any situation, and especially for the most complex and difficult forms of armed combat.

An army consisting of professionals who have from four to ten or more years of service behind them is much better prepared to resolve the most complex combat training missions than an army where the enlisted force is frequently replenished. In today's professional armies of the Western countries, at any given moment only 10-12 percent of soldiers and sergeants begin to master the fundamentals of the military profession and 80-90 percent are trained specialists.

In our Army, based on a manpower acquisition system with two annual drafts, at any given moment soldiers and sergeants form four equal groups depending on the degree of training: a) those who are mastering the fundamentals of the military profession at training facilities; b) those who are perfecting their specialty in combat units; c) those who have attained the initial professional level and have received their level of proficiency, and d) those who have mastered their military profession at the professional level. This "four-level" compulsory service

personnel system dynamically moves and forces people out and causes the need to "go back" and repeat comparatively utilitarian activities, restrains qualitative breakthroughs to new levels of combat readiness and military mastery, creates the objective need for additional measures to regulate relations within collectives, and impedes resolution of many other problems.

The situation that has developed is markedly reducing the effectiveness of officers' and warrant officers' labors for they expend the great majority of their capabilities, knowledge, and skills "marching in place" while training new inductees.

Of course, formation of the Army on the basis of voluntary hiring (recruitment) requires a substantial reworking of regulations, laws, and legal acts along the line of humanizing military service. It will also require rethinking all intra-army relations and carrying out profound changes in the Army's status and in its command and control system.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How do you yourself imagine the new method of Army manpower acquisition in conditions of our society—with the specific features of its historical, demographic, socioeconomic, and even psychological context?

[Serebryannikov] A professional army may be manned only on the principle of voluntary selection (hiring, recruitment). The transition to it in our conditions is a very complex matter both in the economic and in the historical, moral, and psychological contexts.

The Army manpower acquisition system based on the draft has been operating in our country over a great historical period. It did not cause any problems until recently. A fervent desire to complete Army service has always been inherent in young people in which civic consciousness, noble feelings, romanticism, a desire to increase political and technical knowledge and to temper themselves for later life were always closely intertwined. The patriotic civic attitude toward military service manifested itself with particular strength on the eve and during the course of the Great Patriotic War.

Right now the conscription process is not operating impeccably. The percentage [of young men] not desiring to serve in the Army and those refusing to appear at conscription facilities is increasing. A military service deferment system has emerged and is spreading that encompasses an increasingly growing percentage of draft-age youth that in and of itself is an inevitable consequence of the objective requirement for purposeful diversion of a significant portion of our young men to the resolution of new problems of economic and social life. Thus, the Ministry of Defense, while considering the state interest, has prepared a constructive proposal about releasing the truly gifted, talented young people who could already compose the flower of our science in the near future from conscription into the Army. Conscription of students into the Army has ceased in accordance with a USSR Congress of People's Deputies decision.

However, various exceptions, although they are also legal, create the preconditions for ruses, abuses, and violations of the principles of justice. They destroy young citizens' equality before the Law on Universal Military Obligation. This conscription manpower acquisition system essentially eliminates the issue of quality replacements for the Armed Forces. The need arises to literally draft young people "in a lump" into the Army. And this inevitably worsens the intellectual, moral, psychological, and other qualities of personnel during development of a number of negative processes in society. Thus in 1989, up to 25 percent of conscripts had been brought into the militia for questioning, 6.6 percent had been convicted, and many were familiar with alcohol and some were familiar with narcotics.

A professional army selects volunteers in significantly smaller numbers. Here, personnel strength is maintained due to a more prolonged period of service in accordance with the initial contract and also due to the possibility to repeatedly extend it. Naturally, this army is favorably differentiated by higher quality soldiers and sergeants. The flow of new personnel into it takes place without damaging society.

In my opinion, the voluntary hiring (recruitment) system is more democratic and effective. It eliminates many negative factors in Army manpower acquisition and creates the opportunity for selection and excludes coercion into military service which, no matter what causes it, is unnatural under peaceful conditions and gives rise to many harmful consequences for the Army and society. Recruiting volunteers from the beginning places the State and young people on an equal footing and provides people the freedom to select the military profession, terms of service, and realization of an individual's interests and personal inclinations.

Furthermore, some authors assert that repudiation of mandatory military service and the transition to the voluntary hiring principle will contradict the nature, purpose, and missions of the socialist Army. This step, they say, will undermine the moral stimuli of military duty, will cheapen the concept of military duty, and will result in substitution of Army and Navy friendship by a corporate spirit, egoism, and individualism.

It is impossible to agree with this assertion. The social content and nature of the Armed Forces manpower acquisition principle is determined first of all by the nature of society and the State and its policy. And the fact that the Imperialist armies of a number of states are manned in the same way as the socialist armies—based on universal military obligation—does not change the nature of either the one or the other. At the same time we must not forget that our Army's backbone—the officers—are people who are selflessly devoted to the socialist Homeland and to their own people. Officers do not change their socio-political, ideological-moral, or psychological qualities because they voluntarily choose military service as their profession and receive monetary compensation.

It is important to stress that Army manpower acquisition in accordance with whatever process is not an arbitrary process. It is caused by specific historical conditions and by economic, political, financial, and demographic capabilities, military policy, and by the nature and scale of a country's military missions.

The army hiring manpower acquisition method has become possible within a socio-economic and political context at a definite stage of social development when states have at their disposal a sufficient quantity of material technical assets and finances. And in this regard, we should not confuse the hiring system of the slave-owning period, feudalism, and early capitalism with modern army manpower acquisition on a voluntary basis. While speaking about a modern professional army, we do not equate this concept with specific military formations manned based on recruitment of military professionals from various countries to suppress liberation movements, to conduct undeclared wars, or to stage coup d'etats. Although they also act as unique adjuncts of aggressive armies, they are temporary in nature since they are ill-matched, can rapidly disintegrate, and move from one state to another.

Modern professional armies have a different quality: They are permanent, quite stable, and develop on their own national soil. There are numerous reasons for their emergence but the most important of them are social, military-political, and strategic.

I think we ideologized the notion of a professional army for too long while emphasizing Imperialist circles' class interests in the establishment of a closed military organization that is divorced from the broad popular masses. According to the assertions of many of our scholars, the transition to professional armies was evidence of the total failure of bourgeois ideology, its inability to influence personnel and, they say, the Imperialists resorted to material bribery of servicemen as compensation for the weaknesses of Western states' ideologies. Of course, all of this did occur to a certain degree but not in such a primitive form. Today, interrelations between society and armies in the West is hardly weaker than in our country. And in some positions, they are much more interested and varied. The influence on the people of the mass media and ideological institutions that serve the interests of bourgeois armies have even been strengthened recently.

The question about the Armed Forces manpower acquisition method—is one of the fundamental ones in our defense structural development for it determines not only the sources for replenishing the Army and Navy in peacetime but also the State's military defense capabilities as a whole. The manpower acquisition principle substantially influences both interaction of the Army and society and also intra-army relations, the position of the individual in the military environment, and internal order and personnel life styles.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] And, finally, your opinion on the stages of the transition to the new Armed Forces manpower acquisition principle....

[Serebryannikov] The transition from one army manpower acquisition principle to another is a very crucial matter. Here we cannot act while proceeding from the inevitability of a decline, disruption, or worsening of affairs during any revolutionary process before it reaches a qualitatively new level. This phenomenon could drastically change the existing balance of power that remains the decisive factor for maintaining peace and preventing war. It was noted at the February 1990 CPSU Central Committee Plenum that we need to approach changing the Armed Forces manpower acquisition principle and their structural development as a whole with great responsibility and in the context of changes in the world situation.

However, excessive caution and prudence while restructuring the defense profession can also paralyze creative thought and urgent innovations and cause no less harm, especially in resolving long-range problems. We need to weigh all arguments "for" and "against" the transition to a totally professional army. It is important that service in the Army acquires a more attractive image and prestige. To do this, we need to change the entire operation of Armed Forces manpower acquisition organs. We need to expand openness to ground and naval forces life and activities, develop more durable ties with the civilian population, and increase propaganda of military duty.

However, in our opinion, it does not seem possible to immediately begin manning the **entire Army** based on voluntary hiring. To do this, we need a precisely functioning system of state control from top to bottom, social stability, and a relatively high standard of living for the population. The country's size and the degree of infrastructure development—roads, transportation, communications, mass media, etc., are also quite significant. If we compare all of these parameters in our country with those of the West, many factors become apparent based on which we simply are incapable of rapidly forming a professional army. This approach is currently not substantiated in a scientific sense: We do not have military-philosophical, political, ethical, and economic studies of the new manpower acquisition method or the variations for its practical implementation.

But nevertheless we need to more rapidly progress along the path toward establishment of a professional army than we are right now. In this regard, it is advisable to thoroughly research the experience of the armies of the Western states that we have been criticizing until just recently.

It is obvious that we need to create alternative models of the army and conduct scientific experiments taking into account the specific features of the various combat arms and branches of the Armed Forces. For example, these experiments could begin based on the most technically equipped units and combined units in the airborne

forces, the Navy, etc. Furthermore, we could try both a total and a partial transition to the new manpower acquisition method. Qualified scientific research groups made up of scholars and practical people should be created and wide-ranging discussions should be organized for this purpose.

It is finally time to remove the "taboo" from the professional army issue. Conduct a nation-wide referendum that would restore the Leninist principle of democracy while developing military policy and while determining defense structural development methods. In my opinion, it would be advisable to include it on the 28th Party Congress agenda in accordance with the example of the Party congresses of Lenin's time and to discuss it in the military delegate section and at plenary sessions with adoption of a program document as it was at the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] Congress, in particular.

I think we can find material resources for the transition to a professional army during further reductions of Armed Forces personnel and arms, reduction of expenditures for weapons and equipment purchases, maintenance of an excessively inflated command and control apparatus, and also during the process of implementing conversion of the defense industry.

The transition to a professional army can be carried out in three stages. First—transition noncommissioned officers and technical specialists who maintain the most complex military technical systems to a voluntary manpower acquisition basis. Second—transition the most technically equipped branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms (Strategic Missile Forces, the Navy, Airborne Troops, etc.) to the same basis. In my opinion, we can implement a complete transition to the principle of voluntary participation in 5-7 years.

Thus, I do not see another answer to the question of will it be a professional army besides an affirmative one. We can only raise the qualitative state of the Armed Forces and increase its prestige on the paths of radical military reform. Consistent and systematic professionalization of the Armed Forces should become the heart of this reform.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1990.

Also Favoring Professional Army

90UM0597B Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 90
(Signed to press 23 Apr 90) pp 33-47

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank A. Antoshkin, 3rd year student of the Military Pedagogical Department (specialization—political economics and military economics) of the VPA [Military Pedagogical Academy] imeni V.I. Lenin: "A Hired Army: More Expensive or Cheaper?"]

[Text] About the author: Aleksandr Nikolayevich Antoshkin has been in the Armed Forces since 1976. He has been a CPSU member since 1977. He graduated

from Kiev Higher Naval Political School. He has served in the Red Banner Northern Fleet as a Komsomol worker of the Nth Submarine Task Force and was deputy submarine captain for political affairs. At the present time—he is a 3rd year student of the Military Pedagogical Department (specialization—political economics and military economics) of the VPA [Military Pedagogical Academy] imeni V.I. Lenin.

How much does our defense cost? Or, more to the point, on what and how are we spending it? Let us make very simple calculations from generally known indicators. Thus, in accordance with some assessments (specially selected minimum and more favorable for the USSR—A.A.), the United States of America exceeds the Soviet Union in gross national product (GNP) by approximately a factor of 1.8 and the NATO states exceed the Warsaw Treaty nations by a factor of 2.7, and along with Japan by a factor of 3.2; The North Atlantic Bloc has 1.4 times more manpower resources than the Warsaw Treaty [Organization] [WTO]; and, at the same time, the West maintains its superiority in scientific and technical development.¹

Factoring the fraction of the contribution of the countries that are part of military political blocs to total bloc might is far from in our favor. For example, more than two thirds of those under arms in the WTO are Soviet soldiers; U.S. soldiers in NATO are only one-sixth of the total. The Soviet Union provides almost two-thirds of the combat aircraft to its bloc, the United States, less than one-third to its bloc; 220 of 228 submarines in the WTO are ours and, of the 200 that NATO has at its disposal, only 57 are American; and, 101 of the 102 major surface ships in the WTO inventory are Soviet at the same time that only 173 of 499 NATO surface ships are provided by the United States.²

This background permits us to approach the most widespread foreign assessments without any particular preconceptions: Military expenditures are almost 17 percent of the USSR's GNP. For comparison, we will point out that it totals less than six percent of the U.S.'s GNP, approximately three percent of Europe's, and one percent of Japan's.

I must point out in advance: The analysis provided contradicts officially published data about the 1989 USSR Military Budget and USSR Armed Forces chief of the General Staff's commentary to it.³ The 1990 USSR Military Budget does not eliminate this contradiction in accordance with which our "press" is quite a bit easier than the U.S. and USSR military expenditures per capita are a minimum of four times less than the United States (U.S.—approximately \$1,300 and USSR—R270 annually).

Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev presented data about military expenditures in terms of percentage of GNP in the Soviet Union (8.4 percent) and the U.S. (5.9 percent) that do not clear up doubts that arise in this issue: They are almost 1.5 times higher in the USSR than in the U.S. I will also point out that, according to these

data, the percentage of military expenditures in the 1989 State (Federal) Budget of the USSR meanwhile totaled 15.6 percent and in the U.S. 27.2 percent, that is, 1.7 times lower than the U.S.(?).⁴ These data once again convince [me] that our experts use uncoordinated defense expenditure calculation methodology.

Legitimate questions emerge as a result: What USSR Ministry of Defense and defense complex ministry economic levers and bases of coordination do we have? How are arms supplied to it, according to prices or only according to cost, and is this not one of the roots of our difficulties that are associated with price formation? However, let us pose the question to ourselves in this way: Being economically weak and lagging behind the West in the area of technology and productivity of labor, how did we manage to maintain military-strategic parity, moreover with lower expenditures?

When the correlation of economic and scientific-technical potential is not in our favor and when there is inadequate burden sharing within the framework of our blocs, the USSR at the same time produced 2.2 times more tanks during the latest post-parity decade than the NATO countries and Japan (it outstripped the US by more than a factor of three); IFV [Infantry Fighting Vehicle] and APC [Armored Personnel Carrier] production was two times higher than the NATO countries and Japan (it outstripped the US by more than a factor of 4.5); and, artillery—four times greater than NATO and Japan (outstripped the U.S. by a factor of eight). During these same years, the USSR also built two times more multipurpose submarines.⁵

For information: According to specialists' expert assessments, precisely conventional weapons "consume" 60-80 percent of all our military expenditures. For example, experts have calculated that the number of people engaged in the production of military equipment and arms in the USSR is two times higher than in the U.S. (the total number working in extractive and manufacturing industries is 15-16 percent in the U.S. and a third in the USSR).⁶

A conclusion legitimately comes to mind: We cannot get by without a substantial reduction of the military-economic sector. The 500,000 man troop reduction begun in the USSR and the nearly 20 percent reduction of military production and its conversion are unquestionably important steps in this direction. And I think a comprehensive analysis and review of priorities during the course of military reform will permit us to create appropriate conditions for profound structural changes in other spheres of social life.

The problem of a qualitative turning point in Soviet military structural development and optimization of the country's defense efforts are directly linked with proper selection of the army manpower acquisition principle and with the level of personnel combat training of combined units, units, and ships. Does the current Armed Forces manpower acquisition system meet the

demands of the times? Hardly. But, judging by the answers of Ministry of Defense leaders and other military officials who reject the proposal to transition to a hired army due to its allegedly more expensive maintenance costs (5-8 times more), the current Army is that many times cheaper. We will attempt to sort out, is a conscript army that advantageous or cheap for us?

We can express the essence of the entire complex internal mechanism of the Armed Forces as follows: A constant permanent renewal of the struggle for high combat readiness as a result of the twice annual draft and release of people. A soldier or seaman begins to work effectively only at the end of service. This is associated not only with the lengthy mastery of military specialties but also with very complex internal psychological adaptation of people [to the military]. A paradox results: A soldier just "begins to enjoy it" and we need to release him to the reserve and start all over again.

Obviously, the conscription system will place (and already places) all of the Armed Forces in an extremely complicated position due to the complexity of military equipment. If we do not abandon it, we will also man the Armed Forces with poorly skilled specialists in the future!

The Army and Navy are undoubtedly coping with their missions for the time being but at what price for society? To what has been said, we still need to add the problems of their socio-economic functioning efficiency. They say: Society spends colossal amounts on defense precisely to achieve a highly effective military level. Well, how soon will it be that reduction of this level also reduces the economic side of the matter.

Let us ponder this: Following the USSR Supreme Soviet's logic when it decided to release students from the Armed Forces, we also need to add the release of young men who work in the country. Really there is nothing more acute in the country today than the Food Program! But the line is being stretched further: And how is it with railroad workers, miners, and construction workers? "Or maybe," General of the Army Lobov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Treaty States United Armed Forces legitimately asks, "have many people succeeded in withdrawing their sons from under the burden of these problems since the adoption of the USSR Supreme Soviet's well-known decision?"⁷ S. Ivanov, a 9th VLKSM [All-Union Komsomol] Central Committee Plenum participant, poses the question yet more sharply, saying: "Whom have we conquered? Those who stand at the lathe and those who raise wheat?"⁸

Let us add to this the testimony of Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff: Up to 60 percent of the conscripted contingent receive a deferment for a number of reasons.⁹ And in Moscow, Minister of Defense General of the Army D. Yazov has precisely defined the figures and only 32 percent of the conscripts end up serving.¹⁰

Well now. Officially, we have universal military service in our country. In fact, less than half the men subject to the draft actually serve. So having changed the manpower acquisition principle, would it not be better to equalize and balance this social "justice" by providing real concern, attention, and society's understanding to all those who enter the Army's ranks?

Let us ask ourselves: Are there secondary specialties in society? No. How can there not also be excess workmen. Nevertheless, today in the USSR there is one servicemen for every 66 inhabitants, while at the same time in France there is one in 93, in the U.S.—one in 115, in the FRG—one in 122 and, in Great Britain—one in 187. With an indicator of six servicemen per 1,000 of world population, we maintained a 16:1 ratio prior to the 500,000 man reduction of the Army, outstripping in this even such an explosively dangerous conflict region like the Middle East.¹¹

And really, the multi-century glory of Russian soldiers has always been determined by the principle: Fight not with numbers but with skill. Departure from it has punished us with normally heavy, unjustified losses and defeats. In our present asymmetrical confrontation with the U.S. and NATO, the danger exists of transforming this principle into its own contradiction: Fight, if not with skill, then with numbers. Otherwise how can we explain that a Soviet tank crewman spends 10 times less time engaged in combat training than an American tank crewman?¹²

Let us touch upon yet one more side of the problem being examined. There is an official point of view: Compulsory service personnel are totally state supported, therefore the monetary compensation paid to this category of soldiers and sergeants is primarily intended for the acquisition of personal hygiene objects and other small expenditures and total an insignificant amount. Are we saving on military salaries? But is it permissible to ask: To whose advantage is it when a young man released from the Army has 15-20 rubles in his pocket? It is true that they have begun to pay 100 rubles to a soldier upon release [from active military service] since Spring 1990. But this money is only enough to reach home. And how can it go further? What clothes and shoes will he wear? Current prices "consume" it all. Having returned home in a military uniform, he can go no further. Does this mean he is once again a burden to his parents and in an endless line for elementary human benefits? Are such savings an advantage for society?

I think the transition to a hired army could to a significant degree eliminate the acuteness of currently existing problems in the Army and raise the level of personnel combat training. And is the transition to it so expensive that the State currently cannot afford it?

Let us attempt to look into this. The officer corps that exists within the framework of law that is currently in force—is the professional backbone of the Army and its

basis. The institution of warrant officers was also introduced during the postwar period. The 20-year experience of its functioning has not only totally justified itself but I am also convinced of its potential. The ratio of officers and warrant officers in the troops and in the fleets is currently steadily increasing and is reaching an absolute number in individual units and on ships of the technically complex branches of the Armed Forces like the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force, Air Defense, and the Navy.

One of the primary complications during the transition to a hired army can arise with regard to those branches and combat arms of the Armed Forces where there is a relatively high ratio of compulsory service personnel. This is primarily in combined forces units and subunits that have and maintain conventional weapons. But, recalling expert assessments that it is precisely these branches that consume the lion's share of military expenditures and that the asymmetry in the USSR's favor is noted precisely in conventional weapons, I think that the thought that we need to persistently and firmly pursue their reduction and radical reform does not require any special proof.

Thus, in my view, our society can limit the maintenance of a highly mobile professional army during peaceful conditions. The hiring principle of its formation to a significant degree will permit us to avoid such moral losses for society as "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts], the employment of troops to carry out functions within the country that are not characteristic to it and separation of the majority of men from family and home for prolonged periods of time. A noble moral-legal impulse that increases the degree of consciousness of orders carried out will be obtained for the functioning of the Army's internal mechanism because the choice of military service will become a voluntary matter. In short, everything is clear here.

And well, it is extremely difficult to answer the question—is it more economical for society to maintain this Army.

Actually, maintenance of the Army in the U.S. accounts for more than half of military expenditures and in the USSR for less than a third of the military budget. This is also simple if you consider that monetary compensation in the U.S. Army is 8-10 times and sometimes 100 times higher in comparison with ours. And well this circumstance serves as the main argument of the alleged unacceptability of transitioning our Army to the hired [principle]. But this argument, putting it mildly, is incorrect. Otherwise let us then compare and contrast the average wage of the American and Soviet worker, engineer, doctor—the representatives of any profession. The results will once again not be in our favor.

Obviously, here we must make two adjustments for proper reasonableness. First: No one is insisting on 8-10 fold increases in monetary allowances for our professional military. Second: The transition to a hired army

basically requires transferring just privates and sergeants to this hiring principle. In this case, no one is also insisting on a 100 fold increase of their monetary allowances. Therefore in my opinion, it seems that the assertion that salary increases as a result of the transition to a hired army will burden our military expenditures by a factor of 5-8 are unfounded.

I think that the indefensibility of such statements is also manifested while referring to foreign experience. Thus, the transition to a hired army in the U.S. was not accompanied by an increase of expenditures for personnel salaries. In 1987 constant prices, these expenditures totaled 79 billion dollars during the 1968 financial year and 72 billion during the 1988 financial year. As for combined real economic costs, they undoubtedly have been reduced. First of all thanks to the higher professional skill of servicemen.¹³ Thus a rise in the cost of the army is only possible when the structure and scale of the Armed Forces and the quantity of equipment and weapons in them remain unchanged and servicemen's salaries are raised to the level of the European countries and the U.S.

The first steps on the path of military reform that have been expressed in the reduction of defense expenditures, the strength of the Armed Forces, and the involvement of released servicemen in public production is already being measured at 12 billion rubles in total economic impact.¹⁴ During the transition to a hired army, we must talk about much greater Army and arms reductions than the current reduction.

I also want to propose a model for future reductions within the framework of this article. By reducing the strength of the Army and Navy by two million men, we will release workmen from the most healthy and able-bodied portion of the population to the national economy. Each workman can provide an additional 8,500 rubles per year in national income. During this reduction, there is no need to turn away trained professionals—officers and warrant officers. There are hundreds of thousands of them in the Armed Forces (judging by categories, of the 500,000 reduced servicemen, 100,000 officers and 50,000 warrant officers). Thus, the primary task is the transfer of approximately several hundred thousand enlisted personnel to professional salaries. Thus, the advantage of this transition is obvious even without additional economic or mathematical calculations of the salaries of the currently more than three million compulsory service enlisted and sergeant personnel multiplied by the combined economic costs that we already talked about.

Nevertheless, let us also examine the required amount of monetary compensation. If today compulsory service soldiers and sergeants receive an average of 10 rubles per month, monetary compensation of the entire compulsory service contingent totals 360-400 million rubles. This money will be able "to provide" average monthly salaries of 40 rubles to 900,000 privates and sergeants—professionals. If we add the approximately 160 rubles

from the average monthly addition that we would receive from the contribution made to national income by the two million servicemen released—it is already 200 rubles. We need to add 1.6 billion more rubles, that is, 2.2 percent of the entire military budget to the entirely acceptable wage of 350 rubles per month. This is not so much on a national scale!

How much should we pay "professionals"? The most acceptable situation is when the average salaries of officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and privates equal the average worker and employee salary in the country. For example, 217 rubles in 1988. Of course while retaining current salaries by military rank, years of service, area coefficients, special service conditions, etc. With this approach, the total amount of officer monetary compensation will total 700 rubles per month, warrant officers—500 rubles per month, and privates and sergeants—350 rubles per month. Armed Forces personnel salaries will total 15.8 billion rubles per year or 20.4 percent of the current military budget. Here a comparison with Western armies would also help where expenditures for servicemen's salary reach half of all military expenditures!

Of course, this is only a numerical model. I understand that numerous problems will be encountered during the actual conditions of restructuring defense structural development. We can only gradually implement a practical transition to a hiring system. But the need to examine manpower acquisition principles should not be denied just through recognition of these difficulties. Just as, in my opinion, the impossibility should not be denied at the current stage of informing [us about how] to perceive the country's military expenditures as a single whole.

If we really want to learn how to think about military expenditures, the most proven path to this in the developed world—is to transfer all military appropriations to the Ministry of Defense. It must distribute them according to types and needs of the entire defense structural development. Society in the person of the USSR Supreme Soviet only has to determine and approve the total defense budget while considering its own real capabilities and the international situation. Under this approach, our military efforts will be recognized in their true form. Then maintenance of a hired army will not be so frightening or unacceptable.

In short, thorough military reform is simply necessary as an integral part of our entire perestroyka. And, unfortunately, there is no comprehensive, scientifically-based alternatively discussed approach to conduct it other than the one I have discussed at this time. Well, is this not a paradox?

FOOTNOTES

1. A.V. Kokoshin, "V poiskakh vykhoda" [In Search of a Solution], Moscow, Politizdat, 1989, p. 38.
2. PRAVDA, January 30, 1989.

3. PRAVDA, June 11, 1989.
4. Dosye, 1989, No. 1, p 8 (Attachment to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA).
5. MEMO [World Economy and International Relations Magazine], 1989, No. 8, p 12.
6. S. Blagovolin, "Voyennaya moshch, skolko, kakaya, zachem" [Military Power, How Much, What Kind, and Why] MEMO, 1989, No.8, pp 5-19.
7. SOVetskaya Rossiya, October 18, 1989.
8. Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 1, 1989.
9. Krasnaya Zvezda, August 13, 1989.
10. Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 21, 1989.
11. PRAVDA, March 13 and August 24, 1989; NOVYY MIR, 1989, no 8, p 198; MEMO, 1989, No 10, p 81.
12. MEMO, 1989, No 8, p 11.
13. MEMO, 1989, No 8, p 11.
14. N. Sautin, "Rakety s molotka" [Missiles From a Hammer] PRAVDA, November 10, 1989

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1990

View Opposing Professional Army

90UM0597C Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 9, May 90
(Signed to press 23 Apr 90) pp 33-47

[Article by Captain A. Pusev, REO [Radio Electronic Equipment] engineer of the Military Engineer Aviation Academy imeni N.Ye. Zhukovskiy: "And Once Again Counting on a 'Miracle'"]

[Text] From the editor: Valeriy Aleksandrovich Pusev entered the Armed Forces in 1976 (prior to this, he graduated from Kazan Suvorov School imeni Tatar ASSR Supreme Soviet). He has been a CPSU member since 1984. In 1980, he graduated from Ryazan Higher Military Command Communications School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov. He served as commander of a communications battalion telegraph and telephone platoon in the TurkVO [Turkistan Military District], commanded the same type of platoon in the GSVG [Group of Soviet Forces Germany] (currently the ZGV [Western Group of Forces]) and in the OdVO [Odessa Military District], where he later became chief of a communications system maintenance group of a helicopter regiment. At the present time—he is an REO [Radio Electronic Equipment] engineer of the Military Engineer Aviation Academy imeni N.Ye. Zhukovskiy.

A critical polemic has revolved around the issue, especially after publication of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev's open letter to V. Korotich, editor in chief of

OGONEK Magazine, and its essence is contained in the letter's headline—"What Kind of Armed Forces Does the Soviet Union Need?"

I did not understand much of this polemic. If I cannot completely understand S. Akhromeyev's position, V. Korotich has completely disappointed [me] with his use of non-discussion methods. The impression has been created that OGONEK has made its priority not discovery of the truth but discrediting the letter's author as a man in military uniform who has dared to have a different opinion than the Magazine's.

I am struck by the bias and selection of the responses. And there is one emotion in them that we are already tired of. What is the value of the statement concerning the Marshal's advanced age!

But the highest military leadership has not promulgated one serious decision in the sphere of restructuring the Armed Forces till now. This fact does not promote a reduction of the tension that exists in the Army and around it whether we like it or not. This silence to a definite degree also engenders a situation of intolerance in broad strata of the country's servicemen and population that finds its expression in all sorts of "decisive" proposals. Many people have lost hope in waiting for the elimination of the deformations of the past in the Army and some of them have begun to hope for a miraculous force of "unusual" methods.

And well now we are promised a "miracle" like in the famous epic work of the struggle against the "green snake" and we can also take other examples from the country's history. It has also been substantiated using a familiar method: By playing on the sore points and prejudices of the opposing side's opinion. Just what is this "miracle"?

It has been suggested that we advocate "a crusade" for a hired army. Naturally with cries of "Hurrah!" "Great" prospects are being described using all sorts of ruses and "calculations." It turns out that there immediately is a cure for all diseases.

We need to recognize that a "devotion to hiring" is finding quite a few supporters today. Both in the Army and in society in general. The preelection slogans of certain candidates and people's deputies also contained this idea. I cannot call this anything other than speculation on peoples' feelings. The appeal "Give us a hired army!" is increasingly becoming the trump card in the hands of certain forces. I will not be surprised if we receive its realization in the same form as the well-known decision about students. I am thinking about this prospect, I do not agree with it, and I do not want to be silent.

About some of the conscription reform proponents' arguments. One of the main arguments is the excessiveness of the present Army and the possibility that it will become smaller during the transition to hiring. Well, let us see

First of all, the U.S. Army is not that much smaller than ours that it takes on a qualitative nature. Let us assume: By January 1, 1991, we will have 3,760,000 men and they will have 2,168,000 men. But here we must consider: We have a labor army of more than 300,000 men that operates only in civilian departments. There is no such formation in the U.S. Army just like there are no engineer unit large "construction battalions" that are exclusively occupied with construction. And if you consider all of our military directorates, departments, the military VUZ network, and sportsmen, artists, musicians, hunting society workers, and other similar "annexes" that are part of the Army? Is there a "reserve" for reduction of combat units? Hardly.

For some reason, advocates of hiring forget that we are located in the European Theater of Military Operations and consequently we cannot proceed from those proportions of forming the Armed Forces as those adopted in the U.S. The main mass of NATO and Warsaw Treaty Army servicemen are concentrated in ground troops. For example, in the FRG—more than 70 percent, in Turkey—more than 80 percent and, in Spain—more than 60 percent. Only the U.S., located across the ocean, can permit itself to have ground forces in a size that is 30 percent of its total Armed Forces. That is why, even while numerically reducing our Army's strength to the parameters of the American Army which has essentially already been done, we cannot violate the proportions that have developed in Europe. All we have to do is irrationally reduce the Ground Forces and thus violate the balance with the European NATO countries or to resort to violation of the balance in strategic branches such as the Air Force, Navy, or Strategic Missile Forces, or weaken PVO [Air Defense]. All of this is unacceptable for the time being.

I also cannot agree with the following argument: They say the Army, while transitioning to hiring, will immediately rid itself of crime. Really, its' primary cause lies in society itself—youthful banditry, pacifism, legal nihilism, and the crisis in the educational system and educational institutions. We can also ascribe this to anti-Army propaganda whose consequences frequently are desertion, avoiding the draft, and a lack of desire to serve.

Another cause of crime in the Armed Forces lies in army reality itself. Often a commander hears "Educate!" to his demand to arraign a subordinate who has broken the law. This applies to all categories of servicemen. It turns out that interdepartmental accounting is becoming more important than society's requirements. Really the people do not rebuke the Army for bringing criminals to justice, it is dissatisfied with it for the increase in crime. But at times a commander whose subordinate has stirred up the district with a misdemeanor goes unpunished if he "has wiggled out" of accountability and has not spoiled it. This is an example of classic bureaucracy when, as it is stated in Marx's "Das Kapital," the chancellor issue became a state matter and the state [matter] became the chancellor's. And unfortunately this entire mechanism is set forth in the draft of the new Disciplinary Regulation.

These are the realities of the Army's crime problem and hiring is not a way out of this situation. People will not arrive from Australia to serve in the Army. At the same time, the system of "communist education" obviously remains and, by all accounts, will function successfully.

We can turn to the U.S.'s experience. This is the fashion right now. The transition to hiring did not resolve the discipline problem there. They had to discharge up to 600,000 men for misdemeanors (*Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye* [Foreign Military Review] No. 10, 1989, "Komplektovaniye vooruzhennykh sil lichnym sostavom v SShA" [Armed Forces Personnel Manpower Acquisition in the U.S.]).

Major General A. Shatalov's assertion on the pages of OGONEK about the non-existence of the problem of providing servicemen with housing during the transition to hiring seems to be unconvincing. We will encounter enormous difficulties here, even taking the hypothetical number of 1.5 million professional soldiers with which I cannot agree as I stated earlier.

Today 170,500 families of servicemen (of which 128,100 are officers families) do not have housing. The problem is so acute that it is a top priority, according to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's assessments that were made based on the analysis of the course of troop reductions in the Moscow Air Defense District.

Right now the Ministry of Defense has practically ceased all capital construction and has retooled airfield runway slab production plants to the production of [concrete] blocks for housing construction. Conditions have been created for individual construction and purchases of cooperative apartments. However, even having exhausted reserves and having resorted to unprecedented steps, the Ministry of Defense is not capable of totally satisfying everyone who needs housing and of eliminating the tenseness of the situation.

A. Shatalov's argument that there is a possibility of providing housing to 1.5 million professional soldiers within the framework of realizing the program to supply housing to each Soviet family by the year 2000 also does not convince me. The fact is first of all that this program was calculated upon the realities that existed when it was approved and it can hardly withstand these corrections. Really along with those already planned, we need to build thousands of military posts that are remote from centers.

We hardly need to calculate that we cannot erect housing for those who serve in cities. There is a large turnover of personnel already right now among officers alone. Thus, it totaled 17,000 men in 1989. And this is without those "reduced" or retired. More than 100 families from one military post cannot be settled just in one Odessa Military District KeCh [Billeting Operation Unit]. The settlement time period exceeds nine years.

And what awaits us under total professionalization of the Armed Forces? More than 300,000 soldiers alone are

annually discharged from the U.S. Army (Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye [Foreign Military Review] No. 10, 1989, Komplektovaniye vooruzhennykh sil lichnym sostavom v SShA [Armed Forces Personnel Manpower Acquisition in the U.S.]). Can our housing construction withstand this load? Living space provided calculated on a per capita basis for 1988 totaled 15.5 m² in our country, including 14.7 m² in cities and 17 m² in rural areas. One tenth of urban families have less than 5 m² per person; approximately 15 percent of the population lives in communal apartments or dormitories. In Europe, there is over 20 m² of living space per capita and over 150 m² in the U.S. Even to reach 12 m² of living space per capita by the year 2000, we need to increase construction rates by a factor of four but that is already out of the question because of Chernobyl, the Armenian earthquake, and other cataclysms. And can we base our calculations, using the U.S. as an example, on a country that has a tenfold superiority in housing? Essentially, we need to conduct a housing anti-conversion program to provide 1.5 million professionals with just 12 m² of living space. Who will resort to this? I am already not talking about expenditures that are required for development of social, cultural, and life style construction.

In my opinion, the statements that talk about the possible advantage for our national economy of releasing many workmen during the transition to hiring are not very convincing. They are depersonalized and averaged in the calculations cited. Even the value of workmen is raised to the absolute—8,000 rubles and the dialectic of this value is totally ignored.

The value of the work force depends on the capabilities of the national economy. Today it actually corresponds to 8-10,000 [rubles] when a shortage of workmen exists in a number of regions. But this is an average figure. I think it is clear that an inexperienced specialist is "worth" quite a bit less than a highly skilled one.

Just what kind of contingent can be released from the Army? Mainly an unskilled, inexperienced work force whose value will be low relative to the primary level in the country. This is only one side of the problem.

It is also easy to become convinced of the artificiality of the "project to save the economy" with regard to the release of the contingent mentioned above. It is sufficient to turn to our economy's development trends. The fraction of workers who are engaged in unskilled labor totals 35 percent in industry, 55 percent in construction, and 65-70 percent in agriculture and in the services sector. Today the growth of the work force is equal to 3.2 million people and the shortage is 22 million. And the release of 1-2 million from the Army will not resolve the problem.

But this is not all. We must point out the following while speaking about the shortage of 22 million workmen. Unemployment has practically already engulfed the areas of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the Transcaucasus. And it is no secret that the primary mass of draftees

comes precisely from these republics where there is a surplus of workmen right now. At the same time, while considering the current trend for the replenishment of the professional portion of our Army with representatives from primarily four peoples—Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Tatars, we can also approximately imagine the national composition of those who express a desire to serve on salary. Consequently, workmen will be added in the areas where there already is unemployment and workmen will decrease in those areas where there are insufficient workmen right now. Will the economy, let us say, of that same Russia withstand this outflow of the work force?

Almost everyone asserts that the transition to hiring will totally resolve the issue of soldiers mastering equipment. Naturally, the quantity of equipment failures and their failure due to human error by compulsory service personnel are very significant. Especially in comparison with officers. But even during the transition to analysis of this issue, it is important to avoid errors. It is impossible to see in the future soldier who wants to serve on salary a specialist whose training level is equal to an officer's training level. Why? A man who is capable of receiving a higher or middle special education can take advantage of the opportunity to become an officer or a warrant officer—they will pay [him] more. Further. Right now technicum graduates have to serve whether they want to or not. There will not be this adequately trained contingent among soldiers on salary. For example, in the U.S. during the transition to salaries, up to 60 percent of soldiers were composed of people who did not have even a middle education.

In my opinion, the primary cause of our difficulties in mastering combat equipment is its imperfection and lagging behind the West in productivity of labor. Let us say, domestic electronics are designed for repair for due to its manufacturing expense, we cannot permit ourselves [the luxury] that they have in the U.S. Army—replacement of assemblies and subassemblies. "They" are quite skilled at working on serviceable equipment and, if the need arose, at detecting a fault for replacement through an indicator. We need to have special knowledge in order to engage in diagnostics and repair. Major General of Aviation A. Batalov writes, in AVI-ATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA magazine that the cost of major repairs in our country totals 30 percent of the cost of a new piece of equipment. The same volume of repairs "in their country" costs more than production.

Hence all of our misfortunes. Really nowhere else in the world do they have, let us say, automobiles with a 20-year service life like in our country. There is a requirement to master the most complex and expensive types of repair due to this and there is a shortage of spare parts. No kind of salary will reduce equipment malfunctions in the Army as long we replace the bodies of old Zhigulis. One conclusion invites itself: The possibility of reducing the high accident rate by changing the conscription method is illusory. The environment from which the

hiring [system] will be implemented and the economic mechanism will transfer all of our "sore points" to a hired army.

Many people suggest: The "unneeded" layer in it is being eliminated during the transition to a hired army, the command and control staff is being reduced, and specifically, the number of generals will be reduced. At the same time, we are struck by that fact that a narrow-minded envy is taking precedence over rational thought in the very approach to the problem. We are primarily talking not about the benefit of some official but about high salaries and other benefits. But if this is a matter of principle, who is confusing us by trying to build this Army? And where is the guarantee that a hired army will not have "excess weight"? Really, let us say the militia, where they are paid salaries, is not spared from this. Obviously the resolution of the issue does not lie in this plane but in the creation of effective control of the Army's functioning. The Armed Forces of the FRG, Italy, and France do not suffer from this.

They say the Army will be released from economic work in construction while transitioning to salary. But what is preventing the Army from doing this today? Most probably the under-development of those spheres of the national economy that it is replacing. If the economy falters, the hired army will also remain partially "labor" to the detriment of combat readiness.

I am particularly troubled by the ethnic issue surrounding the Army. Events in the Baltic Region and the Transcaucasus say that certain forces in these regions, while playing their card, are not losing sight of the "Achilles' heel" of Armed Forces manpower acquisition—97 percent of the professional personnel are replenished, as I already pointed out, by four peoples altogether. Right now extreme measures are being undertaken to correct this situation. International schools are being established with intense Russian language study and increased physical training for young lads from all of the union republics. But the matter that has been begun is only an embryo and for the time being there are more problems here than solutions.

How then can we, knowing this trend, resort to an Army "hiring system" as a whole? What a destabilizing factor we are creating in this country!

I think that I have already expressed enough arguments against the transition to hiring although there could be more of them.

FROM THE EDITOR: As we can see, "KVS Discussion Club" participants expressed argumentative and at times mutually exclusive opinions. The editors do not agree with all of them but we intend to continue this discussion in order to express various points of view and we invite both military scholars and specialists-practitioners to participate in it.

Comrades, we are awaiting your letters!

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1990.

Work of USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Veterans, Invalids

90UM04364 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Kosarev: "Refusing to Accept Indifference, Members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Veteran and Invalid Affairs Are Working"]

[Text] In the break between plenary meetings of the parliament and its houses, the skyscraper at 27 Kalinin Prospekt in the country's capital, allocated to committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, is buzzing like a disturbed beehive. Its spacious hearing rooms, halls and offices fill from early morning on with people's deputies, consultants, specialists from the ministries and departments and journalists. The Supreme Soviet Committee for Veteran and Invalid Affairs is located not too far from the ground relatively speaking, on the sixth floor. I must admit that I have never seen reports of its meetings on television, but I have often encountered stories about them in the newspapers. To be honest this was also my first visit here. And I was immediately sorry that I had not visited earlier, that I had not acquainted myself more closely with these people, that I had not immersed myself into the atmosphere of their real humanitarianism, their intolerance of indifference, which unfortunately has become a typical trait of many.

By the way, the committee members are not insulted by the inattentiveness to them on the part of representatives of the press. They are beyond that—there are too many issues facing them, and they are rather serious. Let me cite the agenda of the last committee meeting in support of these words. The first issue to be examined was the conclusion on the draft USSR Law on Pension Support. The deputies were given a briefing on preparations for the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. After this, issues concerning housing for servicemen retired from active service and the progress in fulfilling instructions of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies on intensifying attention to the needs of invalids and on expanding production of resources of locomotion and small mechanized tools for them were discussed. Captain A. S. Kolodeznikov—assistant division chief of the Yakutsk City Military Commissariat and a USSR people's deputy representing the Komsomol—was assigned the responsibility for the latter issue. He was the hero of the day, and the meeting began with warm congratulations, friendly wishes and presentation of flowers to him. On that day Aleksandr Semenovich celebrated what one of the deputies that congratulated him referred to as his 28th spring.

What other sort of problems must the committee members deal with? First of all there are problems associated with protecting the social rights and improving the life of

invalids and the elderly, was what committee deputy chairman Trofim Iosifovich Gorinov told me. Special attention is devoted to participants of the Great Patriotic War, and not just because the 45th anniversary of the victory is coming near. These people have earned the best we can give them. USSR people's deputies are conducting inspections locally in order to see how well government decisions on benefits and privileges established for invalids, war veterans and the families of deceased servicemen are being carried out. Working together with the USSR Ministry of Defense and the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans they prepared a draft resolution on the 45th anniversary of the victory, which is now being examined by the government. It foresees new measures to improve the life of war veterans and laborers of the rear to be financed by the local soviets and assets of the enterprises and organizations.

There is just a little more than a month before Victory Day, the people are very eagerly awaiting adoption of the resolution, and they are counting on it.

As with the other committees and parliament commissions, the Committee for Veteran and Invalid Affairs is perpetually examining bills brought up before the Supreme Soviet—chiefly from the positions of protecting the rights and interests of the elderly, of war participants and of invalids, and it submits its own proposals and corrections. Right now for example the draft Law on the General Principles of Local Self-Management and Local Administration in the USSR is being discussed. The committee is very interested in seeing that this document reflects the rights and responsibilities of local government authorities in matters of improving the life of veterans and invalids.

Each day the committee receives dozens and hundreds of letters. People complain about housing conditions and about poor trade and medical services, and they raise many other painful problems. As a rule, all of this is the consequence of indifference and an inattentive attitude on the part of local government authorities to the needs of the elderly. I was told that more than 70,000 letters were received from laborers, labor collectives and veterans just during discussion of and work on the pension bill. It was stated in many letters that enterprise administrations were cancelling work contracts with workers attaining retirement age on the basis of Article 17 of the Principles of USSR Labor Legislation. The committee members assessed this as administrative tyranny that deprived people of retirement age of their social and legal protection, and exercising their right of legislative initiative they submitted a proposal on this matter to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This is but one episode in the life and activities of the committee.

But let's get back to the last meeting. First Deputy Chairman of the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans A. I. Golyakov briefed the members on the progress of preparations for the 45th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War. It began as a simple message, but it

turned into a discussion of major problems involving the status of veterans, war invalids and the families of deceased frontline soldiers, their lack of social protection and the need for interring as soon as possible the remains of Soviet soldiers who had died in battles with Hitler's forces. Listening to Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, Marshal of Aviation A. P. Silantyev, committee chairman N. V. Bosenko and other deputies, I experienced a feeling of shame before the frontline soldiers. How long will we continue talking about this, when will our conscience, and the conscience of those upon whom the resolution of all these matters depends, awaken?

We have also been irritated for a long time by the problems of providing housing to servicemen discharged from active service. A report was given on this matter by Lieutenant General (Retired) N. P. Likhanin, the chief specialist of the Main Billeting Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, who was invited to the meeting. Here are just a few facts with which the committee members were acquainted. As of 1 January 1990 the number of families of officers and warrant officers lacking housing reached 173,600. This number increased by almost 200,000 in connection with withdrawal of military units from the groups of forces. The number of officers discharged into the reserves finding themselves without housing is constantly increasing. And consider how many resolutions were adopted on this account by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers—in 1960, in 1963, in 1975, in 1981.... They stated that persons discharged into the reserves or retired due to health, age or reduction in forces are provided housing space on priority by executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, but not later than three months after arriving at their place of residence selected with regard for the registration procedures presently in effect.

However, this deadline has not been observed anywhere in recent years. Instead of three months, most discharged persons are waiting two, three and more years for housing. They are forced to wander about looking for private housing and pay considerable amounts to rent apartments, they have no opportunities to find employment and to accrue time on the job, they and their families are unable to receive medical care, their wives can't find work, and they can't find space for their children in schools and preschool institutions. Moreover the quantity of space allocated by local soviets to persons discharged from the army has decreased from year to year. Thus the percentage of persons needing housing that received it was 37.2 in 1987, 30.7 in 1988 and only 21.9 in 1989. In this connection the number of persons without housing is increasing, and as of the beginning of this year the total was 28,763 families. Solution of the problem is aggravated also by the fact that in recent times a number of local and republic government organs have groundlessly introduced additional restrictions on registration and on selection of a place of residence by servicemen discharged into the reserves or retired. This is especially characteristic of Belorussia, Moldavia,

Estonia, Latvia, Kirghizia, Maritime Kray, and Kaluga, Kalinin, Novgorod, Zhitomir, Kostroma and a number of other oblasts.

During the discussion, which once again attested to the principles and the concern of the committee members, the status of the housing problem was once again revealed to be unsatisfactory in the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the causes were identified. It was noted in particular that the situation is also aggravated by the fact that local soviets are too slow in moving persons who had broken their ties with the army from the military posts to their own housing, and that there is no legal, legislative basis for solving the housing problem of servicemen on a unionwide scale. The committee members supported a proposal from the USSR Ministry of Defense to improve the supply of housing to servicemen and expressed their support to the fastest possible solution of this important problem.

Just one day, but so much done.

Maj Gen Kudinov on Theft of Weapons, Materiel

90UM0463A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen Yu. Kudinov, deputy directorate chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Lt Col I. Yesyutin: "A Weapon 'In the Search'; Reflections on Alarming Statistics"]

[Text] One constantly hears stunning news about the enormous number of weapons and ammunition moving without control through the nation, falling into the hands of criminals and operators and becoming an article for sale. The Armed Forces have become one of the sources for this ominous stock, as bitter as it is to admit. What has given rise to this phenomenon? What measures are being undertaken by the appropriate services of the Ministry of Defense to prevent the loss of weapons? It was with these questions that I went to a meeting with the Deputy Directorate Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Maj Gen Yu. Kudinov...

[Yesyutin] Yuriy Viktorovich [Kudinov], the impression is being created that the Army and Navy dumps, depots and storage facilities have begun to be more poorly guarded than before....

[Kudinov] Such an impression has actually arisen. But what do you want? Suddenly people have been overwhelmed by statistics which they previously simply did not know about. This is, so to speak, the purely psychological aspect of the question. Another more serious one is that the number of thefts and losses of weapons, ammunition and explosives in our country, in the Armed Forces, has actually been rising. And sharply so. While in 1988, we had 195 units of such losses, last year it was over 300 and just in the two months of the current year, already 162. But it is not a matter here of heedlessness.

[Yesyutin] Then what is it?

[Kudinov] The demand for weapons has increased sharply. There has been an increase in the activeness of criminal, extremist, nationalistic and other groups endeavoring to secure weapons in order to achieve their goals with the aid of them. For the sake of this they will resort to anything: piratical attacks, drawing into their nets persons involved in guarding military dumps and storage facilities and bribery. Last year, for example, there were 27 attacks committed against sentries and individuals on daily detail. In the current year, there have already been nine of these.

Previously, we did not encounter such a phenomenon where juveniles were involved in criminal groups so that when they were inducted into the army they would then be accomplices in securing weapons. But now these are no longer isolated instances. In one of the air defense units, for example, a soldier, while acting as a sentry, made off with assault rifles and cartridges and hid out. An investigation established that he was acting in a preliminary conspiracy with a group of civilians following a previously elaborated plan.

Or such a case. Jr Sgt Akhunov, being the chief of one of the patrols, personally stole six assault rifles and 11 pistols in order to sell them for an offered 42,000 rubles to a group of racketeers.

Characteristically, the number of attacks on servicemen, the theft and loss of weapons and ammunition are directly dependent upon the situation in regions, as we say, of particular social tension. Last year, the greatest number of weapons thefts occurred in the garrisons of the Turkestan Military District and in the current year, in the Transcaucasus...

[Yesyutin] Does this mean that the reasons for the theft must be sought outside the army and that the servicemen are not to blame?

[Kudinov] Of course, that is not the case. However, in this problem it is also essential to see the conditions which have objectively arisen for us. We are not refusing to admit our mistakes. We, we honestly admit, did not foresee the current situation involving the loss of weapons. For an extended period of time the services involved in the storage, accounting and issuing of weapons did not give sufficient attention to this. It was considered that a position "without others involved" did not require particular moral and professional qualities from the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik," "michman"]. These positions in many instances were filled by specialists who could not be used anywhere else...

[Yesyutin] But where, we might ask, was your administration and the corresponding departments and services of the districts looking?

[Kudinov] In virtually every order and directive which we prepared, it was stipulated that positions with such responsibility should be filled by persons with high

moral and professional qualities, desirably CPSU members, and the choice should be made through the certification commissions. But the personnel would simply not fill these positions. They were not interested as the pay was bad and at the same time responsibility was great.

This problem, of course, must be settled immediately. The position of a chief of a weapons or ammunition dump should be highly paid and prestigious. I am confident that together with other measures this would tell on the quality of service. At present, approximately one-third of the total amount of weapons stolen in the army disappears from the dumps, from the vehicle parks and storage facilities.

[Yesutin] What about the remaining two-thirds?

[Kudinov] From the subunits, from the ranges and as a result of tax on servicemen...

[Yesutin] But certainly some portion is returned as a result of a search?

[Kudinov] Of course. Of the weapons stolen, for instance, last year for now 65 units were not recovered. The remainder were returned.

[Yesutin] You have said "for now"...

[Kudinov] Yes, the stolen weapons are still being searched for. The search involves both the troops, the military procuracy and co-workers from the KGB and MVD. As a total for the Soviet Army since 1946, some 1,530 units of combat firearms are still being sought. But, it seems to me, we have digressed from the subject.

The problem is that the equipment of many of the guarded installations has grown old. Unreliable fencing, insufficient illumination of the posts, poor utilization of security equipment.... In September of last year, on the territory of one of the artillery dumps in the Transcaucasus Military District unknown persons broke in and made off with 12 assault rifles, 20 grenades and 2,560 cartridges. The theft was carried out through the ventilating intakes. Their screens, it turned out, had not been connected to the alarm system...

[Yesutin] Have you reported each case?

[Kudinov] Absolutely so. Each instance of a loss of weapons is recorded and reported personally to the USSR minister of defense. But it is not a matter of merely reporting, rather we analyze the causes and conditions leading to the losses of weapons, we prepare official reviews and provide help in introducing new methods for guarding the installations. As a subunit of the General Staff, our directorate coordinates and accumulates the studies and proposals from the main staffs of the Armed Services, the districts and fleets. The officers from the directorates spend over one-half of their working time directly in the troops and fleets, in actually organizing the work of the staffs in improving guard duty and other areas of troop service.

[Yesutin] I do not know, Comrade Major General, whether the information has reached you but, judging from personal encounters and from the editorial mail, the troops are simply "groaning" under the guard duties.

[Kudinov] Each day over 400,000 men go on daily detail. As an average for the Armed Forces, the workload is not so great. But, as they say, life isn't always fair.

[Yesutin] Possibly in the process of the military reform we should follow the path of setting up regular guard subunits? This, as many officers feel, would help improve the quality of the service and would free the combat subunits for beneficial training.

[Kudinov] I would not want to reject this idea, as, it seems to me, there is something to it. Particularly if one assumes that the manning of such guard subunits could be carried out on a contract basis with the corresponding pay.

But a more realistic and justified way would be one which, in my view, would consider both the interests of service and the interests of combat training. I have in mind the inventorying of the guarded facilities and on this basis a reasonable reduction in the number of guards and posts. We must categorize the military installations and determine what conditions should be maintained at each of them. It is not wise, for example, when the administrative-housekeeping, trade and service facilities are guarded as military dumps with weapons.

Only what actually should be guarded should be protected. Here on an integrated basis one can employ both sentries, equipment and guard dogs.

[Yesutin] Incidentally, how are things with these auxiliary guard duty facilities?

[Kudinov] We are still slow in developing security and alarm equipment, their series production and introduction. Here we can feel that the Ministry of Defense for a long time did not have a general contractor for this equipment. It has been difficult to carry out a unified policy in this area. At present, collaboration has been started with the enterprises and institutions of the Ministry of Atomic Power, Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry and the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems. In the troops a promising start in this area has been made by the order of the USSR Minister of Defense on measures to further equip military facilities of the Army and Navy with security and alarm equipment. The introduction of these is being supervised by the General Staff. In this area the situation is now better in the Belorussian, Kiev and Odessa Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet.

We are not forgetting the guard dogs. At present, over 7,200 of them are guarding military facilities. The figures will rise.

[Yesutin] All the same, the main, if it can be so said, figure in guard duty for now will remain man?

[Kudinov] Yes, man. The soldier. This is with whom we must work constantly and about whom we must be constantly concerned. No one has ever considered guard duty a sweet thing. It is difficult, dangerous and fatiguing combat work. And we must show a responsible attitude toward the persons carrying it out. This must be on the spiritual, moral and material-service levels.

Obituary: Lt Gen Tyulin

90UM0523A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Text] Lieutenant General Georgiy Aleksandrovich Tyulin has died following a serious and prolonged illness. Tyulin was a Hero of Socialist Labor, a Lenin Prize winner, a member of the CPSU since 1940, a Doctor of Technical Sciences, a professor, and a retired Lieutenant General.

Tyulin was born on 9 December 1914 in Penza. He began work as a machine operator. After graduating from the Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov he attended graduate school and did research on missile aerodynamics.

In the early days of World War II he volunteered to go to the front. He fought in guards mortar units and advanced from the commander of a katyusha [multi-barreled rocket launcher] battery to the chief of staff of an operational group.

Following the war G. A. Tyulin worked in various management and engineering and technical jobs within

the USSR Ministry of Defense and later within the defense industry, where he devoted his creative strengths and talent and exceptional organizational skills to the development of Soviet space science and to strengthening the national defense capability. In his final years he was actively engaged in scientific research at the Moscow State University imeni Lomonosov.

All who worked with Georgiy Aleksandrovich held him in respect and recognized his deserved authority; they admired his high exactingness and adherence to principle, which were combined with an attentive and sensitive attitude toward people.

For his outstanding service to the Motherland G.A. Tyulin was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, two Orders of Lenin, an October Revolution medal, a Red Banner medal, a Labor Red Banner medal, an Aleksandr Nevskiy medal, a World War II First Degree medal, and many other USSR orders and medals. He was an honored RSFSR worker in science and technology.

The blessed memory of Georgiy Aleksandrovich Tyulin will be preserved in our hearts.

[Signed by:] L. N. Zaykov, O. D. Baklanov, I. S. Belousov, V. Kh. Doguzhiyev, G. I. Marchuk, O. S. Belyakov, Yu. A. Prokofev, O. N. Shishkin, S.A. Afanasev, R. R. Kiryushin, V. V. Lobanov, A. S. Matrenin, V. N. Soshin, Yu. N. Koptev, Yu. P. Maksimov, V. L. Ivanov, V. L. Lapygin, Yu. A. Mozzhorin, A. A. Logunov, and I. I. Melnikov.

Thoughts on Regimen of Soviet Sailors in Foreign Ports

90UM0328A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank S. Kuzmin, candidate of technical sciences and senior instructor in the Navigation Department at the Kaliningrad Higher Naval School, under the rubric "Returning to What Was Printed": "Parade Step in Marseille"]

[Text] More than two years ago, in the article "Routine Port Call" published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, I attempted to direct attention to certain problems involved in organizing routine port calls at foreign ports by Soviet ships. Although the article touched upon only a few issues (open to discussion at that time), during the intervening period no decisions have been made on them for improving the organization of sailing on training ships. Unfortunately, the subject of discussion is still important only to the participants in long cruises but not to those in a position to make them more effective.

No one denies the fact today that the nation's leadership has achieved some impressive success primarily in restructuring relations with foreign states. I believe that the sailors could make a contribution to the further improvement of these relations and in publicizing our restructuring abroad. It is annoying that this is not occurring for reasons which could be eliminated without any great difficulty.

The training ships ordinarily make routine port calls at ports in the East European nations; rarely in other countries. This is apparently due to our nation's financial situation. While it was previously believed that people looked upon the Soviet sailor with admiration and envied him for the fact that he lived in such a wonderful country, we now acknowledge that this is not entirely so. My considerable experience on cruises with cadets permits me to conclude that we sometimes draw attention abroad with our inability to communicate with people, a uniform not suitable for the climate in the countries we visit, lack of money and the way shore leave is organized for the personnel.

We are still not resolving many matters which degrade our sailors and turn them into "second-rate" people compared with the sailors of other nations. The schools prepare officers who will be entrusted with awesome weapons and the fate of large numbers of subordinates. But it turns out that our state does not trust the officers and cadets. Where is the trust if, whenever our training ships pass through international straits, the officers and cadets stand in formation at a special spot for a long time in every kind of weather and a so-called "vigilance watch" is posted on all the ladders. "Vigilance over what?" one asks. That question must be answered squarely. I believe that such a procedure degrades people.

Now consider the infamous "fivesomes," about which the military press is silent, although they are discussed in other publications. It is clear why they were introduced in the situation of administration by command. In the Russian navy, as in the navies of many nations today, the sailors could freely go ashore until a certain time. Naturally, they tried to stick together in a strange city. They were released with friends however, and not with whom-ever the command element designated, and they knew that everyone had the right to spend the time as he saw fit.

However, today's references to possible acts of provocation against our sailors (and these are not ruled out) by the command element evoke sarcasm in the officers and cadets. I have worked within the system of naval training institutions almost 10 years, and I have never heard of any such acts of provocation. This arrangement for shore leave is very convenient for the command element, however. If something happens, there is someone to hold accountable—the senior man of the "fivesome." Before a "fivesome" departs for shore, they are told straight out that if one of them receives a reprimand, none of the "fivesome" will be permitted to go into town again. This organizational excess apparently goes back to the times of Stalinism, when everyone had to be watched at all times. The "fivesomes" do not actually protect against any acts of provocation. It is not realistic, in a city with a large density of people, to expect to keep an eye on everyone, to promptly notice any sort of unlawful act by or toward the cadets. It is true, as they say, that if something happens the "fivesome" can be formed up and taken back to the ship and that people will not dare commit an act of provocation against servicemen in a formation. They do not seem to understand that if an act of provocation is planned, nothing will stop it.

In short, it is my conviction that the "fivesomes" serve no purpose. They do entail large additional expenses, though. When they are put together, each officer is assigned three or four "fivesomes." During a four-day routine call it is usual for every cadet to visit shore a minimum of twice. In addition, many officers are also called upon for various ceremonial duties. And so, the officer is engaged mainly in taking the men into town. He will take one "fivesome" (sometimes two) in the morning, another in the afternoon. The officer himself has no time to see the city.

During a visit to the naval school in Varna in 1989, the Bulgarian officers told us that several years before, following our example, they too had instituted the "fivesomes." They went through the torment for a year and decided to abolish them. The Bulgarian cadets now go on leave—in Marseille, for example—without a senior man, in threes. And one does not hear of any acts of provocation against them.

What is the conclusion to be drawn? If the state prepares a person for military work at a VUZ, it should trust the future officer. Something else: In my opinion, the legal

status of Soviet sailors should be indicated in their service papers. After all, even our driver's license is now in the international format.

I shall now discuss the painful issue of financial support for Soviet sailors in foreign ports. Our fellow citizens can exchange at least a few dozen rubles for a tourist visit or an official trip abroad. Everyone admits that it is a very insignificant amount, however. But what about us? We are issued only 88% of our pay rate for the days spent in a foreign port while sailing on a training ship. Furthermore, the day of arrival and the day of departure are considered as one day. This means that the senior officers receive 4-5 rubles, the cadets less than a ruble. What is more, there is a very complicated procedure for obtaining even these meager amounts (those who have been on the cruises know what I mean).

Now take the sailor's appearance. By stretching it greatly, we can say that the uniform is almost suitable for our nation's temperate climate. But what about those regions in which we sail? Simply described, Soviet sailors march behind the leader at temperatures of more than 30 degrees in the shade wearing black woolen trousers, black boots and black sailor's caps. Their entire bodies are covered with sweat. And quenching their thirst is out of the question. There is nothing to drink.

Naturally, the problems and issues raised cannot be resolved in a single sweep, with a single order, particularly those pertaining to financial support. We need first of all to resolve those matters which do not involve large outlays: to wit, organizational issues. Let us trust those whom we prepare for rigorous trials. This will demonstrate to the whole world that our society is truly becoming an open one.

Baltic Fleet Experiments With 'Professional' Missile Boat Crew

90UM0445A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Capt. 2nd Rank V. Gromak: "Professionals on the Missile Boat"]

[Text] This Experiment Was Proposed for the Baltic Fleet

Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak has been made a permanent correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for the Baltic Fleet. This is his first article.

The initiators of the idea were two missile boat commanders, Capt. 3rd Rank I. Yakovenko (the officer received this rank ahead of his peers), and Capt-Lt S. Krivenchuk. They devised all the documents related to the experiment over several months.

"For several years I have observed the same picture," Capt-Lt S. Krivenchuk confides. "A crew is knocked into shape in a year of combat training. And then some specialists are discharged to the reserve, and officers are promoted. What has been achieved collapses like a house of cards. The training year begins, and again we start

practically from scratch. I shared my thoughts with Igor Yakovenko, and together we began to figure...

The idea of the commanders was also appealing to Capt. 1st Rank Yu. Krivenko. On the basis of his service experience, Yuriy Ivanovich had long ago concluded that present-day equipment can only be serviced well by professionals.

He reasons: "For example, while a missile cruiser has seven cadre servicemen in an air defense missile battery and headquarters (officers and warrant officers), on a small missile boat there are only two. But operator's skills and sound knowledge are equally necessary on a cruiser and on a small boat. What will we gain from the formation of a professional crew? First of all, a higher quality, not to say entirely different level, of combat readiness. Secondly, we will eliminate problems with so-called service maintenance of complex equipment. To some extent we will eliminate questions related to military discipline, and special training will become more orderly. Basically it will be independent...

Here then is an incomplete list of the main questions for which it was proposed that the experiment be started. In other words, the formation went from general talks about military reform to specific proposals. The ideas of the boat commanders, the staff officers, and the staff specialists of the formation acquired material form in the document "A study of the possibility of changing a missile boat to manning by officer and warrant officer personnel."

With the new organization, it was proposed to have five officers, 12 warrant officers, and eight extended-service seamen in the crew. Of course, there are some in the fleet combat training directorate who also want to include several compulsory-service seamen in the crew. For auxiliary positions, so to speak: cook, medic, boatswain. But these are mere details.

As you see, the basic idea of the experiment is a radical change in the organic structure in the direction of reduction. The question arises: will the reduction in personnel not affect the combat readiness of the boat? Everyone I talked to answered this question in the negative. The boat commanders believe that combat readiness will be achieved by raising the level of professional training.

The combat training directorate also has its arguments. The first deputy chief of combat training of the fleet, Capt. 1st Rank E. Reznikov, told me: "I support the initiative of the boat men. If we consider the formation of professional crews from the military standpoint, there will be a significant gain in combat readiness. After all, professionals will work in the combat posts. And not, to put it in the words of one writer, 'every Tom, Dick, and Harry.' If we succeed at this, then there will be a revision of many long-held concepts in combat training, in the organization of training, which will allow us to do without one third of expenditures for combat training. And this is an enormous amount."

Of course, this idea also has many opponents. Whom do I have in mind? First of all those who talk of the expense of the experiment. But who has counted the cost of breakage of combat equipment through the fault of personnel?

Specialists believe that the situation with respect to maintenance and repair of combat equipment and arms in the fleet is more chaotic than planned.

Says Capt. 1st Rank Yu. Krivenko, "The formation also has very many representatives from the manufacturing plants doing guaranteed and planned repairs of equipment and arms on our boats. Colossal sums are spent on all this. Guaranteed service just on the propulsion systems on eight or nine boats costs around 300 thousand rubles per year."

The staff specialist of the formation, Capt. 2nd Rank V. Butko, expands on the thought of the Capt. 1st Rank: "A radar complex on a boat costs several million rubles. If it is broken through the fault of a seaman, we can take, at the most, 100 rubles, and punish him. And as for maintenance and repair, this is the Minister of Defense's order, which long ago prescribed the creation of professional technical maintenance groups for combat equipment and arms. And it requires us to separate the functions of users and repairers."

There are analogous problems among the specialists of the electromechanical service.

Capt. 2nd Rank Yu. Bayzert, deputy formation commander for the electromechanical service, believes: "The times force us to begin manning crews with professionals. If we count the economic losses inflicted on the fleet by the malfunction of main and auxiliary engines through the fault of personnel, we get a number with quite a few zeroes after it."

But in the fleet technical directorate they were restrained with their "zeroes". The chief of one of the sections, Capt. 1st Rank V. Karasayev provided the following information. In 1988 there were three breakdowns of main engines and nine of auxiliary engines in the fleet. Last year there were three and thirteen respectively. But the total cost—no one at the technical directorate counted it up.

Yet another fundamental question arises: where will we find the cadres? After all, it is well known that there is a very grave situation in the fleet now with respect to warrant officers and extended-service seamen. The chief of the personnel officer of the formation, Capt. 2nd Rank V. Tyulkin, assured me that if the experiment is approved for implementation, it will enhance the prestige of the warrant officer service.

And Vladimir Erestovich told me: "They are prestigious even now on the missile boats; in the unit where they propose to conduct the experiment, there is a one-hundred percent strength level. This has also become part of the system here: we ourselves go to the warrant officer schools and academies, and to the training detachments, and pick our own people."

The fleet personnel office has its own opinion on this subject.

The chief of the personnel office, Rear Admiral A. Petrov, told me, "Certain conditions have to be created in order to shift to professional crews. Namely: personnel have to work only at their immediate duties. To support the ships it is necessary to create security, commandant, and other auxiliary subunits. The second problem: where do we get the money? The way I see it, officer and warrant officer positions should be reduced in all special and rear support units. I think that employees of the Soviet Army should work in the fuel, clothing, and food warehouses."

Many of the people I interviewed touched on the question in one way or another: where to find the additional monetary resources? The financial side of the experiment also very much disturbs the crewmen. Professionals must be paid more for their labor. By the terms of the experiment, plans are to increase wages by 100-150 rubles. According to careful calculations by the boat personnel, this adds up to several additional tens of thousands of rubles a year.

The chief of the fleet finance service, Col. S. Leponov, was succinct: "I am not against this experiment, but does the project have a significantly scientific basis? For it to take place, for the additional monetary resources to be allocated, the main thing required is a decision."

...For more than a year the idea of the experiment has been stirring the formation. The question of whether it will be, or not be, is still up in the air.

Experiment With 2-Year Contract Servicemen

90UM0484A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with Col Gen G. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the General Staff, by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Litovkin, under the rubric "From Competent Sources": "Into the Navy Under Contract"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense has sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers a proposal for reducing the term of active duty in the Navy from three to two years and for conducting an experiment in the manning of individual positions for seamen and petty officers with specialists who sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense.

Col Gen G. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the General Staff tells our correspondent about the substance and the terms of this experiment.

[Litovkin] Grigoriy Fedotovitch, we know that every third person in the Armed Forces today is a professional: officer, warrant officer, petty officer or extended-duty man. Given the overall reduction of the army and navy, why was it necessary to increase the number of professional fightingmen in it?

[Krivosheyev] There are many reasons. I shall single out the most important: the complexity of the combat weapons and equipment entering the forces. "Amateurism" in its servicing and use is unacceptable. It can lead not only to major breakdowns and accidents but also to a drastic decline in the combat readiness. We have a great interest in having specialists of the highest caliber in certain of the most crucial positions, which are manned today by soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers. The fact is that they become real specialists only toward the end of their service term, and we use them in their specialties only six months. That is not enough.

It is extremely inefficient to waste time training them twice a year, only to send them into the reserve soon thereafter. We can no longer get along without professionals who sign a long-term contract with us. Particularly in the Navy, in which the combat equipment is becoming more complex and the service terms are being reduced.

I believe that the army's future lies in professionalization, which does not rule out universal military duty, and the experiment which we intend to conduct in the Navy is one step toward that.

[Litovkin] What are the terms of the experiment?

[Krivosheyev] Under our plan, individuals who sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense will be considered extended-duty personnel. They will live in barracks or on ships and perform all the duties specified in the military regulations, and they will of course enjoy all the rights, benefits and privileges extended by current laws to first-term seamen and petty officers and their families.

There are some special features, to be sure. Since the contract is concluded for a period of three years and the ordinary term is two years, the positional pay rates for young men entering into a contractual relationship with us will be the same as for extended-duty personnel. With all the increments provided for special service conditions—that is, for standing alert duty, for proficiency ratings, for serving at remote sites, and so forth.

In this situation, the total pay can range from 200 to 380 rubles per month. The three years of service will be broken down as follows. The first six months will be spent in a training detachment with the usual pay, after which the fightingman may choose to sign a contract and be paid the same as extended-duty personnel for the remaining two and a half years.

[Litovkin] What if, after serving two years, let us say, the individual who has been receiving 200 rubles per month instead of seven or eight suddenly announces that he has served out his time under the law and wants to go home?

[Krivosheyev] We do not plan to hold anyone by force. The experiment is voluntary, and there are provisions for abrogating the contract.

It is possible for reasons of illness, for example, as determined by a military medical commission, for being

convicted of a crime by a court or for reasons of service incompatibility, when the serviceman regularly violates discipline, evades his duties or announces that he does not wish to remain in the service.

In the latter three cases the serviceman has to repay the difference between the amount received under the contract and the pay specified for first-term servicemen who have not signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense.

Other provisions are included in the terms of the contract. They cover leave, the procedure for resolving conflicts, proficiency rating and certification commissions and a great deal more which are not covered today. That is the purpose of the experiment, to make certain changes and adjustments dictated by life and the service.

Everyone needs to understand the most important thing: that we are entering a new area of contractual relations with the fightingmen, in which a contract is a contract. Both parties to the contract—the fightingman and the commander, representing the Ministry of Defense—will bear material and legal liability for the precise observance of its terms.

[Litovkin] What will the Ministry of Defense itself and the young man who signs the contract gain from it?

[Krivosheyev] It will enable us to have highly skilled specialists from among the NCOs and lower-ranking personnel, which means that we can raise the combat readiness of the Armed Forces as a whole to a higher level. For the youth who signs a contract.... Let us look at it. For three years he will have complete state support, during which time he will acquire and perfect a good specialty and then return to civilian life with a minimum of 6,000 [rubles] in his pocket.... What could be wrong with that? He can use this to pay the fee for a cooperative apartment, to help him out while studying at an institute or in other ways. And if he reenlists, becomes a warrant officer or enters a higher military school, other prospects will open up for him.

[Litovkin] It is clear that the introduction of service by contract will require additional funds. Where will they come from? And when is it planned to begin the experiment?

[Krivosheyev] Yes, even in the initial stage we will need around 82 million rubles in additional funds. The sources for financing it are presently being worked out. It is not out of the question that we might obtain the necessary funds from the proposed 50% reduction of strategic weapons. And we shall begin the experiment next year.

[Litovkin] Is it limited to the Navy alone?

[Krivosheyev] At first only to the Navy—in four fleet forces of surface ships and submarines. If the results are good, however, we hope very much that it can be extended to the missile, air defense and ground forces. Time will tell.

'Zenit' Plant in Tashkent Producing Consumer Goods

90UM0392C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
25 Jan 90 p 2

[UzTAG report, Tashkent: "Over to Peacetime Production"]

[Text] The Zenit plant of the Fizika Scientific Production Association, previously a closed enterprise specializing in the production of items for defense equipment, has totally switched to producing equipment for the radio and electronics industry and scientific research institutes.

It also produces a large range of consumer goods. Its children's bunkbeds, foldup desks and electronic alphabets (Russian-Uzbek and Uzbek-Russian), collapsible dryers, electric bells and theft-prevention devices for motor vehicles are in great demand.

Technical agreements have been signed between the Zenit and the South Korean Goldstar company for the production of video players and Goldstar-Zafar video recorders.

'Command' Style Conversion May 'Deepen Economic Crisis'

90UM0392A Moscow POISK in Russian No 10, 8-14
Mar pp 4-5

[Article by Aleksandra Mukhina under the rubric "Our Expert Appraisal": "Neither Guns Nor Butter"]

[Text] USSR Gosplan, the State Commission on Military Industrial Matters and the USSR Ministry of Defense submitted to the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers the State Program for Conversion of the Defense Industry for the Period Extending to the Year 1995. It was recommended that the program submitted be refined within a three-week period, however. And this is not surprising. Today we are witnessing heated debate by the specialists on what the rapid demilitarization of our economic life can provide and what its consequences could be for the national economy, which is experiencing a profound crisis.

The Armor Is Strong and Our Tanks Are Fast

And so, it has been decided drastically to reduce the production of strategic missiles, tanks, military aircraft, infantry combat vehicles, multiple rocket launchers and other military equipment. Quite recently, however, this process was developing with equal speed—but in the opposite direction. Based on extremely rigid plans, there was a methodical buildup of missiles, tanks and other "wealth." According to Academician V. Avduyevskiy, chairman of the Soviet National Commission for Assisting the Conversion, since 1917 we had continued to live with the slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" Today's outlays on the defense

industry, however, would be justified only if there were a war underway on even a single front....

What kind of an army do we have? Even producing far more weapons than the USA and more of certain types than all the NATO nations, our defense industry was unable rapidly to convert the army and navy to the new equipment. Having created a tank pool of 64,000 units, for example, we could totally renew the army only in ...dozens of years. In short, the "monster is overgrown, roguish and enormous," but, unfortunately, it is as awkward and archaic as some dinosaur.

In addition, certain economists with the Soviet National Commission for Assisting the Conversion estimate that the material wealth accumulated in our Armed Forces and in the branches producing military goods is comparable to all of the nation's basic "civilian wealth." The military machine designed by the defense ministries grew to gigantic size, and finally the critical moment was reached at which the civilian economy began to "capsize," dragging the military after it. We loaded one side of the boat for so long that it finally began to sink.

In the opinion of Academician V. Avduyevskiy, we have spend more than just a single trillion rubles on the defense industry. And although approximately a third of the weapons produced were "exported" to third-world nations, practically all of the currency received was reinvested in the military. The result is that the store shelves are empty and there is a crisis of overproduction in the military area, because, in the first place, the anticipated war with the entire capitalist world, fortunately, never started, and the former purchasers of our "fast tanks" today prefer to invest their money in more modern equipment—that is, forgive me, that coming off the assembly lines of the leading Western nations.

Today the state planning and management agencies see only the political side of the conversion. And although it is indeed important, there are also economic realities, which have once again been forgotten in the fervor of "historic" decisions. It should be noted that all of the campaigns—from the "corn fuss" to universal robotization—suffered from this. In the opinion of the economists, however, a command-style conversion in the situation of the state budget deficit could produce not an improvement of the economy but the opposite, a worsening of the crisis. And you and I will find ourselves once again no better off than before.... After all, that which is occurring before our eyes today would most accurately be described as conversion by directive. The masters of the situation, the defense departments, are now specifying who is to produce how much. The proposed draft conversion program therefore does not guarantee that the enormous scientific and technological capability built up in the military field will be used for resolving problems of the entire national economy.

The economists call the present version of conversion "passive." This means that the main task of the defense industry enterprises continues to be that of producing

military equipment, producing for the national economy only what they can with the means "left over." It would be difficult to list all of the consequences of the financing of the "civilian" portion of the defense branches according to the "what is left over" principle or with additional funds from the budget. In this case, after all, the extent to which swords are forged into plowshares will be limited basically to conversion of... the cadres. In any case large outlays will be needed for the development of this kind of conversion. If events continue to develop according to this economic scenario, we shall do no more than build a few enterprises (instead of the thousands we need) which essentially differ none from "Potemkin villages." We can proudly show them to foreign visitors and say: You see, we can do it!

The conversion program is presently coordinated by the defense departments of Gosplan. From the standpoint of Ye. Rogovskiy, laboratory head at the Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technological Progress, however, they prepared the conversion using obsolete branch planning methods. It is ultimately oriented toward preserving the separation of the defense branches and the civilian economy.

It is calculated by the authors of an article published in one of the central newspapers that the conversion will make it possible to increase the country's national income by a minimum of 1.8 billion rubles, and its economic effect will amount to 12 billion. Other publications are less optimistic. But let us make our own calculations. In 1989 civilian goods worth only 15-20 kopecks were produced with capacities which turned out a ruble's worth of military goods. The figure will increase to 30-33 kopecks in 1990. The result, according to assessments of the IEPNTP [Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technological Progress] of the USSR Academy of Sciences, this conversion will reduce rates of growth of the national income by approximately 0.5% a year.

And what about the cost of the output? One defense firm decided to produce sports training devices selling for around 2,000 rubles. Few people can afford such products.... In short, judging from the prices, the present version of conversion is not oriented toward the production of popular goods affordable to the consumer....

What is the cause of this situation? Painful as it is to admit, it lies in the tenacity of Soviet militarism. Defense industry enterprises are attempting to "load" their capacities with the production of civilian goods making it possible rapidly to begin producing their former products again should the political climate change. In the second place, it has to do with the position of the defense ministries, which are not eager for conversion. In the third place, it involves the position of Gosplan's command-style "operation." In answer to my question as to whether it would not be possible to "free" part of the defense firms of "military duty" and convert them entirely to the production of civilian products, V. Kotov, deputy chief of a composite department of the

USSR Gosplan and one of the authors of the State Program for Converting the Defense Industry, said: No, we cannot take the route of removing entire enterprises from the military economy. We have to leave classified and secret areas at these plants.

And finally, the main thing. The conversion program is actually classified. "We cannot obtain essential information and are forced to use only "public sources,"" complains Academician V. Avduyevskiy. He, the chairman of the National Commission for Assisting the Conversion, is forced to work blindfolded! Furthermore, several billion rubles is being requested for the implementation of this program just for the 13th five-year period. According to Ye. Rogovskiy, outlays for financing civilian research at defense scientific research institutes and design offices also approach this amount. How does one assess these figures? Will this version of conversion not be ruinous for our nation? After all, we are not rich enough....

A "Dual" Economy or a Free Association?

The conversion plan proposed by Gosplan and the military-industrial complex is essentially very simple: provide consumer goods for the nation, on the one hand; on the other, do not halt the production of tanks, aircraft and other military "toys." Essentially, it is being proposed that we create an economy with a false bottom in the military-industrial complex, in which the military will continue to be the main factor. But is this in fact the only possible solution?

Not at all. We need a different kind of conversion, the kind the economists call "active." The main thing it requires is an independent search by defense enterprises for economically and technologically expedient ways to participate in the production of civilian products. A free association which finds its own partners, parts suppliers and orders without anyone's help, instead of a semi-classified, semi-secret plant. The priority areas of the conversion measures should be those in which the priority economic tasks can be most rapidly accomplished. This can be achieved only if the conversion does not require new outlays by the nation but is based on thorough cooperation between existing defense and civilian production capacities. The list of civilian products should include not just the traditional televisions and tape recorders, but also ATS's [automatic telephone exchanges] and gas infrared radiators for decentralized heating and ecology monitoring equipment. We need a dictatorship of the national economy, figuratively speaking, and not a dictatorship of the military-industrial complex.

And how does one assess the effectiveness of the conversion? It seems to me that it should not be based on the intermediate volumes of the defense departments and not even on their output volumes for household appliances. The effectiveness of the conversion is indicated by

its contribution to the establishment of conditions conducive to getting the national economy out of its social, ecological, technological and financial time crunch....

We already have examples of "active" conversion. The Konversiya engineering center formed out of the Scientific Research Institute of Machine-Building Technology of the Ministry of General Machine Building, for example. It was formerly one of the institute's scientific departments and was fairly well financed out of the state budget. The situation then changed. What was it to do? The center took on the "acute shortage" problems of the national economy, the reconstruction and retooling of civilian enterprises and the establishment of sections and firms jointly with those enterprises. We are accustomed to thinking that joint enterprises can only be formed with Western partners. It turns out, however, that this is not necessarily so. Partners have been found nearby, and they have fairly good equipment and specialists.

Credit should be given to the center associates. They did not sit around and wait for a client to appear at the door. They went themselves to Moscow plants and factories and explained what was needed. And they resolved a broad range of problems: development of an engine block, lines for measuring out and packaging detergents and other equipment. They recently concluded several contracts for currency. The center's main task, however, in the opinion of A. Kibalchenko, its chief, should be one of saturating the domestic market with goods which the consumer can afford and "uplifting" the civilian industries to the level of the military....

It is obvious that with time such conversion will make it possible to reduce imports of industrial equipment and to save currency and use it for purchasing scarce consumer goods abroad. It will enable us to eliminate "bottlenecks" in the national economic area and to accelerate the social reorientation of our economy by means of the defense branches and not with investments.

Specialists with the IEPNTP of the USSR Academy of Sciences believe that in the conversion priority should be given to the development of a multipurpose state program. It should be tied in with other special-purpose programs: ecological, foreign economic and the like. The financing and production of military products should be effected exclusively with funds allocated by the Ministry of Defense out of the national budget. And no secret subsidies through other channels! We will then finally learn the real cost of the weapons.

The future of the conversion also depends upon whether we begin implementing the principle of less secrecy and more of various freedoms: from the right for civilian organizations to acquire or rent production space, equipment and instruments from "defense" at contractual prices to the provision of all types of services for the enterprises by the "military economy." Perhaps then we shall have a different life.

Who Has the Final Say?

We have repeatedly written that before spending billions on any large project, we need to have it appraised by a highly skilled commission of experts. And the commission of experts should be authorized to question decisions already approved for implementation. It, and not the ministries and departments involved, should have the final say on a project's fate. Only in this way can we safeguard ourselves against economic disasters.

Everything stated here should be fully applied also to the conversion. Yu. Yaremenko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the IEPNTP of the USSR Academy of Sciences, believes that the conversion needs a commission of experts which would include both practical planning workers and economists. Unfortunately, the National Commission for Assisting the Conversion has been unable to perform a number of tasks involved in the expert appraisal both because of the meagerness of the information provided and as a result of the limited range of tasks assigned to it.

The program must be reviewed, of course, in existing extra-departmental expert organizations such as the GEK [State Examining Board] of the USSR Gosplan. In addition to this, however, a special commission of experts on conversion must be set up. It should consist of specialists in composite and branch departments of the USSR Gosplan, the GKNT [State Committee for Science and Technology] and the USSR Academy of Sciences, as well as representatives of civilian and defense branches of industry.

It seems to us that this must be done in order to avoid new mistakes. The USSR Supreme Soviet should probably take the commission under its wing. Otherwise, we face the danger of a "military coup" without a single shot being fired—a command-style, competitive, poorly conceived conversion—which will leave us without either guns or butter.

Conversion at Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant

90UM0392B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 20 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by A. Usoltsev: "First-Born of the Conversion"]

[Text] The enterprise anticipated it the way a young couple await their first-born. Now here it is, small but alert, running exuberantly around the plant aisles and drawing a crowd of the curious wherever it goes. It is a rare worker or engineer who can pass by the infant without stopping to admire its deft motions. But the people are not motivated by idle interest. Everyone understands that the appearance of the first-born represents prospects opened up for the plant collective and hopes for a stable future.

Until now the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant imeni V.I. Lenin, a production association, produced the powerful T-180 and DET-250 tractors. Now colossi, the DET-350 and T-800, are about to come out. There is no question

that these products are needed. The trouble is that they are designed for use in the heavy and extractive industries and construction. What is the enterprise doing for the people, for our consumer market? Even in the plant shops of the Ural tractor builders one increasingly hears the previously unknown word "conversion." Particularly since it became clear that the nation does not need the defense items produced there.

This word evokes a natural feeling of satisfaction in us rank and file consumers. At the plants directly affected by the conversion it is known as "surgery without an anesthesia." It turns out that it is not so simple to convert a plant to the production of civilian products. The Chelyabinsk people too had to rack their brains a great deal to find a way out of the situation. How were they to use the freed capacities? How were they to employ the almost 7,000 idled workers?

A decision was made which satisfied both the labor collective and, most important, the broad masses of the population. The plant designers proposed producing mini-tractors. There is almost unlimited demand for this kind of machine in our nation. Many farmers and renters of farmland and the owners of gardens and subsidiary plots dream of having one. And I doubt that even the large farms will refuse the mini-tractors. It has long been understood on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes that it is simply criminal extravagance to send a K-700 for a can of milk.

The team of specialists headed by V.L. Vershinskiy, chief designer at the enterprise, has now completed the development of the new item, and the first-born of the conversion has now been assembled at the plant for the production of large tractors. Deputy chief designer V.P. Saraykin tells about the merits of the infant:

"Our mini-tractor fully conforms to its purpose in both size and weight. One would not call the Uralets a weakling, however. It has a maximum power of 10 hp. One feature of our machine is that it can be either wheeled or tracked. That is, when the owner wants to he can cover the wheels with rubber-ribbed tracks."

The plans called for the plant to produce 10 test models last year and to turn out 1,000 mini-tractors this year. They would have been snatched up instantly. B.I. Zakharov, director of the plant for the production of large tractors, showed us a stack of requests for the Uralets. At the present time, however, only four tractors have been assembled. The producers of this equipment, which the people need, came up against a solid wall of incomprehension on the part of the enterprises which could produce the assemblies and parts. One after another, these plants have sent them rejections. The Petropavlovsk Small Engine Plant dealt the heaviest blow to the Ural tractor builders by refusing to supply the "heart" for the mini-tractors.

And so, are the renters and farmers waiting in vain for the equipment they need?

Centralized, Administrative Management Hinders Conversion Program

904A0326A Moscow *EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI* in Russian No 4, Apr 90 pp 58-66

[Article by Boris Varisovich Salikhov, candidate of economic sciences, lecturer in the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin: "Conversion: Retrospective and Prospective"]

[Text] The INS Treaty and the immense shifts that have been outlined in disarmament have really brought about practical accomplishment of conversion in our country. The search has begun for ways of making the most effective civilian use of the research and production capacities of the defense branches of the economy that have actually become available and are planned for availability.

However, as noted at the conference in the headquarters of the CPSU Central Committee on problems of further development of the economic reform and during many scientific conferences and discussions, conversion is not being carried out in our country as well as it might be, the defense ministries are trying to get by "with little bloodshed." This can be seen in the very poor selection of nonmilitary goods scheduled for production, in their technical level, which is inadequate, while their value is at the same time high, and in the technological separateness of the defense and civilian sectors of the economy, which has been retained.¹ This article is devoted to an analysis of certain reasons for this situation and the prospects for eliminating them.

For Us, This Is a First Time

Conversion refers to the process of the transition of the weapons industry, military production, to the manufacturing of products for civilian purposes. By virtue of its content, this process signifies a planned change of the proportion: in distribution of resources of all kinds between the nonmilitary and military spheres of the economy and an interrelated set of corresponding financial-and-economic, organizational-and-technical, social welfare, and other measures.

We can speak of conversion as a military-economic phenomenon only if the objective conditions obtain for carrying it out, above all the material conditions. It is accordingly important to emphasize that for a long time the very level of development of the productive forces and of military production in our country did not afford the possibility of examining conversion from the practical standpoint.

Quite often conversion is treated incorrectly because its objective foundations have been underestimated. For instance, frequently it is equated either with reduction of the numerical strength of the armed forces or with reduction of defense expenditures in the budget, and so on. We cannot agree, for example, that the first major conversion in the Soviet era was carried out in the period 1920-1924.² The conversion in that case simply

amounted to a reduction in the strength of the armed forces, even though it was a very substantial reduction to one-ninth of the previous level. But reduction in the size of the armed forces can figure only as a condition favorable to conversion, since it is the weapons industry that gets converted. At the outset of the twenties, our country's productive forces, which had been razed to the foundations, were as a practical matter not producing in the required amount even the simplest types of weapons (there was no production of tanks and airplanes at all). The output of those several military enterprises which had somehow continued to operate did not meet the needs of the Red Army, although its strength had been reduced from 5 million to 652,000 men.

The task in that period was rather the reverse: to build a powerful defense industry by developing the heavy sectors of the economy and as a consequence supply everything necessary to the armed forces. That task was being performed over practically the entire postrevolutionary period all the way up to the beginning of the war. During the actual war years, the defense industry expanded by leaps and bounds, it was bolstered on the one hand by new construction and reconstruction of defense enterprises and on the other by units of the civilian sector of the economy that were converted to military production. By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the armaments industry, which had reached a gigantic scale, included the sectors of military production proper and a greatly weakened civilian sector, as well as an overcentralized system for management of the country's economy. In that system, the military-industrial complex (VPK) occupied a monopoly position. In my view, the need to carry out conversion was more than obvious: Under the conditions of rigid administration from the center and the monopolism of the military-economic departments, the civilian sector was transformed from a foundation of military production to an appendage of it that in many respects was not independent. Decisive measures were needed for fundamental change of the situation, but they were not adopted. There were no structures in society that were both interested in conversion and possessed real economic and political power.

We should note that whereas after the Civil War and foreign military intervention there could not have been conversion in our country, since the armaments industry, the sector that undergoes conversion, did not for all practical purposes exist, following World War II, on the other hand, conversion was not carried out for the diametrically opposite reason: the defense sector of the economy, I repeat, was hypertrophied, and its management was overcentralized. Under those conditions, there objectively could be no protagonist of conversion, and the expanding civilian sector remained as before under the dictate of the VPK.

The objection can, of course, be made that following World War II conversion was impossible for other reasons: the beginning of the Cold War and the struggle to eliminate the nuclear monopoly of the United States,

which afterward grew into the struggle to achieve military-strategic parity. What is more, in the context of the scientific-technical revolution all energies and resources had to be concentrated along the key directions and programs for economic development on which the country's defensive might ultimately depended. What did we care about conversion? But all of these circumstances still cannot serve as any justification for the civilian sector of the economy remaining on "short rations." And we utterly fail to understand why our military preparations continued with the same intensity even after military-strategic parity with the United States had been achieved. After all, its achievement should have been a turning point in the development of our military production and the beginning of conversion. But this did not occur, and the main reason was that the political leadership and the bodies of government and military-economic administration proved unable to evaluate in a new way the situation in the country and in the world. As a consequence, we began to produce weapons and military equipment over and above what was necessary to guarantee the country's security. Thus, conversion in our country has never previously been carried out. The conversion of defense enterprises to the production of civilian products at the end of the forties and at the beginning of the sixties cannot be looked upon as conversion. First of all, it was accomplished within the framework of the previous system of priorities, in which military-economic tasks unconditionally dominated civilian purposes; second, it was conducted without a plan, without taking into account the economic interests of the work collectives of enterprises; third, it was essentially reconversion, since most of the enterprises were simply being returned to the previous list of non-military products they produced; fourth, the process about which we are talking was accompanied by the construction of fundamentally new defense production operations equipped with advance technology.

We are at least 4.5 decades late with conversion. Today's difficulties and problems can largely be explained by the fact that we have no experience in carrying it out.

The Militarized Economy, or What Kind of Conversion Do We Need?

Most of what is written has to do with the conversion of military production. Yet it seems that what gets converted is something broader: It would seem more appropriate to use the term "national economic conversion." The transition to a civilian economy necessarily affects not only individual enterprises and spheres of the country's defense complex, but the national economy as a whole. The macroeconomic and microeconomic levels of the implementation of conversion measures should be distinguished. Whereas at the microeconomic level it is specific military production units that undergo conversion, at the macroeconomic level it is the country's militarized economy as a whole. An economy can become militarized not only in wartime, but also in peacetime if the VPK occupies a monopoly position in society, and total military-economic needs are so diverse

and great that efforts of the entire economy are required to meet them. In this case, the danger of going beyond the objectively permissible limit of the growth of defense expenditures and of undermining society's economic potential arises and is constantly reproduced. It is this very situation that we now observe in our country.

Of what does our militarized economy consist? What are its features?

First, the very structure of the country's economy is characterized by a vividly pronounced military-economic orientation. First of all, it contains an immense sector encompassing the branches of military production. This includes numerous enterprises making weapons and military equipment, machines and equipment for their production, and also consumer goods for the personnel of the defense industry.

As for the branches producing products for civilian purposes, in one way or another they are all subordinate to military production. The present economic mechanism (it would evidently be more correct to speak of the military-economic mechanism) distributes and redistributes money and resources in such a way that priority in development goes to those spheres and directions which have importance to defense. This is mainly achieved by means of the present pricing system, whereby resources intended for development of industrial branches in Group B, agriculture, and the nonproduction sphere are "siphoned over" into the branches of heavy industry and the defense industry.

Second, immense amounts of resources of all kinds are consumed by the militarized economy to meet military-economic needs. For example, one-third of the entire work force employed in the extractive and manufacturing branches works at enterprises of the VPK (approximately 13 million persons).¹ We also have to bear in mind that products for military purposes are being produced by science-intensive production operations using expensive equipment and exceptionally highly qualified manpower. Three-fourths of all budget appropriations for scientific projects are used for military research purposes² and the like. In view of our essential lag behind the United States in the level of labor productivity and the efficiency of labor, and that also applies to military production, it can be said that to maintain military-strategic parity our expenditures in terms of personnel, money, and scarce resources have to be between three and four times as great as those of the Americans.

There is another circumstance, one which reveals more fully the extent of our defense expenditures, to which I would like to call attention. We know the present (1989) level of military expenditures: 77.3 billion rubles. But in the present pricing system the prices of products for military purposes are often set even below the production cost. Which distorts the real magnitude of the costs of production of a number of military commodities.³ If we calculate more objectively the expenditures to

acquire weapons and military equipment, including in the price for products for military purposes not only the portion of the production cost previously taken into account, but also the proposed cost-accounting income of the work collectives of defense enterprises (which at present they are not receiving), then the real outlays to meet the needs of defense considerably exceed the figure given above. Unfortunately, even our parliamentarians do not have reliable information about the real outlays even for the principal types and models of weapons: Soviet-manufactured surface and underwater vessels for military purposes under construction or already put in service, intercontinental missiles, strategic bombers, etc. At the same time, data of this kind on the weapons and military equipment of the NATO countries can be found in many reference books and statistical handbooks, which are freely sold in the bookstores of those countries.

Third, our militarized economy is characterized by the dominant position which the military-economic departments have in society. The specific nature of the needs of defense and the orientation toward satisfying those needs first of all have turned our VPK into a structure that stands far "above" the civilian branches. It could not have been otherwise when the defense sector of the economy has been developing and is continuing to develop in the framework of the administrative system that is in place. It is that system that has given the military-industrial complex the position of a monopolist in society, and the VPK in turn has been helping to reinforce that system even more.

The monopolism of the VPK is the most important feature of the militarized economy. It is manifested not only in the indisputable right to obtain all that is best from society, but also in the extension of secrecy over everything that falls in its "sphere of influence." And although as many as 100,000 sets of scientific-technical documentation⁴ are delivered every year from the military sector to other branches of the economy, the general level of the economy's civilian sector, which has literally been put in a desperate situation, does not always allow for organizing the production of science-intensive products. This is because of the generally huge technological gap behind military production and because of the shortage of highly qualified specialists.

Fourth, the militarized character of the economy generates a train of adverse consequences. One of them is that the civilian sphere of the economy is not merely experiencing a scientific-technical and technological "starvation," but, by turning over to the defense complex everything that is best, just as before, it has been losing incentives for its own development, and has been turning into a "hereditary estate" of the defense production groupings. Evidence of the widening technological gap between the civilian and military sectors of the economy and of the uncompetitiveness and loss of internal incentives for development of most of the branches of nonmilitary production is to be found.

specifically, in the fact that practically all science-intensive and expensive products intended for the consumer market are being produced at defense enterprises. This diversion of personnel and resources, incidentally, is weakening the defense sector of the economy itself.

Another of the adverse consequences is the growth of stagnant tendencies within the defense complex. Neither technological monopolism nor the immense resources and amounts of money obtained without labor offer salvation. The reason is that the economic mechanism that is now in place here prevents the generation of motivation of workers and work collectives of defense enterprises to do highly productive work.

So, we have to carry out conversion of the entire economy. When we say national economic conversion, we evidently should be thinking of an interrelated set of macroeconomic measures to convert the country's entire economy to a peacetime footing and for demonopolization of the military-industrial complex. We should emphasize that conversion at the macroeconomic level is an indispensable condition of its high effectiveness at the level of individual branches and enterprises of the defense complex as well. The transfer of successive groups of enterprises to the civilian sphere, however well-thought-out and successful it might be, will not solve the problems of conversion in principle, since it does not eliminate the subordination of the nonmilitary sector to the military-industrial complex. We must in essence talk about a military-economic reform, whose principal task is to eliminate the monopoly position of the VPK and to free the civilian sector of the economy from its dictate. In addition, this kind of reform must also presuppose fuller use of commodity-money relations in all spheres of the economy.

It is important to emphasize that by no means are we talking about weakening the country's defensive capability, nor of cutting back military production. On the contrary, national economic conversion will speed up the development of the general economic base of the country's defense and ultimately strengthen its defensive might.

Why Is Conversion "Spinning Its Wheels"?

The disassembly of the armaments industry has nevertheless begun, although at present it is progressing sluggishly, with difficulty, and only under pressure from the central leadership. The "reluctance" of the defense complex to become part of the process of conversion, the "spinning of its wheels" result not only from the factors we have already noted (lack of experience, the need for conversion at the macroeconomic level), but also from essential miscalculations in solving this problem.

It should be emphasized first of all that conversion in our country is being planned and carried out in very short periods of time, that is, it is "rapid" in nature. What is more, we have neither thorough theoretical elaborations, nor a conception, nor national economic plan for conversion that have been thought through in all respects, a

fact "favored" to no small degree by the practically complete absence of information about the domestic defense industry. What is more, without having taken another serious step along the road of carrying out the measures of conversion, we have already begun to divide up the resources supposedly being made available as the armaments industry is converted to manufacturing civilian products. It would not be a bad idea to think about the fact that conversion itself requires very sizable expenditures for its implementation.

To illustrate: In Sweden, it took 3 years (1981-1984) just to draft the national plan for conversion. Scandinavian experts did not begin by dividing up the resources they assumed would be made available, but by taking a detailed inventory of the military industry, by thoroughly investigating the specific nature of military technologies and their applicability on the civilian commercial market, by studying the occupational and skill structure of employment in the branches of military production, etc. Possible difficulties of conversion were analyzed, a search was made for "niches in the market" for alternative civilian products. But the main thing is that the approximate costs of carrying out the measures of conversion were first determined, and only then was a determination made of the supposed advantages and gains. Sweden's scientists believe that conversion takes time and considerable outlays, especially in the transitional period (the period of the actual conversion of defense production operations to the manufacturing of civilian products). In their opinion, it takes at least 10 years just for the production of nonmilitary products to begin to show a profit at such enterprises.

But there are reasons of a more profound character, reasons that not only explain why conversion is being held up in our country, but which also condemn it from the very outset to low effectiveness, if not to utter failure. The reason is that in the context of the radical economic reform that has just barely begun, the only possible conversion is "from above," that is, one that is carried out directly. Here, the authority to solve any of the problems of conversion at both the macro- and microeconomic levels is vested exclusively in government administrative agencies. The state uses noneconomic methods to compel defense enterprises to convert to the manufacturing of civilian products, the list of which is also determined by the center. This coercive conversion can never be effective, since the work collectives themselves at those enterprises are not active participants in it under those conditions.

Experience shows that the opposite extreme, i.e., carrying out conversion mainly "from below" while the center has a passive role, does not recommend itself either. That is predominantly how conversion was carried out in the postwar years in the Chinese People's Republic. It was not distinguished by high effectiveness, since the converted enterprises were almost deprived of any state support, and their workers did not receive the necessary guarantees of their social protection. As a

consequence, cases of utter bankruptcy of enterprises that had been converted were not isolated instances.

World practice, and indeed the logic of the economic reform being carried out in the USSR, suggests: without an optimum combination of the principles of centralization and decentralization in organizing and carrying out the measures of conversion, we should not count on their having good results. The role of the state must be to bring about favorable economic conditions for the activity of conversion "from below," of adopting the relevant normative acts, of extending real aid to enterprises undergoing conversion, and so on. But such matters as choosing the alternative civilian product, establishing commercial and other relations with other enterprises, disposition of the income gained, and so on, must be the prerogative of the work collectives themselves. As a matter of fact, who better than the workers themselves will be able to appreciate and utilize their own production capacities, intellectual abilities, technology, the skill of personnel, and the specific economic features of the region? The state is called upon to stimulate the process of conversion, imparting to it the necessary orientation, but not interfering in the operational economic activity of enterprises. It would seem that this form of conversion is the most acceptable, since it fits logically into the "tissue" of the economic reform we are carrying out.

Conversion, Reform, and Ownership

Conversion should be examined in the context of the radical economic transformations being carried out in our country. It is important to bear in mind that without democratic production relations both in the economy at large and also in its defense complex, the only possible form of conversion at enterprises of the VPK can only be conversion "from above." That is why perestroika in the sphere of military production of the nucleus of production relations—property relations—is today the main condition for motivating workers and work collectives of defense enterprises not only to modernize their own military production operations, but also to gradually convert them to the manufacturing of products for civilian purposes. In short, we need an economic mechanism that generates "initiative for conversion from below" and a motivation of work collectives to obtain both economic independence and also completely guarantees for the social protection of workers (to replace the privileges they have lost and which were dependent upon their belonging to the defense complex).

The criterion of the quality of conversion's performance at all levels is its socioeconomic and environmental effectiveness. Conversion of enterprises in the military sector of the economy to manufacturing products for civilian purposes must not be accompanied by a drop in the standard of living and qualifications of their workers, by a drop in the general technical-and-economic and technological level of production, nor by damage to the environment.

Objectively the type of conversion being carried out in the USSR cannot be effective if it is evaluated from the standpoint of long-term social goals and interests, not from those of the present moment. The degree of success of conversion should be determined from the contribution of yesterday's defense enterprises to solving the general problem of restoring the country's economy to health and on that basis achieving high results from the standpoint of the national economy. We cannot allow civilian products of the most mediocre quality to be manufactured instead of science-intensive, technologically complex, and technically improved military products. But it is this trend that has already become predominant, unfortunately, throughout our entire activity of conversion. Consequently, to begin the actual conversion of defense enterprises to the manufacturing of civilian products before the basic measures of the radical economic and military-economic reform have been carried out is to condemn oneself to a socioeconomic effectiveness of conversion known to be low.

How effectively is the state form of social ownership being exercised within the limits of military production? In spite of having a better technical-and-economic base and manufacturing wherewithal, a high skill level of the work force, a strong scientific potential, and unhindered supply of scarce resources from the state, the activity of the VPK is just as ineffective as operation of enterprises in the civilian sector. Integral economic indicators of its performance correspond approximately to averages for the USSR national economy and fall far short of corresponding indicators of the advanced capitalist countries.

The main reason for this situation is in our view the absence of effective forms for the exercise of socialist ownership in the military sector of the economy. This is manifested in the fact that economic methods of carrying on economic activity are used to a still smaller degree than elsewhere. The fictitious prosperity of the VPK is achieved mainly by pumping in here the best resources of society, advanced technologies, and so on. The economic "motivation" of the workers is at times maintained with injections of state resources, relatively high salaries, and certain benefits. Under those conditions, economic realization of ownership is quite clearly a reflection of dependency; that is, the worker who is the "owner" of the socially owned means of production and the product created exercises his "right" of individual ownership by obtaining guaranteed remuneration of labor that for all practical purposes is independent of its results. That being the case, can the work collectives of defense enterprises be motivated to achieve high effectiveness of conversion? Indeed, they do not even know (nor is it their fault) what normal motivation is, motivation based not on dependency, but on enterprise!

Improvement of economic relations in military production and their democratization constitute a prerequisite for effective conversion in the future. In this case, we can speak about so-called "potential conversion," about forming the susceptibility of defense enterprises to the measures of conversion at the socioeconomic level. As

the workers of defense enterprises are transformed into real owners and disposers of pieces of property, as the processes of commercialization develop in the branches of military production, work collectives also become more responsible for the efficiency of economic activity. This would be promoted to the greatest degree by developing leasing relations or other forms of cost-accounting relations that are the most advisable in each specific case. But leasing relations and cost accounting are impossible in the defense complex unless the prices of goods for military purposes are made objective. This requires above all carrying out the reform of pricing, specifically making provision for application of contract and market prices on goods for military purposes within some limits. This will obviously increase substantially specific military expenditures in value terms, but it will not signify a rise of real inputs of resources for defense. In my opinion, it is not possible to begin to convert specific enterprises in the military production grouping without creating an entrepreneurial mechanism in that sphere for the exercise of ownership. Otherwise, it will be impossible to make optimum use of what still is the immense scientific-technical and technological potential of the defense branches in the interests of the entire economy.

It is in the actual course of conversion that the process of democratization of property relations and elimination of the facelessness of ownership will develop further. In my view, conversion of any particular military-economic unit must conclude with a change (assuming this is economically advisable) in the form of ownership and with creation of an effective mechanism for exercising it. In each specific case, of course, a clear determination has to be made as to what product the converted enterprise will produce and where it will be sold. If, for example, an enterprise is converting entirely to the manufacturing of civilian products, but will be manufacturing them as before under the state order or will become a center for some kind of pilot product operating for the future, then in this case it is advisable to preserve the state form of ownership and go no further than applying up-to-date progressive forms for the organization of economic life (leasing, participation of stockholders in other enterprises, and so on). It is another matter when plans call for conversion in order to produce products for the open market and for managing the enterprise by means of standard rates and allowances (taxes). Here, replacement of the owner is quite legitimate if it is economically advisable.

If only a portion of the capacities of a defense enterprise are to undergo conversion, then in addition to the issue of whether the owner is to be retained or replaced, the issue also has to be resolved of the possibility of combining the military and nonmilitary production operations. It would seem not to be very promising to combine the two types of enterprises "under one roof." It is practically impossible to manage effectively this kind of "hybrid" in which one sector operates under the state order, and the other for the open market.

In summarizing what we have said, we will identify a number of directions of development of ownership relations in the process of conversion. First of all, there is the strengthening of the economic independence of enterprises being converted within the framework of the nationwide form of ownership. This mainly applies to enterprises which have been added to the state sector, but still have the state as their principal customer, as well as to large economic facilities converted to manufacturing civilian vessels, aircraft, automation equipment, etc.

Another version of conversion is also possible in which the enterprise will pass over to collective or mixed ownership. It is evident that the property subject to these forms of ownership will mainly be enterprises which intend to produce consumer goods, facilities in the military-production infrastructure, and also certain sections and units of large defense production operations.

It is also indispensable to make a detailed study of all the possible strategies and versions of creating joint enterprises on the basis of those which previously manufactured science-intensive and technically sophisticated military products. The scientific-technical and technological level of production at many defense enterprises is approximately the same as in advanced Western firms. If joint enterprises are created as a result of conversion, we might speak about mixed ownership in which foreign capital participates.

How Is the Return to the National Economy From the VPK To Be Increased Even Today?

Our gaze is hopefully turned to the branches of military production. It is not without reason that we expect good consumer goods from them, new equipment for enterprises in light industry and the food industry, for agriculture, and so on. But it would be incorrect to relate the benefit to the national economy from the defense complex solely to conversion (which objectively cannot at present yield any solid result). The defense branches can and must make their contribution today to the economy of the country as a whole by performing several other tasks which are not directly related to conversion.

First of all, additional measures should be adopted to increase the production of products for civilian purposes which defense enterprises have already put into production, to develop the processes of diversification, to merge military and civilian production operations, to place them under one roof. In this connection, we should also mention the "potential conversion" referred to above. The reason is that in the defense enterprises to be converted in the future there will be a "visible image" of the alternative product for civilian purposes, and the management structures that exist in every defense ministry and which are concerned with the problems of producing products for civilian purposes could in future manage conversion.

What is more, the return from the defense branches can be speeded up through reconversion, a point supported

by the possibilities for extensive use of existing experience and the existence of the necessary documentation and scientific-technical developments for civilian production.

Large and speedy results might come from broad use of advanced technologies and scientific-technical innovations of the defense complex in the branches of civilian production. It should be emphasized that neither this measure nor diversification nor reconversion of military production actually constitute conversion. They are related in one way or another, but they constitute quite independent processes in the military-economic sphere.

In conclusion, I will emphasize once again that conversion is inseparable from the process of further democratization of ownership relations, since the transition to the footing of a civilian economy signifies a movement from the command forms of management to predominantly economic methods in organizing economic life.

Conversion requires very solid preparation. The defense complex cannot be expected to carry it out "speedily." In augmenting the return to the national economy from the VPK by the method proposed above, we should above all be concerned with theoretical substantiation of the measures of conversion, with thorough study and conceptualization of world experience in conversion, with planning it, and with its gradual implementation at present only in the sphere of R&D and other preparatory measures. We have to have a law on conversion, a national economic plan for carrying it out, and many other things.

We will not achieve anything if we are hasty: On the one hand, we will not restore to health the devastated civilian economy by means of a more advanced defense complex, and on the other we will drain the blood from the military sector of the economy itself, annihilating those little islands of high technology that at present are still functioning.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 30 October 1989, p 2.

2. A. Izyumov, "Conversion? Conversion! Conversion," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 12 July 1989, p 11.

3. S. Blagovolin, "Military Power—How Much, What Kind, and Why?" MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 8, 1989, p 13.

4. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No 13, 1989, p 2.

5. This is already being discussed in the press. See, for example, A. Isayev, "Reform and the Defense Branches," KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1989, pp 24-30.

6. PRAVDA, 28 August 1989, p 4.

7. We should note that in recent years the average real wages of workers and engineering and technical personnel in the defense branches of production have on the whole been close to the level of the civilian sector of the economy.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Vysshaya shkola", "Ekonomicheskiiye nauki", 1990

Maj Gen Shenin on Defense Ministry's Spring Agricultural Effort

90UM0520A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Major I. Ivanyuk interviews Major General V. Shenin, chief of a directorate of the Central Food Directorate: "A Day that Provides Food for the Year"]

[Text] This is a busy time for agricultural workers. The planting of fields is in full swing. Each day, which, as they say, provides food for a year is important. Workers at the military state farms also live with concerns about the planting. The amount of food on the soldiers' table will depend greatly upon the effectiveness of their work.

The Major General V. Shenin chief of a directorate of the Central Food Directorate tells us how the USSR Ministry of Defense agricultural workers have approached the new season.

[Shenin] On the whole last year was not bad for us. We fulfilled our assignments for the production of the basic kinds of agricultural products. We produced 114,000 tons of live-weight meat, 66,000 tons of milk, 230,000,000 eggs, and 285,000 tons of grain.

I want to note that this was achieved "not at any price:" there was a profit of 52,000,000 rubles—one and a half times greater than what had been planned. The profit was obtained by improving the yield of agricultural crops and the productivity of cattle and chickens and the development of subsidiary farming efforts. At present at 63 military state farms there are shops for processing groats, grain, dairy and meat products, and other products. This makes it possible to improve the supply of food to troops, to decrease losses in transport, and to raise the profitability of the farms.

These general, more or less favorable indicators do not erase, of course, the existing shortcomings in our work. Several agricultural enterprises in the Siberian, Volga-Urals, Moscow, Transcaucasus, Turkestan and Far Eastern military districts, and the Pacific Fleet did not fulfill their agricultural program. The production of potatoes and vegetables fell so seriously that overall for the military state farms the plan was fulfilled by only 86 percent.

Unfavorable weather conditions, of course, were to blame for this. For example, in the Turkestan Military District a shortage of water meant that less land could be irrigated. At the same time it is necessary to state plainly that the main reason for the lagging behind can be found

in the fact that unsatisfactory work was done to improve the fertility of the soil, to introduce progressive forms of organizing and paying workers, to build and modernize the existing material and technical base, and to create the requisite conditions for the labor and rest of people.

[Ivanyuk] Vitaliy Semenovich, perhaps the assignments for the production of potatoes and vegetables were simply too high. After all the non-fulfillment of planned assignments is fairly persistent. And it is no secret that they have risen sharply in recent times.

[Shenin] It is true that we have been given a big job—by 1995 the military state farms and the subsidiary farms are to provide six months worth of the potatoes and vegetables needed for the personnel of the USSR armed forces. But I would not say that this task is impossible. After all in the Carpathian and Northern Kazakh military districts last year, in similarly difficult conditions, we managed to increase the output of these crops by nearly 8,000 tons. But in the Transbaykal Military District we produced even fewer potatoes and vegetables than we did in 1988.

Why did this happen? On this score one can speak about the poor quality of agricultural work and about the slow pace of introducing new farming methods. But I will specify only one indicator that speaks for itself: over the past three years in this military district nearly 1,200 hectares of cultivated land has been converted into pasturelands. Can such wastefulness really be tolerated?

Unfortunately, these are not the only examples. Take the Volga- Urals Military District, for example. It is not enough that the leadership of the agricultural department in this military district is not devoting the needed attention to the production of their own seeds; they also are in no hurry to submit the paperwork for obtaining supplies of seed. With such an attitude toward this matter can one really anticipate high yields?

And so there are many things that can be done; and what is most important is that these things do not require special outlays. This is borne out by the experience of the leading units in this very Volga-Urals Military District

and in the Belorussian, Moscow and other military districts, where subsidiary farms are providing more than 40 kilograms of potatoes, vegetables and greens to each person. And some of these farms are fully meeting fresh food needs through their own production output.

For this reason I believe that the assigned tasks are fully realistic. By the way, increased assignments have been established for other crops besides potatoes and vegetables. In order to ease the acute nature of the food problem in the Army and in the Navy, over the next five years we are to produce enough meat to cover our needs for four and a half months, enough eggs to cover our needs for eight months, and enough milk to meet our needs for the entire year through the use of our own capabilities.

[Ivanyuk] What are the workers of the military agricultural enterprises doing these days?

[Shenin] Spring planting is proceeding at full speed at military state farms in the southern zone. We receive operational reports from there each day. As of today 62 percent of the land has been sown and of this amount 81 percent has been planted in grain, 26 percent in potatoes, and 49 percent in vegetables. This work is proceeding most successfully in the North Caucasus and Carpathian military districts, where the planting of potatoes is nearly complete and more than two thirds of the grain fields have been sown.

Overall the preparation for planting has proceeded in an organized manner: equipment was repaired and seeds and fertilizers were prepared. At the farms brigades have been formed which are working on a collective contract basis aimed at the final result. The experience of earlier years indicates that the effectiveness of their work is two to three times greater than under traditional forms of labor organization.

In other regions weather conditions are hindering the start of the sowing on a broad front, but it is necessary to be ready to commence. And at some state farms of the Pacific Fleet and of the Transbaykal and Siberian military districts they are still procrastinating in getting ready. It will be very difficult to make up for lost time later.

Growth of Military-Patriotic Clubs, Associations

90UM0521A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col O. Sholmov: "'How Much Can Enthusiasm Be Exploited?' or 'How to Help the Military-Patriotic Clubs'"]

[Text] You will recognize these young fellows immediately. And it is not just the obvious signs of their recent connection with the military service: the military uniform or the striped vest of the airborne troops. These frequenters of the administrations and departments of the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Trade Union Council], the Komsomol Central Committee, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the USSR Ministry of Defense are favorably distinguished by their zealous, altruistic involvement with their cause, and also by their bearing, which combines persistence with a special dignity....

I refer to the leaders of military-patriotic youth associations and clubs, the number of which is approaching 4,000 in the nation. They came into being at the initiative of concerned and worried people who recognized before others the gap in the development of a morally and physically healthy young generation.

The development of the clubs has not been easy. Playing on the premises of democratization and demilitarization of the society, certain mass media depict the military-patriotic activities of the youth clubs as unneeded or even harmful.

Despite this, it appears that the clubs have gained sufficient public acceptance. What is more, they have gained the good grace of a number of extremely prestigious organizations. But.... Let us take things in order.

The Komsomol was the first to respond to the initiative of the enthusiasts. It was the head founder, so to speak, of the movement. The Secretariat of the Komsomol Central Committee approved the Statute on the Military-Patriotic Association (Club), which was coordinated with the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF. It specified that the Komsomol committees were to coordinate the activities of the founders locally. The job proved to be too much for the Komsomol organizations, however. Here is a typical illustration. With the help of workers on the Komsomol committees in Perm and Sverdlovsk oblasts I tried unsuccessfully merely to calculate the number of clubs with a military-patriotic focus. There are no records or registration of the youth associations and clubs.

It should be admitted that the statute regulates the vital functioning of the youth formations fairly vaguely. I recall how, at an assembly of leaders of military-patriotic clubs of the Russian Federation in Kolomna, V. Akolzin of Magadan expressed a lack of faith in the document this way: "The statute was drawn up by indifferent, incompetent people, without taking into account the interests of the true founders—thousands of boys and

girls—and there will therefore be no benefit from it." It would be difficult not to agree with this assessment. When one reads it, one can see that the founders exhibited not only excessive caution with respect to obligations concerning the clubs, but even out-and-out wile in an attempt not to give the clubs anything "extra."

The decision to eliminate the sections for mass defense work in the oblast Komsomol committees worsened the situation markedly and distorted the substance of the indoctrinational work performed with the teenagers. It promoted the removal of ideology from the indoctrinational process in the clubs. In some cases the entire stress is on special tactical training and general physical conditioning, hand-to-hand combat, military-like marches and firing. A stress on leisure-time activities and entertainment predominates in others. Some of the clubs have devoted themselves to finding income-producing activities—once again, to the detriment of the spiritual element. Economic accountability objectively encourages this. In this situation the management and Komsomol workers frequently lose their interest in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth as unprofitable.

The military commissariats, which were among the founders of the teenage clubs, represent the interests of the USSR Ministry of Defense locally. Their role of client for the draftees obligates them to demonstrate more zeal in seeing to the end result of the work of the military-patriotic associations and clubs, drafting the cadets into the appropriate branches of forces and troop arms. The military commissariats of Voronezh and Zaporozhye and a number of oblasts in Kazakhstan have accumulated some useful experience in this area. In general, however, these key matters are not receiving the attention of many military commissariats.

Again, the obligations of the military commissariats to the military-patriotic clubs are described so vaguely in the aforementioned statute that the military commissars sometimes find themselves in an awkward position. Take the matter of turning written-off military equipment and supplies over to the clubs without recompense, for example. This system is so complicated that it is sometimes difficult even for clubs located in cities with military district headquarters to use it. And what is it like for clubs in a rayon center hundreds of kilometers away from the nearest military unit? In this case, of course, requisitions go not to the oblast Komsomol committee and on to the military district headquarters but directly to the rayon military commissar. He has nothing to give the clubs, and there is therefore only one thing for him to do: join them as an ordinary petitioner. This clearly does not add to the military commissar's prestige.

DOSAAF and the military-patriotic clubs.... Even in this connection, it has to be self-critically admitted, relations are not easy to develop. A study has shown that the DOSAAF committees and organizations demonstrate proper interest in the work of the military-patriotic clubs. They exert their influence upon more than a third

of the clubs, mainly those with an airborne orientation, those which can find their own way to the DOSAAF clubs when it comes time for parachute jumps.

Unfortunately, the recommendations of the DOSAAF Central Committee for setting up military-patriotic clubs in the defense society's training organizations have not yet been implemented. And there could be no better place for them, after all. Setting up clubs at DOSAAF schools opens up possibilities for establishing a smoothly functioning system for preparing the youth for the military service. The first component is the military-patriotic club; the second, acquisition of a military specialty at a DOSAAF school.

This is a perfectly realistic task. With the decisions adopted at its 5th plenum the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF took a step to accommodate the patriotic movement by bringing up the issue of revising the primary organizations, the society's foundation. They could perfectly well serve as military-patriotic youth clubs. The kids and their parents would decide on the amount of membership dues and how often they are to be collected, and the entire amount would naturally remain with the clubs. Furthermore, as a collective member of the defense society, the club would be able to use the latter's legal defense, centralized funds and equipment and to participate in publishing activities.

The fact should be mentioned that this idea has local support. Interest has been shown in the Kazakh SSR, in Arkhangelsk and Kaluga Oblasts and in the Salang patriotic youth movement in Perm. Together with the latter, the oblast DOSAAF committee is presently working out the matter of establishing a center for the military-patriotic indoctrination of the pre-draft youth.

This idea alone will not solve all of the problems, however. In the first place, the question of reliable sources of financing for these clubs remains open. It is verbally acknowledged that their work is a social mandate from the society, but in reality the approach taken to the financing of their work is far from a state one. And this rightly evokes anger in the leaders of the military-patriotic associations and clubs. For example, I once heard A. Anferov, chairman of the Salang patriotic youth association in Perm, heatedly say the following, after unproductively making the rounds of the different authorities: "If even DOSAAF does not help, I'll give up these 'military patriotics,' take the kids and join a cooperative."

The appeal to the defense society for financial support is only natural. It is well known that DOSAAF invests more than 130 million rubles of its own funds annually to improve the materials and equipment for enhancing the training of specialists for the Armed Forces and for developing the technical and practical military types of sports. During the period 1987-1989 a total of slightly less than 24 million rubles was invested in various special funds and charitable activities. The defense society's financial capabilities are not unlimited, however. In addition, as a result of the conversion of the organizations and committees to the new management conditions, there has been a drastic drop in receipts from them into the society's centralized fund. Furthermore, present normative enactments of the Ministry of Finance, the State Committee on Prices and the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems practically deprive the defense society of the right to independently spend the money it itself has earned to finance the military-patriotic youth associations and clubs. What is more, the draft Law on a Unified Tax System of the USSR calls for an additional tax of 25% on profits to go into the republic budget in addition to the 35% income tax paid into the state budget for DOSAAF. This places the financing of main DOSAAF programs in jeopardy and completely rules out any possibility of providing financial support for the military-patriotic associations and clubs.

What is the solution? Are we really to continue conducting all of the clubs' activities on a volunteer basis, with the enthusiasm of the reserve fightingmen? I believe the time has come to resolve the problems once and for all, to legally provide for attaching the military-patriotic youth clubs to the DOSAAF with full T/O and with financial support and the provision of materials and equipment. For this we need to relieve the defense society as a public organization focusing on the indoctrination of the youth partially or totally of the need to pay income taxes, with authority to spend the money freed up for financing the military-patriotic clubs.

We can see that the military-patriotic clubs have many problems. They must be resolved immediately and competently. They could be worked out at a round-table discussion by the departments and organizations affected, primarily the founders and leaders of the military-patriotic clubs and associations.

But does everyone want to sit down at such a round table...?

Update to British Sea Harrier

90UM0515A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 3, Mar 90 p 32

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Great Britain": "Preparing For Testing"]

[Text] The carrier-based FRS.2 Sea Harrier fighter built by British Aerospace for the Royal Air Force will be the first European aircraft capable of carrying the AIM-120 air-to-air guided missile produced by the Hughes company. Until then it will be armed with four AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles.

The FRS.2 Sea Harrier is an improved version of the FRS.1, which the Royal Air Force has had for 10 years. The program was initiated in 1983 and also covers the possible development of a new aircraft.

The basic changes involve the installation of a modern fire control system using Doppler-pulse radar enabling the aircraft to attack a target from the rear hemisphere from above. This system has tracking features in the scanning mode and is capable of intercepting several air and ground targets.

The complete radar and fire-control system is also installed on the modified HS 125-600B aircraft, which it is planned to use along with the first two FRS.2 aircraft for implementing the planned program.

The FRS.2 itself will have, in addition to the fire-control system, a radar detection receiver and radioelectronic suppression equipment.

The aircraft has certain other important features. The fuselage of the FRS.2 Sea Harrier has been lengthened by 1.1 feet in the back. This was done in order to enlarge the interior. The nose has been significantly modified to accommodate the new radar system. It will have the HOTAS control circuit and a tactical situation display system.

In addition to the planned four AIM-120 missiles, the FRS.2 is capable of carrying up to four AIM-9L Sidewinder or Matra's Magique missiles. Other versions are also possible: two Sea Eagle air-to-air missiles or two Alarm anti-radar missiles along with the AIM-120 missiles. The Royal Air Force presently has approximately 50 FRS.1 Sea Harrier fighters. It is planned to modify them into the FRS.2

COPYRIGHT: "Krylya Rodiny", 1990

New British Combat Air Support Aircraft 'SABA'

90UM0515B Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 3, Mar 90 p 33

[Article under the rubric "Great Britain": "A New Aircraft Design"]

[Text] It is called the SABA. It was designed by British Aerospace. It is an example of a new conceptual

approach to the design of a direct support fighter. SABA stands for "small, highly maneuverable front-line aircraft."

The history of the SABA's development is the following. British Aerospace was considering different designs for an aircraft which could counter combat helicopters, variable-propeller aircraft and cruise missiles. The conclusion was that such an aircraft could be made but that it would need to meet the following requirements: turn 180 degrees in five seconds; have a speed of 400 knots and excellent takeoff and landing features for dirt runways; be able to patrol for four hours at low altitude; carry weapons, including a cannon and at least six air-to-air missiles.

During experiments the design engineers determined that the low specific wing load and the advanced aerodynamic design would give the future aircraft an advantage in combat even over highly maneuverable helicopters. The company then modeled the aircraft with electronic computers to reveal the SABA's potential and the possibility of duplicating in it certain functions of Fairchild-Republic's A-10 Thunderbolt, which is flown in the U.S. Air Force.

Various configurations for the aircraft were also considered. The P1233-1 design, which has a pusher propeller in the rear section, was ultimately selected. The Avco Lycoming 4,501hp T-55 engine is the primary power unit. All indications are that a more powerful engine will be required for the version in regular production.

A few more words should be said about the aircraft design. We should specifically mention the large front elevator unit with its dorsal and ventral vertical rudders. One ventral rudder will be located in front of the cockpit for directional control. Modern materials, including aluminum and lithium, will be used in the P1233-1. According to the designers, this will give the SABA an advantage in combat also over highly maneuverable fighters.

In kilograms and meters the aircraft data will be the following: empty weight, 3,535 kilograms; 1,000 kilograms more with payload; wing span, 11 meters; length, 9.5 meters.

British Aerospace is currently beginning an extensive research and development program. It will include tests in a wind tunnel for structural strength and reparability. The experts will install modern systems and determine the aircraft's role and possibilities for its use in an increasingly polluted environment. At this time the company has issued no information on scientific and technological cooperation with other companies on the SABA, but U.S. companies will no doubt join it in the future, followed by the FRG, Italy and possibly Spain. The preconditions for this already exist.

COPYRIGHT: "Krylya Rodiny", 1990

Commentary on British Defense White Paper

90UM0458A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS observer Vladimir Chernyshev: "Signals From the Past"]

[Text] The British government has published a "white paper" setting forth the basic directions of Great Britain's military policy for the 1990-1991 fiscal year. One must acknowledge frankly that this "authorized" document was awaited by the country with special interest. And this is quite understandable. The profound political changes in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, the reduction in armed forces and arms by Warsaw Pact states, and the continued progress at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe have vitally changed the strategic situation on the continent. As the English press has repeatedly stressed, all this has led to the need for fundamental revision of military strategy and developmental plans of Great Britain's armed forces.

In February and March, the English mass media organs increasingly hinted that a comprehensive study of defense policy was under way in the Defense Ministry and at Downing Street. It was reported that the government was approaching the concept of "balanced armed forces." With this goal they were generating a whole group of new documents on military development, and the Ministry of Defense was holding active discussions with the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the words of one highly-placed military spokesman, the goal was set of "sending correct signals, both to the East and to Nato colleagues." At the same time, according to the English press, the ongoing re-evaluation was supposed to "help Great Britain create defense forces more appropriate to a world in which the Soviet Union, while remaining the strongest power in Eurasia, constitutes a significantly smaller threat than before." It was proposed that the broad-scale re-evaluation touch not only on the needs of the armed forces in the future, but also on the prejudices of the past.

And now comes the "white paper", the fruit of "long and extensive analysis," submitted to the court of public opinion. What sort of "signals" does it send to East and West? The first signal: none of the key elements of British military policy will undergo any changes whatsoever. The second signal: in comparison with last year the country's military spending not only will not be reduced,

it will even be somewhat increased (by 80 million pounds sterling) and in 1990-1991 fiscal year will amount to 21 billion 223 million pounds sterling. The third signal: no changes at all will be made in the structure of the armed forces or in the current programs of arms development and production. These signals, to put it mildly, not only are not future-oriented, they do not even correspond to present realities. And if we may speak frankly, they seem to come from the past; "cold war" winds are blowing.

Especially conspicuous here is the fact that the "white paper" continues the plan for refitting the nuclear submarine fleet with "Trident" missiles. It proposes that expenses for the maintenance and modernization of nuclear forces be increased in comparison with last year (by redistribution of resources) by 322 million pounds sterling, raising them to 1 billion 480 million pounds sterling. Of course, to be fair we should also note the new element in Great Britain's military policy: the "white paper" now does not rule out the possibility that in the future, at some stage of the negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the U.S., British nuclear forces may be included in the discussion. Until recently such a possibility was completely discounted.

The majority of my English colleagues agree: the government has not lived up to the hopes of those Britains who hoped that the reduced tension in the international arena would allow a reduction in military spending.

How does the English government justify its current position? In a recent interview with the BBC, Thomas King, Great Britain's Secretary of State for Defense, stated: "At present there is serious concern, especially with respect to the situation in Lithuania, and therefore at this stage it would be absurd to rush about exclaiming that peace has already triumphed... so we cannot dismantle our defense and radically change our military strategy until we have a much better idea of the probable final result."

"Disappointing and uninspiring" was how the "white paper" was described by a spokesman for the liberal democrats. The decision of the Tory cabinet not to cut but to increase military spending was criticized by Martin O'Neil, a spokesman on defense matters for the Labor Party's "shadow cabinet." He stressed that this decision once again testifies to the continuing isolation of the British government in a period when everyone believes that it is possible to benefit from the peace opportunities presently opening up."

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

2 July 1990